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ANAT LAPIDOT

**ISLAM AND NATIONALISM: A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN TURKEY (1980-1990)**

SUBMITTED FOR Ph.D, 1995

This thesis addresses the relationship between Islam and nationalism in Turkey in the 1980's. It asks whether the nation-state as a political order was accepted by the ideologists of the Turkish Islamic movement. The research focuses on the examination of three main streams of Islamic political thought in Turkey during that period.

The first stream is the "new Muslim intellectuals" represented by Ali Bulaç. Bulaç rejected any idea of division within the Islamic community, including ethnic division and the nation-state as political division. The basis for this rejection was the theological principle of tevhid, now projected onto the political order. The thesis elucidates Bulaç's work, by analyzing it in the light of liberation theology. The second stream is represented by Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Welfare Party. Erbakan too rejected the nation-state, preferring an Islamic political order or at least the re-establishment of an Islamic empire, this time based on the Islamic Turkic people. The third stream is represented by the creators of the Turkish Islamic synthesis, an intellectual group known as the Aydınlar Ocağı, whose ideology was co-opted by the military regime. This group saw religion as an ideology and a tool for social control. In this spirit, they tried to promote a quietist version of Islamic conservatism. Although they collaborated with the regime and even worked toward its legitimation, they did not reject the possibility of creating an ethnic-based state.


The thesis concludes that although the Anatolian-based nation-state exists in reality, at the ideological level, within the religious community in Turkey, there has been no agreement on its legitimacy. In the 1980's Islam neglected the struggle for the national cause in favour of a struggle for social justice. In a paradoxical way, while the military and later the civilian regime encouraged Islam as a counter-ideology to the left, an ideological alliance evolved between Islamic circles and the left in the name of social justice.

**Islam and Nationalism:
A Study of Contemporary Islamic
Political Thought in Turkey,
1980-1990**

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ANAT LAPIDOT

Submitted for a Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Politics,
University of Durham
1995



15 AUG 1996

No material offered has previously submitted by me
for a degree in this or any other university.

Anat Lapidot, 1995

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To my parents

Finally, I am most grateful to my parents, without whose unfailing support this thesis could not have been written. It is a pleasure to dedicate it to them.

October, 1994

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PREFACE

This thesis addresses the relationship between Islam and nationalism in Turkey in the 1980's. The standard approach used by scholars of modern Turkey in evaluating this relationship examines Islam as it is perceived by the Turkish state. A less emphasized aspect of this relationship is the extent to which the national Turkish state is accepted by Islamic groups. This dissertation concentrates on this neglected issue.

To what extent is the concept of the nation-state, both as a political framework and as an identity, accepted by Turkish Islamic groups? In evaluating this question, I have chosen to analyze the literature of three leading currents of Islamic ideology in Turkey: the views of Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic oriented party, Refah (Welfare) Partisi; Ali Bulaç, whose work represents the new generation of Muslim intellectuals and independent circles; and the Aydınlar Ocağı, a group of professors and intellectuals which shaped the ideology known as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, co-opted as part of state ideology during the 1980's.

On the theoretical level, the notion of a nation-state based on the recognized territory of the current Turkish state is rejected by Erbakan and Bulaç, and is accepted, if only as an option, by the Aydınlar Ocağı. On the other hand, both Erbakan and the Aydınlar Ocağı accept the ethnic connection which calls for the establishment of a greater state based on the Islamic Turkic people. In view of these attitudes towards the Turkish nation-state, it is possible to suggest that the

conclusion presented by researchers such as Toprak, Heper and Özbudun, to the effect that most Islamic groups accept or even promote the nation-state order, is not correct.

The research of this thesis focuses on the 1980's. The starting point chosen is September 1980, when the generals took power for a period of three years, ushering in changes for Turkey in general and for the Islamic cause in particular. The policies adopted during the decade by the military and civilian regimes resulted in a period of relatively free intellectual activity and religious expression which accelerated Islamic revival. The local elections of August 1990 and the general elections in October 1991 mark the end of the period under study. In these elections, the effects of the growing influence of the Islamic movement in the 1980's became apparent.

Methodology

This research makes use of theories and models from the disciplines of sociology, intellectual history and political science. From a methodological point of view, it is assumed that there are causal links between the socio-political historical events and the evolution of ideology. During the period under scrutiny, the authors surveyed responded in their work to the prevailing socio-political climate and in so doing contributed to and reinforced the changes that were occurring. Since the intellectuals of these three trends of thought were active within society and politics, their writings constituted a response to events and a continuous attempt to reshape

them.

Sources

This thesis is based on four different types of sources:

- a. Primary sources, which include books and essays written by the intellectuals themselves.
- b. Secondary sources, such as critiques and analyses of the writers' works, and literature which aids in clarifying the Turkish and Islamic context.
- c. Methodological literature, taken mainly from the discipline of social science and intellectual history.
- d. Personal interviews with Turkish academics, Ali Bulaç, and Nevzat Yalçıntaş, the head of the Aydınlar Ocağı.

Chapter 1 seeks to provide the political and historical background that will facilitate a better understanding of the problems presented above. The main question is: what are the reasons for the strength of the Islamic movement in the 1980's? The intention is not to ask whether Islam is a threat to the state, but rather to examine the reasons for the movement's success in the period surveyed. The main argument presented in this chapter is that the policy of the military and the civilian governments, which tried to create a strong ideological base to counter the ideology of the left, allowed and even promoted "approved" Islamic activities. The chapter deals with the government's ambiguous policies toward Islam and attempts to demonstrate the influence of these policies in different areas of social and political life.

In chapter 2 an attempt is made to define the Islamic movement and trace its various factions. In most current research, the Islamic movement is presented incorrectly as being homogeneous. This confusion is the result of the absence of a correlation between the movement's ideological and organizational structures. In addition, while attention has been given in previous research to the political party as the main representative of the movement, very little work has been done in analyzing the various ideologies.

Chapter 3 addresses the relationship between nationalism and Islam, reviewing the existing literature on this subject. It does not ask whether nationalism and Islam are compatible, which is a question for discussion within a theological context, but emphasizes two points:

- a. that nationalism means a demand for a territorial-based political order.
- b. that the issue of compatibility between religion and nationalism has been discussed by Muslims at the theoretical and the practical levels. The difficulties and the various arguments concerning this issue are demonstrated in the chapter.

The fourth chapter describes the penetration of the national idea into the Ottoman Empire from the 19th century until the 1980's, when the nation-state had been a political reality for sixty years but was still a matter for discussion. The object of the chapter is to show that nationalism and Islamic radicalism were interconnected and developed at the same time. In the Atatürk period, the victory of nationalism forced the Islamists to go underground but not to disappear, so the views of Islam survived throughout this period, and in the 1970's and 1980s pan-Turanian ideology and Islamic thought made something of a return to mainstream politics.

Chapter 5 examines the existence of Islamic intellectual activity in Turkey and its importance. It deals with the central question of rational thinking and cultural stagnation and describes the influence of Islamic ideas, both of Shiite and Sunni origin, on modern Turkish thought. It also asks whether modern intellectual Islamic thought in Turkey presents an alternative to orthodox views.

Chapter 6 deals with the new school of thought of the New Muslim Intellectuals in Turkey. An analysis of the philosophy of Ali Bulaç, the representative of this circle, is presented. The two dominant questions are whether his theory recognises the nation-state concept, and whether his work initiated a new era of thought.

Chapter 7 asks the central question of whether the nation-state is accepted by Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan, as a politician, was mistakenly taken for an Islamic nationalist. My argument is that his ideology is aimed toward creating a greater Turkey, meaning a state based on the Turkic people, and does not accept current political territorial limits. The present political system as a whole is not accepted, though this view is very carefully disguised.

The last ideology to be examined in chapter 8 is that of the Aydınlar Ocağı. This is known as the Türk-İslâm Sentezi, and is the most influential because of its adoption by the state as official ideology. It is based on the integration of the Turkic people into Islam. Here again, the question is whether or not this requires the acceptance of the nation-state principle. I argue that it is accepted, but not as the sole option.

This study closes with a ninth chapter in which my findings will be summarized and some conclusions will be drawn as to the attitudes of our authors

towards nationalism and religion.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION: ISLAM AND THE STATE IN THE 1980's**1.1 Historical Background**

On 12 September 1980 the Turkish army took power by a coup d'état.¹ Martial law was announced in the country's 67 provinces. The reasons for this army intervention, the third since the establishment of the Republic, were many.² Serious, widespread economic and social problems, as well as political instability and street violence, were the main reasons, as the leaders of the new regime later explained.³ Another was what has been described as the danger of Islam.⁴ The government's inability to function properly and to solve the country's problems led the army once again to the conclusion that the only solution was to take power into their own hands. This, as pointed out by William Hale, is connected with their Atatürkist legacy, "which encourages the army to think of themselves

¹ For more reading on military interventions in Turkey see: Ergun Özbudun, The role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics, (Harvard, 1966); Kemal H. Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-civilian relations in Turkey before and after 1980. in: Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980's, (N.Y: de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 137-158; "The Military and Politics in Turkey 1960-1964. A Socio-Cultural Analysis", AHR, 15 (1975), pp. 1954-1683; İsmet Giritli, "Coup of Memorandum: Events and Projects in Turkey", NME, 32 (May 71) pp. 40-42; Ferdinand Hurani, "Democracy and Turkish Military", SRWA, 21, No. 2, (May 1971) pp. 13-14; Mehmet Ali Birand, The Generals' Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980, (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987); William M. Hale, "Military Rule and Political Change in Turkey, 1980-1984", in A. Gökalp, (ed.), La Turquie en transition: disparités-identités-pouvoirs, (Paris: Manisbonne et Larose, 1986), pp. 155-175; G. S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," MEJ, XIX (1965), pp.54-66, 169-176.

² See: Lucille W. Pevsner, Turkey's Political Crisis, Background, Perspectives, Prospects. (The Washington Papers/110 Vol. XII, Washington D.C 1984). Hereafter cited as Pevsner, Political Crisis.

³ Pevsner, Political Crisis, p. 68.

⁴ The danger of Islamic *irtica* (reaction) has been presented by the commanders as the main reason for the coup. However, Birand's analysis and Evren's memoirs would seem to reinforce the idea that the decision to take over was taken much before the Konya rally, and for different reasons, mainly political violence. See Evren's memoirs, Milliyet, 26 August 1980.

as the ultimate guardians of the Atatürk revolution".⁵

During the 1970's, Turkey suffered from serious economic problems.⁶ The foreign trade deficit reached \$4.7 million in 1980. Inflation, which had increased since 1974, reached 140 percent per annum in September 1980.⁷ While prices increased, workers' salaries remained low. The country's foreign debts reached 30 million dollars in 1980, exhausting its external credit. According to official figures unemployment grew from 8.3% in 1979 to 10.6% in 1980, but in reality the latter figure was probably nearer 20%.⁸ The closure of numerous factories as a result of the economic depression led to demonstrations by the unemployed.

The economic situation, especially the high rates of unemployment and the critical housing shortage, aggravated the existing social tension in the country.⁹ This tension was particularly apparent in the larger cities, to which many villagers migrated beginning in the 1950's.¹⁰ In the eastern provinces, where religious and ethnic tensions existed, the feelings of social deprivation aggravated the tense relationship between the Shi'ite minority¹¹ – which generally identified with the underprivileged social strata and tended to follow the

⁵ William M. Hale, "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective" in: Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, op.cit., p. 174

⁶ On the Turkish economic crisis see: Mehmet Özyay, "Turkey in Crisis: Some Contradictions in the Kemalist Development Strategy", IJMES, 15, No. 1 (February 1983): 47-66.

⁷ Mehmet Yaşar Geyikdağı, Political Parties in Turkey. The Role of Islam, (New York: Praeger, 1984). p.133 (hereafter cited as Geyikdağı, Political Parties)

⁸ The massive emigration of workers abroad helped to mask the Turkish unemployment problem.

⁹ Pevsner, op.cit., p.13.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 14-15. See also: Kemal Karpat, The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

¹¹ Shi'ites live mainly in central and eastern Anatolia. One must distinguish between the real Shi'ites in Turkey, mostly confined to a few hundred in Kars province, and the Alevis, whose beliefs and practices are markedly different from those of Iranian Shi'ites.

ideology of the left¹²— and the Sunni majority, which generally held a nationalist right-wing or radical Islamic position.¹³ The radicalization of the views of both sides led to the establishment of militant underground movements, in addition to the Kurdish militant activity, whose adoption of violence and terror brought the armed forces commanders to the conclusion that the existing government was unable to solve Turkey's problems, and that therefore a forceful take-over was needed. The main participants in these underground movements were students and youth, perhaps because they were more sensitive to and therefore more vulnerable to social change.¹⁴ Between 1978 and the coup in September 1980 the situation deteriorated into a state of general anarchy. In these two years more than 5,000 people died and over 10,000 were injured.¹⁵ During the first days of September 1980, twenty deaths a day were reported.¹⁶

The difficult socio-economic and political situation called for strong and decisive leadership. The government, however, was weak and fragile. During the 1970's weak governments succeeded one another with dizzying speed, causing a complete erosion of confidence by the public and the army.¹⁷ None of the big parties managed to win a majority sufficient to create a non-coalition cabinet. The premiership was transferred back and forth between Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the Republican People's Party (RPP), and

¹² Another reason for the leftist leanings is that Turkey's leftist parties in Turkey are secularists, a characteristic valued by any religious minority.

¹³ The Kahramanmaraş incident in 1978 symbolized the state of political and social anarchy aggravated by ethnic division. What started with the shooting of two Alevi teachers by NAP forces ended up with more than 100 dead. On this incident see: MacKenzie, Turkey under the Generals, p.8.

¹⁴ See: Şerif Mardin, "Youth and Violence in Turkey", Archives Europeen de Sociologie, 19, No. 1. (1978).

¹⁵ Pevsner, op.cit., p.1

¹⁶ For details and figures of incidents and the number of killed and wounded between 1977 and the military takeover see: Pevsner, Turkey's Political Crisis, pp.68-70.

¹⁷ Pevsner. op.cit., pp. 67-68.

Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the Justice Party (JP). Their need for the support of radical parties such as the Islamic National Salvation Party (NSP) and for collaboration with parties whose interests conflicted with theirs, caused many disputes and governmental crises. The government found itself paralyzed, forced to lobby for the support of small parties for any move or parliamentary vote. During the seventies, hundreds of essential draft laws for social, economic and administrative reform waited for governmental approval, delayed due to disagreement between the coalition parties. In fact, Demirel's last minority government of 1979-80 ceased to function after the NSP joined Ecevit's RPP in attacking it.¹⁸ The political battles weakened the government, rendering it unable to concentrate on solving the country's serious socio-economic problems.

In this time of governmental instability and weakness as well as activity of radical organizations from left and right, radical religious groups were also active.¹⁹ In addition, Kurdish separatists took advantage of the situation and instigated many terrorist actions.²⁰ This activity peaked in a mass demonstration organized by the Islamic National Salvation Party at Konya on September 6, 1980.²¹ This demonstration, which was later described by the Evren regime as the climax of "shows of force by reactionism,"²² was originally intended as a protest against the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem²³ but turned into a protest

¹⁸ This was done for different reasons. These two different parties which held opposite views joined together against Foreign Minister Erkman, each for its own reasons. Erbakan and the NSP wanted to get rid of liberal ministers while Ecevit hoped that a gradual weakening of the government would lead to its fall. On this affair see: Pevsner, Turkey's Political Crisis, p.82.

¹⁹ Geyikdağı, Political Parties, p. 133.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 136

²¹ Pevsner., p. 82.

²² Ibid., p. 82.

²³ To be more precise it was a reaction to the Israeli Jerusalem Law which officially annexed the city.

against secularism – a constitutional principle of the Turkish Republic. Some of the demonstrators carried slogans in favour of the return of Islamic law to Turkey and placards proclaiming: "Today Iran – Tomorrow Turkey".²⁴ Others carried the green Islamic flag instead of the red Turkish flag. For the army, which was wary of so-called 'Sunni Khumeinism', this was the straw that broke the camel's back.²⁵ Three times during 1980 the army had warned the political leaders, demanding immediate and effective action against anarchy and terror, but their demands remained unanswered. On 12 September, the military acted.²⁶

The army had set itself four main objectives: to suppress terrorism, restore economic growth, prevent anarchy by introducing a new constitution and legal arrangements, and to work out effective arrangements with veteran and new politicians.²⁷

The stated intention, according to General Evren, was to work for:

the re-establishment of the democratic order, for the fundamental principles of Atatürk and Kemalism, and for the political structure which best fits the Turkish nation. They [the army]²⁸ have always done their utmost to facilitate the introduction of new arrangements to restore the democratic system. And when they have completed their mission they have returned to barracks, leaving power in the hands of a civilian administration, in total accordance with the rules of a democratic society.²⁹

In reality, the generals held power for three years. It was only after pressure from the West

²⁴ Pevsner, op.cit., p.82.

²⁵ Geyikdağı, op.cit., p.136. It is possible that in addition to all the above reasons there were also internal army reasons for wishing to take power. It is possible that the high commanders wanted to act before any of the young and radical officers did so on their own. It is also a possibility that the army, which too often had to act in order to create order, desired to return to its main task – that of protecting the country's borders.

²⁶ For the events preceding the military coup see: Birand, op.cit.

²⁷ "Transition to Civilian Governments", p.166.

²⁸ My emphasis: A.L.

²⁹ Evren quoted by Pevsner., op.cit., p.85.

that the army returned to its barracks.³⁰

The first step towards Turkey's return to democracy was taken in October 1981, when a consultative assembly was established to draft a new constitution.³¹ The assembly submitted this constitution to a national referendum which approved it on 7 November 1982 by an overwhelming majority (91 percent).³² The same referendum approved General Evren as president for a seven-year term.

The ban on political parties was lifted in 1983, following heavy domestic and foreign economic and political pressures. However, the formation of new parties was allowed only under the condition that pre-1980 party leaders or members of parliament were banned from politics for up to 10 years. Of the 15 new parties formed, only three were allowed to take part in the elections held on 6 November 1983.³³ Turgut Özal, the leader of the Motherland Party (MP), became prime minister in December 1983.³⁴ His party captured 45.1 percent of the vote and won 211 seats in the 400-seat Grand National Assembly (GNA).³⁵

In a national referendum held in September 1987, a narrow majority approved a repeal of the 10-year ban on political activity.³⁶ Prime Minister Özal, despite having mixed feelings toward lifting the ban, called for immediate elections, the first since 1980 in

³⁰ Beside foreign pressure there were other reasons for the return to civil regime.

³¹ See : John H. McFadden, "Civil-Military Relations in the third Turkish Republic", *MEJ* 39 (1985) pp. 70-73; Andrew Mango, "The Third Turkish Republic", *World Today*, 39,(1983) pp. 32-37.

³² *Defence & Diplomacy*, Turkey Country Profile, (April 1990), Vol.8, No.4.

³³ Hale, "Transition to Civilian Government", p. 170.

³⁴ On the 1983 elections see: Üstün Ergüder and Richard I Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or change in voting patterns" in Heper & Evin, *op.cit.*

³⁵ İlder Turan, "Political Parties and the Party system in Post-1983 Turkey", in Heper & Evin, *op.cit.*, p. 76

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 73

which all parties could participate. In the elections which took place in November, the MP won a majority in the newly enlarged GNA and Prime Minister Özal won another five-year term.³⁷ Local elections held in March 1989 resulted in a serious political setback for the MP, which obtained only 22 percent of the total votes. In November 1989 Özal was elected president and Yıldırım Akbulut, a compromise candidate, was nominated as prime minister. Akbulut remained in power until being replaced by Mesut Yılmaz from the liberal wing of the party in June 1991.[see pp. 18-20]

The army, and later the civil government, attempted to stabilise Turkish politics. But it seems that their main efforts were directed toward the symptoms of the problem and not to the causes. They fought terror and political violence³⁸ and attempted to improve the conditions that created the breeding-ground for violence – economic depression and internal parliamentary political battles.³⁹ But the sources of Turkey's problems ran much deeper, rooted in social problems derived from social and cultural gaps and ethnic differences.⁴⁰

1.2 Government's Policy Towards Islam

After the coup, the generals' attitude towards Islam was ambiguous, on the one hand opposing Islamic radicalism and on the other promoting Islamic activities. As Mehmet Yaşar Geyikdağı puts it:

After the September 12, 1980 intervention, the military leaders took a definite stand against the exploitation of religion. Three new fundamental laws, the constitution,

³⁷ It only received 36 percent of the votes, but because of Turkey's electoral system it obtained 292 seats.

³⁸ Pevsner, *op.cit.*, pp. 88-90.

³⁹ Geyikdağı, *op.cit.*, pp. 137-141.

⁴⁰ Williamson, *op.cit.*, p.141.

the law on political parties, and the law on the election of deputies, strictly prohibit the abuse of religion and beliefs. At the same time, measures, aimed at providing increased religious education to youth, have been taken. It is thought that citizens, with better knowledge of Islam, should be less prone to religious exploitation.⁴¹

Even though the fear of Islamic irtica ("reaction") was one of the major reasons for the military takeover, ironically it was the generals who introduced Islam and adopted it as part of the state ideology.⁴² Moreover, as Feroz Ahmad argues, "there is no doubt that the influence of Islam in Turkish politics and society has increased dramatically under the military government".⁴³

This tendency continued and even increased under the rule of the Motherland Party.⁴⁴ The state ideology introduced by the generals and known as the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis [see chapter 8], was formulated by right wing circles which came together at the end of the 1960's, against the backdrop of the leftist-dominated student riots.⁴⁵ Their conservative theoretical formula was encouraged after the coup by the generals, who hoped to create a counter to the left wing ideology which attracted the nation's youth. It was later adopted by most right wing political figures, who saw in it not just a potential replacement for the leftist ideology, but also its potential for attracting voters.⁴⁶

The influence of this ideology was seen especially in the areas of education and the

⁴¹ Geyikdağı, Op.cit., p. 156.

⁴² Feroz Ahmad, "Islamic Reassertion in Turkey", TWQ, (April 1988), Vol. 10, No. 2, pp.750-769. (p.760)

⁴³ Ibid., p.763

⁴⁴ Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yıldızoğlu, MER, (July-August, 1988). pp. 15-16.

⁴⁵ Süleyman Yalçın, "Türk-İslâm Sentezi", Türk-İslâm Sentezi, (Aydınlar Ocağı, 1987). See also: Binnaz Toprak, Religion as State Ideology in a Secular Setting: The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis", in Malcolm Wagstaff (ed.), Aspects of Religion in Secular Turkey, (University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 40, 1990), pp.10-15, and Gencay Şaylan, İslâmiyet ve Siyaset. Türkiye Örneği, (Ankara: V Yayınları, 1987). p.66.

⁴⁶ On the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis ideology see Chapter 8.

media, the traditional major battleground between Islamists and secularists.⁴⁷ The initial intention of the generals and the civilian governments was to eventually create a peaceful, controlled Islamic ideology, subsequently, a green light was given to religious activities in all areas of public and social life. This trend, described in chapter 2, gave a push to the Islamic movement and grew during the 1980's to the point that the army became alarmed. This alarm was expressed by General Evren in an Istanbul University opening ceremony in 1986:

We have been observing that reactionary and religious organizations have been raising their level of activity under a variety of guises, we are following these developments closely. I would like to urge you all to be vigilant and on your guard. Our universities must become strongholds against religious conservatism and reaction.⁴⁸

The extent to which the post-1980 military regime turned to Islam was revealed in the Rabita affair.⁴⁹ Rabita – the Saudi-based Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islâmi (World Islamic League) is an institution which advocates the establishment of a pan-Islamic federation based on the Shari'a. As Margulies and Yıldızoğlu point out, one would have expected it to be among the last allies sought by Turkey's Atatürkist generals, since it promotes a political system which is anathema to the military and funds publications denouncing Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his secular policies.⁵⁰

Rabita's ties in Turkey came to light when Uğur Mumcu, a Turkish investigative journalist, reported in the left liberal daily Cumhuriyet that a 1981 decree by the military-backed government of former Admiral Bülent Ulusu allowed Rabita to pay the salaries of

⁴⁷ For an excellent account on Islamic influence in these areas see: Uğur Mumcu, Rabita, (Ankara: Tekin Yayınevi, 1987).

⁴⁸ Quoted by Ronnie Margulies & Ergin Yıldızoğlu, op.cit., p.12.

⁴⁹ DT, 21, March, 1987.(pp.1-3); 28, March, 1987. (pp.1-2).

⁵⁰ Ibid.

Turkish religious functionaries in Belgium and Germany.⁵¹ Later, the Motherland Party gave Rabita carte blanche to fund numerous religious organizations and projects in Turkey. At a time when thousands of leftists were being prosecuted for their links to "international communism" and a new constitution prohibited international contacts by labour unions and political parties, the World Islamic League had gained access to the highest reaches of the Turkish government through Saudi links with conservative politicians, among them the family of the later Prime Minister, Turgut Özal.⁵²

Aside from sponsoring the salaries of Turkish imams abroad, rabita also provided money to build a small mosque on the grounds of the parliament and funded a mosque and an Islamic centre on the campus of the Middle Eastern Technical University at Ankara.⁵³ In addition, Saudi Arabia funded a major portion of the university's Arabic language programme.⁵⁴

1.3 MP's Internal Conflict

The government's ambiguous attitude toward Islam and the seemingly contradictory leanings towards the West on one hand and the conservative Islamic world on the other, reflects the different factions within the Motherland Party, and should be seen in this light. The party was based on three factions: the Islamists, the ultra-nationalists, and the faction of

⁵¹ DT, (4 April, 1987), pp.4-5; BBC, (23 March, 1987).

⁵² FT., 23 March, 1987.

⁵³ This project was first proposed by Korkut Özal, and was submitted for President Evren's approval by Yusuf Özal, yet another brother of Turgut Özal, who then headed the state Planning Organization.

⁵⁴ It is interesting that a similar scandal known as Rabita 2 was uncovered in Cyprus in the same year. See: DT, 22 August, 1987. p.4.

the liberals and social-democrats.

The first signs of strain between the different wings of the party appeared in the 1988 party convention when the 'Holy Alliance' forged between the nationalists and the religious fundamentalists within the party organization mounted an attack on the party liberals and indirectly challenged Özal's authority.⁵⁵ The tension increased when Özal was replaced by Yıldırım Akbulut. From the start, Akbulut had inevitably been overshadowed by the president. In fact, he was generally and not incorrectly regarded as a colourless stand-in for Özal, and had probably been chosen for precisely that reason.⁵⁶ Mesut Yılmaz, the former foreign minister who resigned from the cabinet in February 1990, had emerged as the leader of the anti-Akbulut faction within the ruling party. These personal contests were sharpened and complicated by divergent ideological currents in MP. The dominant trend within the party could be broadly defined as pro-Western liberal, attached to the vision of a democratic, modernised and capitalist Turkey which was aligned with the Western powers while preserving its national traditions. Against this was a more distinctly pro-Islamic tendency, which supported the preservation of religious values in education and other spheres of public life.

The 'Holy Alliance' gained strength in November 1989 when four of its members entered the cabinet following Kenan Evren's retirement from the presidency. The cabinet which was set up on 9 November 1989 is a good example of the balance prevailing within the party. Out of 29 members, seven were from the ultra-nationalist wing: state ministers Ercüment Konukman and Mustafa Taşar, Justice Minister Mahmut Oltan Sunğurlu,

⁵⁵ Üstün Ergüder, "The Motherland Party, 1983-1989", in Metin Heper & Jacob Landau (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991). pp.152-169.

⁵⁶ William Hale, "Turkey", Middle East Contemporary Survey, edited by Ami Ayalon, (U.K: West View, 1991). Hereafter: Hale, MECS.

National Education Minister Avni Akyol, Health Minister Halil Sivgin, Industry and Trade Minister Şükrü Yürür and Culture Minister Namık Kemal Zeybek. Five cabinet members were identified as Islamists: state ministers Mehmet Keçeciler⁵⁷, Cemil Çiçek⁵⁸ and Vehbi Dinçerler⁵⁹, National Defence Minister Hüsnü Doğan⁶⁰ and Interior Minister Abdülkadir Aksu.⁶¹ The rest of the cabinet members were from the liberal-social democrat wing.⁶²

The strength of the 'Holy Alliance' had stiffened the resistance of the liberals, of whom Mesut Yılmaz became the main leader. Hence, the ideological battle came to overlap

⁵⁷ Keçeciler was born in 1944 in Konya. He graduated from Konya High Institute of Islam and Ankara University Political Science Faculty. In 1975 he went to Paris to study and returned in 1977 and was elected Konya mayor from the Salvation Party during the 1977 local elections. In 1983 he was nominated candidate for deputy from the MP but his candidacy was vetoed by the National Security Council. A founding member of the MP, Keçeciler was elected Deputy Chairman of the party in the end of 1983. He was a candidate during the by-elections in 1986 but he lost. Keçeciler was elected deputy from Konya in 1987.

⁵⁸ Cemil Çiçek was born in 1946 in Yozgat, graduated from Ankara University Faculty of Law and was one of the founders of the MP. In 1984 he became Yozgat mayor and served in that post until he was elected deputy from the same province in the 1987 general elections on the MP ticket. During the second Özal Government he was appointed Minister of State.

⁵⁹ Dinçerler was born in 1940 in Gaziantep. He graduated from Istanbul Technical University Engineering Department, and completed his master's degree at Syracuse University, USA. He has worked in various public and private organizations, and also in the State Planning Organization. Dinçerler was a founding member of the MP, and was elected deputy for Istanbul in the 1983 elections. He was a minister of Education, Youth and Sports in the first Özal cabinet. In the 1987 elections he was elected as deputy for Hatay.

⁶⁰ Doğan was in fact appointed in 28 October, 1990, after Safa Giray resigned. He was born in 1944 in Malatya, graduated from the Engineering Faculty of Ankara Middle East Technical University, and has worked as a project engineer in the Electrical Works Study Department, as a researcher in the State Planning Organization and as a counsellor at the Ministry of Agriculture. Although Doğan was a candidate for the 1983 elections, he was vetoed by the National Security Council. Doğan was appointed as the Minister of Agriculture in the first Özal government although he was not a member of the Parliament. He became a member of Parliament in the 1987 elections as the deputy for Istanbul.

⁶¹ Born in Diyarbakır in 1944. Graduated from Ankara University Political Science Faculty. Worked as Malatya security director, Kahramanmaraş deputy governor, deputy security director general, Rize governor, mayor and Gaziantep mayor. He entered Parliament as a Diyarbakır deputy in the 1987 general elections.

⁶² The Liberal ministers of that cabinet were: State Ministers Kamuran İnan, Güneş Taner, Isın Çelebi, Mehmet Yazar, İsmet Özarslan, İbrahim Özdemir, Kemal Akkaya and Hüsamettin Oruç, Foreign Minister Ahmet Kurtçebe Alptemoçin; Finance and Customs Minister Adnan Kahveci; Public Works and Settlement Minister Cengiz Altunkaya; Transportation Minister Cengiz Tuncer; Labour and Social Security Minister İmren Aykut; Energy and Natural Resources Minister Fahrettin Kurt; and Tourism Minister İlhan Aküzüm.

the personal rivalries in the party.⁶³ The struggle for power within the MP came to a peak during the party's national convention on 15 June 1991, when the convention delegates elected the party chairman: the person who is virtually certain to take over the premiership if the party is elected. The only effective challenge to Akbulut came from Mesut Yılmaz. Akbulut, who had previously avoided becoming involved in the conservative versus liberal debate, was projected as the standard-bearer of the conservative faction after their leader, Hasan Celal Güzel, failed to win more than a few votes.⁶⁴

In the second round of balloting for the leadership Yılmaz won with 631 votes over Akbulut's 523.⁶⁵ While the reason for this change in power within the party is not the subject of this thesis, suffice it to say that its importance was in the fact that the MP was no longer seen as representing the Islamists. This may have been a factor in the MP's fall in the 1991 general elections.⁶⁶

On 16 June 1991 Akbulut formally resigned as premier. Yılmaz was asked to form a new government, which was announced on 23 June. The new cabinet showed a clear victory for the liberals.⁶⁷ Of its 30 members, only eight were holdovers from the Akbulut government and 18 were new faces. The remaining four were rebels who had resigned from the previous government. Besides the premier himself, the group consisted of Ekrem Pakdemirli, formerly minister of finance, who was named minister of state with special responsibility for the economy; Safa Giray, Doğan's predecessor as defence minister who

⁶³ Hale., MECS, *op.cit.*

⁶⁴ Güzel was involved in a scandal over a romantic affair and lost his credibility during this campaign.

⁶⁵ Voting figures from *Milliyet*, 30 June 1991.

⁶⁶ This is not the only reason for the MP's fall. The main reasons were to do with economic policy.

⁶⁷ The full cabinet list was published in the Turkish press on 21 November 1991.

became foreign minister; and Fahrettin Kurt former minister of energy and natural resources, now another minister of state. Only two of the remaining ministers – Vehbi Dinçerler and Barlas Doğan – were identified as Akbulut supporters, and neither had much influence in the new government.⁶⁸ This change of personnel also symbolised the beginning of the decline of the government's Turkish-Islamic Synthesis policy which characterized the 1980's.

1.4 The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı)

The importance which the governments attached to Islam as a tool of social control was manifested initially in the growth of activities and financial support given to the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA). Since the establishment of the republic, the organization of orthodox Islam has been under the jurisdiction of the DRA.⁶⁹ The DRA was first established on 3 March 1924, and placed under the prime minister. It was founded under law no. 429 which abolished the original Religious and Pious Foundation Ministry and established in its stead two new offices, the DRA and the Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü (Administration of Estates in Mortmain). The 1924 law stated that "religious services must stay out of politics" and provided several means to achieve this goal. The president of the DRA was appointed by the council of ministers nominated by the prime minister. The DRA was charged with managing mosques and other religious institutions permitted by law. It was also responsible for appointing imams (preachers) and müezzins and all other mosque functionaries. The DRA has offices (müftülük) both on the provincial (il) and

⁶⁸ Hale., MECS, op.cit.

⁶⁹ Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey" in Metin Heper & Ahmet Evin, op.cit., p.122.

subprovincial (ilçe) levels. The müftüs controlled the administration of the religious institutions under their jurisdiction and supervised all religious services. The teachers, textbooks, and curricula of all religious schools, were under the supervision of the Directorate General of Religious Education (Din Eğitimi Genel Müdürlüğü), a separate office within the Ministry of Education.⁷⁰

The DRA derived its legal status from certain legal and budgetary developments, and especially from Law no. 633 of 1965. The 1961 and 1982 constitutions gave the department constitutional status. The objectives of the DRA as stated in their publications were:

Executing issues related to Islam's beliefs, worship and ethical values, and enlightening the community about religion, and administering the management of worship establishments.⁷¹

When it was first founded, the DRA consisted of 391 offices of the müftüs in the rural areas. By 1989 the DRA had a budget of TL 232 billion and 84,642 employees. It is in charge of 62,947 mosques in Turkey and 4,714 Koran schools with a total enrolment of more than 155,400 students. The DRA increased its activities enormously in the 1980s, especially from 1984, when power was returned to civilians and the Motherland Party came to power.

The DRA was traditionally used for two main purposes. The first, as a tool for social control and the promoter of the quietist version of Sunni Islam. The second was to give positions to Islamists and conservatives within the parliamentary system to prevent them from joining the opposition. The Motherland Party's exploitation of the DRA to expound the 'quietist' version of Islam is best demonstrated in publications of the

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Turkish Republic DRA publication, (Ankara: DRA Press, 1989).

Directorate of Religious Affairs. One, entitled Our Duties towards Our Homeland and

Nation, attempts to combine religion with nationalism. It states:

The love for homeland comes from faith and the unbeliever has no patriotism in his heart for his homeland.... It is the duty of every person to love his country and nation... and to obey the laws of its government.

And on military service:

Military service is the most honourable duty to the nation and government because in a way it is a tax paid in blood and life... Those who avoid military service by inventing different lame excuses or desert after joining are cowards and traitors as well as sinners.⁷²

This is a good example of the use of religion for the state's own purposes and of the linkage of the religious concept of the sinner to the patriotic concept of the traitor.

1.5 The Prospects of Islamic Reaction ('irtica')

As described in Chapter 4 the prospect of Islamic irtica is not a phenomenon new to the 1980's. However, its appearance then was viewed by many as different and as much more serious than in the past.⁷³ Some researchers, such as Kemal Karpat, even attribute to this 1980's wave of Islamic resurgence the strength to present an alternative to the current regime.⁷⁴ The Islamists' accession to power, he claims, provided the only alternative to a military takeover, since no other force had so much popular support. This was clearly demonstrated, he argued, when the clandestine radio station of the Turkish Communist Party in East Berlin denounced the coup in 1980 and then called on followers of the NSP

⁷² Boratav., in an unpublished paper presented in St. Anthony's College, Oxford University in 1989.

⁷³ Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, "Pluralism Versus Authoritarianism: Political Ideas in Two Islamic Publications" in Richard Tapper (ed.), Islam in Modern Turkey. Religion, Politics and Literature in Secular State, (London: I.B Tauris, 1991). pp.254-279

⁷⁴ K. Karpat, "Turkish Democracy at Impasse: Ideology, Party Politics and the Third Military Interval", IJTS, Vol 1, No 1. (1981) p.1-4

to lead the resistance.

While Karpat may have exaggerated the power attributed to the NSP, his argument did point up an interesting issue, that of the relations between Turkish Islamists and leftists.⁷⁵ During the 1980's there was an attempt to create a dialogue between Islamists, especially figures from the circle known as the 'New Muslim Intellectuals' [see Chapter 6], and several well-known leftist leaders.⁷⁶ A number of former leftists became Islamists, especially during the early years of the Iranian Revolution.⁷⁷ This closeness was expressed not only on the personal level, but also in joint publishing projects and public debates.⁷⁸ The reason for this phenomenon is not the topic of this thesis; however, I would argue that part of the strength of the Islamic movement in the 1980's stems from its appeal to people from the left as well as religious traditionalists. [see Chapters 2 and 6]. The audience of the Islamic movement and the left share common interests. Both movements emphasise not only social equality, living standards, inflation and unemployment, issues which were also important in the 1970's, but also such areas as the environment, women's rights, and human rights, which are new to Islamic discourse. Thus, with the collapse of communism in the late 1980's the Islamic movement was able to offer to the ex-communists an attractive alternative.

So why then, if some parts of the secular community recognized Islamists for the

⁷⁵ See also Arnold Leder, Catalysts of Change: Marxist Versus Muslim in a Turkish Community, (Austin: University of Texas, Middle East Monographs, 1976).

⁷⁶ The most outstanding example of leftist-Islamist relations was those between Ali Bulaç and Murad Belge, from the left.

⁷⁷ Feroz Ahmad, op.cit., p. 763.

⁷⁸ For an example, see an article on a conference entitled Din ve Siyaset, where Gencay Şaylan, a journalist, Murat Belge, a dominant figure in the leftist movement, and Hüseyin Hatemi, a Shi'ite Islamist writer, were among the participants in: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Dergisi, İstanbul, (Şubat, 1987).

first time in Turkish history and wished to collaborate with them, did others see them as such a threat?⁷⁹ There are some possible explanations for this. Ayşe Güneş-Ayata provides four main reasons:

This third wave is radically different from the first two, because the nature of the subject, Islamic revivalism, has changed drastically. First, this new movement in Islam is a result of popular reaction but its proponents intellectualize it much more fiercely than before, so much that they have published up to 45 monthly periodicals. Secondly, they are organized but not necessarily in political parties. Thirdly, although this is one of the rare periods when Islamic groups have been very close to power..., direct attacks on the secular Turkish state, as well as demands for a totalistic Islamic state, have greatly increased. Fourthly, radical Islamic elements are introduced for the first time in Turkish republican history, especially under the influence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.⁸⁰

Güneş-Ayata's first two arguments seem acceptable. The Islamic movement in the 1980's gained an intellectual foundation which not only provided it with a coherent ideological base, but, even more important, gained the respect of the secular audience [see Chapter 4 and 5]. The importance of the second argument, which is that the Islamists are organized but not into political parties, needs to be clarified. It seems that when a radical movement joins the recognized political framework, it must lose some of its militancy and radicalism. This was the case with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the same can also be argued in Turkey's case.⁸¹ Once the Islamic party joined the parliament and moreover a coalition government, as it did in 1975-78, during the 'National Front' government, it had more at stake and was not unlikely to jeopardise its position. But, as part of the government, the party shared responsibility with the other parties for economic, social and

⁷⁹ For an opposing view see: Geyikdağı, *op.cit.*, p.156. Geyikdağı believes that in modern Turkish history, there has been a long-term trend toward secularization despite some short term religious upheavals of a cyclical nature. Present conditions, he argues, as well as future prospects, favour the perpetuation of this trend.

⁸⁰ Güneş-Ayata, *op.cit.*, pp. 254-255.

⁸¹ After the assassination of al-Banna in 1949, the moderate wing of the brotherhood tried to retrieve its legal status by electing as its leader Hasan Ismail Hudaybi, an outspoken opponent of violence and terrorism. However, as Hamid Enayat points out, militants soon took over again. See: Enayat, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

political mistakes it made, causing it to lose popular support. This could have been the main reason for the NSP's decline in the 1970's. It was only after the WP, the continuation of the NSP, lost its position in the legitimate political institution, that is in parliament in 1983, that it regained support.

Güneş-Ayata's suggestion that the Islamic movement was well organized but not part of the recognized political framework, suggests that the government found it difficult to control the movement, and that the more independent and fragmented in its organization the movement became, the more likely it was to adopt radical and original views. The problem is that the more divided the movement the more difficult it was for it to consolidate at election time. An example of such electoral division is the strong approval by the Nurcu members for Demirel, in contrast to the support given by the Nakşibendi to Özal and Erbakan.⁸² Further research on the influence of the tarikats on the electoral system is required.⁸³

Güneş-Ayata's third argument is somewhat confused. She argues, that while the Islamic movement came close to strengthening its ties to centres of power in the 1980's, it nevertheless stepped up its direct attacks on the secular base, and demands for an Islamic state. This, of course, contradicts the last argument since it assumes that there is no connection between the distance of the movement from the legitimate political system and its radicalism. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the generals who promoted Islam, wished to promote only a specific kind of a conservative right-wing Islamic synthesis, which could be controlled, and then only for the purpose of creating an

⁸² It should be noticed that in 1980s Özal received a lot of support from some Nurus, which are now divided. In January 1987, a series of articles on the relations of right wing parties with Islamic groups was published in Cumhuriyet. Nurculuk showed favour towards the DP as early as Menderes's period. for more information on the Nurcu see: Çetin Özek, Türkiye'de Gerici Akımlar ve Nurculüğün İçyüzü, (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1964). pp. 239 300.

⁸³ See Chapter 2, pp. 73-76.

ideological counter-balance to the left. Hence, those who were close to power represented only one ideological element of the movement. Direct attacks on secularism and Atatürkism came from other directions.

Güneş-Ayata's last argument concerns the introduction of new radical Islamic elements which Turkish society had never known before, possibly as the result of the Iranian revolution. The exact elements meant are not detailed in her article. An examination of such possible elements shows that active militant groups such as Hizbu't-Tahrir⁸⁴ or the Islamic Jihad do exist in Turkey.⁸⁵ However, they stayed on the fringes of society and never became a locally-based movement. They were more likely supported by foreign forces. Another example of a foreign-based and supported radical figure is Cemalettin Kaplan, a Khomeini supporter who is considered by the Turkish authorities an ongoing irritation to Turkish security. Kaplan, also known as Hocaoglu, the former müftü of Adana and currently a political refugee in Germany, launched a campaign against the Turkish secular regime. He seeks to bring down the Turkish republic by following Khomeini's strategy of smuggling audio and video cassettes of his sermons into the country to expose the masses to the ideas of the Islamic state. He intends to wage his struggle against secularism through the mosque rather than through a political party. His influence has been estimated by Uğur Mumcu as minimal, with only a few thousand supporters.⁸⁶

Although most terrorist activities were based on foreign support, verbal attacks on the state appeared within the country in the 1980's in different forms. Why in the 1980's?

⁸⁴ According to Hürriyet, the fundamentalist terrorist organization Hizb't-Tahrir has been operating in Turkey for some years. The organization has its headquarters in Jordan where it was established and in operation since 1950. In November 1982 some members and founders of its Turkish offshoot were arrested during a police operation in Ankara. Five of them were Turks and the rest were Palestinians and Jordanians. See: Hürriyet, 19 November, 1982.

⁸⁵ See: Özek, Devlet ve Din, (İstanbul: Ada Yayınları, 1982). pp. 568-569.

⁸⁶ Uğur Mumcu, Cumhuriyet, 10 Feb 1987; Rabita, p.207.

Apart from the reasons mentioned above, the answer may be found in the collapse of the communist regimes at the end of the 1980's. Whereas previously, a different form of political organization such as pan-Islam and pan-Turanianism was regarded as a utopian dream, the collapse of communism supplied the Turks with another option - an Islamic empire based on the Muslims of the former Soviet Union and centred in Turkey. This option became more obvious at the beginning of the 1990's. Such an option is attractive to both ultra-nationalists and Islamists, since the population of the republics is of Turkish origin and Muslim. It is a populist notion, in contrast to the elite view which sticks to the current nation-state system and strongly opposes such a change.

1.6 The Battle over Islamic Education

Traditionally, the most important battlefield between religious and secular views in countries with a pluralistic system is education. This is definitely true for Turkey, where education was the main tool in the secularisation efforts of Kemalism. The beginning of the Islamization process of the educational system was in the 1940's, when the RPP recognised the need to provide training courses for imams and hatips and those were duly provided. The Party allowed the building of İmam-Hatip schools (religious teacher training schools); this continued under the period of the rule of Menderes in the 1950s and on into the 1970s under Demirel.⁸⁷

Since the 1980 coup, enrolment in the İmam-Hatip schools has risen greatly. This was noted by Bill Williamson:

⁸⁷ Details can be found in Nahit Dincer, 1913'ten Bugüne İmam-Hatip Okulları Meselesi. (İstanbul, 1974)

The ostensibly surprising growth of imam-hatip schools since the military coup in 1980 is perhaps best explained as a tactical concession by the army to religious interests hoping thereby to secure their support for the regime and to keep religious education under official control and surveillance. The alternative would have been to see the potential growth of clandestine religious education among outlawed religious movements like the Nurculuk or Süleymancis. By condoning religious education the Turkish government can exert greater control over it.⁸⁸

The Motherland Party has pursued this new educational policy since 1983. It has encouraged the expansion of Koranic schools, which are run by various religious orders patronised, some claim, by the parties in return for political support.⁸⁹ The MP has also supported the growth of state-run schools for chaplains and preachers. It has been argued that the expansion of religious education in the 1980's was so great that it overtook secular education.⁹⁰ The figures, however, do not support this argument. While Islamic education has increased, in comparison with secular education its scale is still relatively small. With the appointment of Vehbi Dinçerler from the Islamist wing of the MP as minister of education, support was given for the teaching of creationist theory instead of the science of evolution in the schools. Dinçerler became famous for his declaration denouncing Darwin's theory of evolution and his instruction to teach the Koranic creation.⁹¹

The table below shows that between 1980 and 1986 the number of religious schools increased by 22 percent and the number of students enrolled in them increased by 34 percent. In 1986 there were 238,025 pupils enrolled in these schools, or 15 percent of the total number of Turkish high school students. In addition, about 1000 Koran schools with an unknown number of students operate in different areas of the country.

⁸⁸ Williamson., op.cit., p.156.

⁸⁹ Feroz Ahmad, op.cit., p.765.

⁹⁰ Ibid.; also see Kenneth Mackenzie, "Turkey Rocked by March of Islam" Observer, (London) 18 January 1987.

⁹¹ Feroz Ahmad, op.cit., p.766.

Table 1

Education in High School Level Muslim Religious Teacher Training Schools (imam-hatip okulları)

<u>Academic year</u>	<u>Number of schools</u>	<u>Number of teachers</u>	<u>Number of students</u>	<u>Number of graduates</u>
1978-1979	506	5289	148690	23699
1979-1980	588	6082	178013	30236
1980-1981	707	7768	201004	28083
1981-1982	710	9212	216864	32512
1982-1983	715	10532	219931	37310
1983-1984	715	11113	220991	46455
1984-1985	716	11334	228973	42294
1985-1986	717	11439	238025	45230

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1987. p.123.

At the end of 1986, when the irtica tehlikesi (the danger of reaction) in the education field became more visible, the Turkish press, alarmed by the threat of the religious fanatics which such schools were thought to produce, began publishing figures on the growth in the number of junior high schools for priests as an indication of the increasing influence of religion.⁹² Devoted to the belief that political change is possible only when the social climate is ready for it,⁹³ religious activists have traditionally sought to increase their influence on education. It was thus only natural that education would become the battlefield between the authorities and religious activists, especially among members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who had the organization needed to operate an educational system. Religious education was supposed to be controlled by the DRA, but since 1980

⁹² See: Nokta, (Istanbul) 24 May 1987.

⁹³ See Chapter 2.

many schools were established by independent organizations such as the tarikats or vakıfs.⁹⁴

November 1986 marked President Kenan Evren's first public reaction to the apparent rise of religious influence, during a speech in Denizli. This followed the news that the Süleymanci tarikat had become very active in this area in an attempt to attract more young students to the brotherhood's schools. In his speech, President Evren said:

pretending to do good, some of the associations are brainwashing young people...If we do not want to lead our children on the wrong path, the administration of these boarding houses has to be handed over to the state.⁹⁵

Three days after Evren's announcement, which contained a hidden criticism of the government's concessionary policy towards Islamic activities, Prime Minister Turgut Özal responded by saying that no danger of reaction existed in Konya or Denizli. The controversy continued for months and came to a head on 8 January 1987, when President Evren, in a speech in Adana, described Islamic fundamentalists as "evil forces" and warned that unless they stopped "their evil initiatives... their heads might be squashed"⁹⁶. On exactly the same day, and not by accident, a ban on the wearing of headscarves by female students was announced. Although this was only a reinforcement of the law on "contemporary dress at universities" dating back to 1981, the ban aroused a storm of protest.

Though the question of wearing headscarves was in this context political, it is also closely connected with the issue of women's rights, the second major issue on which the secularists and the Islamists were divided.

⁹⁴ There is also an interesting activity of Turkish schools run by tarikats, mainly the Nakşibendi, in Uzbekistan.

⁹⁵ Quoted by Margulis, op.cit., p.15.

⁹⁶ Feroz Ahmad, op.cit., p.763.

1.7 Women's Rights

For secularists, the two Koranic verses that have caused a great deal of dismay are 2:228, which says literally that men are a step above women, and 4:34, which clarifies that men are the protectors of women because God gave preference to one over the other and because men provide support for women.⁹⁷ These two verses have become the focus of debates, explanation and interpretation by both Muslims and non-Muslims.⁹⁸ The secularists regard the Islamic view of women as humiliating and unequal. The Islamists have taken an apologetic stand in an attempt to explain the logic of the Koran. In their eyes, women are not mistreated but protected; their role in society is no less important than that of men, but it is different.

The Koranic legal injunctions regarding women centre around three major issues: marriage and divorce, veiling and seclusion, and inheritance and ownership of property. The Islamic perspective on these issues was seen as contrary to the secularist view. According to the Koran, a man may marry up to four wives, so long as he is able to provide for each equally.⁹⁹ He may marry a Muslim, Jewish or a Christian woman.¹⁰⁰ A Muslim woman, however, may marry only one man and he must be a Muslim. Divorce is nearly always initiated by the husband. Technically, it may be initiated by the wife (khul)¹⁰¹ but this

⁹⁷ For a general bibliography on women's position in Islam see: Allman, James (ed.), Women's Status and Fertility in the Muslim World. (N.Y: Praeger Publishers, 1978); Louis Beck and Nikki Keddie, (eds.), Women in the Muslim World. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); Fatima Memissi, Beyond the Veil, (N.Y: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1975); Nadia H. Youssef, "The Status of Fertility Patterns of Muslim Women" in Keddie, op.cit., pp. 69-99.

⁹⁸ Smith, op.cit., p.236.

⁹⁹ Qur'an, surah 4:3.

¹⁰⁰ Surah 5:6.

¹⁰¹ Divorce initiated by the man is called talaq.

requires either a special stipulation in the original marriage contract or specific grounds such as desertion, physical abuse, lack of financial support, insanity or impotence on the part of the husband. In practice khul is not often carried through.¹⁰² Polygamy is forbidden by Turkish law, but in many areas of the country this Islamic custom has continued, and social pressure on women prevents the authorities from enforcing civil law.¹⁰³ In fact, the authorities often pass laws legitimizing the children of Imam marriages (religious marriages not accompanied by civil marriage). Religious marriages are not necessarily polygamous. In many areas imam marriage is practised instead of, or in addition to, the civil registration.

The Koran stipulates that a woman may inherit property but that the inheritance should be only half that of a man.¹⁰⁴ The rationale for this is based on the above-mentioned verse stating that men are in charge of women. The man must spend his own earnings to maintain his female dependents and therefore should receive twice as much from his inheritance.¹⁰⁵

Perhaps the most distressing issue for secularists is the practice of veiling, which symbolises the segregation of women. According to the Koran, women should not be immodestly exposed to public view.¹⁰⁶ While veiling is part of the general phenomenon of the segregation of women, Jane Smith argues that many women maintain that it allows liberation and freedom. The custom, which seems so oppressive to Western observers, at least allows women to observe without being observed, affording them a degree of

¹⁰² Smith, op.cit., p.239.

¹⁰³ Polygamy is not illegal in the sense that the state can punish those committing a 2nd or 3rd marriage by imam, at it is illegal in the sense that state does not recognise it.

¹⁰⁴ Surah 4:11-12, 177.

¹⁰⁵ Smith, op.cit., p. 240.

¹⁰⁶ Surah 24:31.

anonymity.¹⁰⁷ In the modern period Islamic dress is also adopted by Muslim women consciously to demonstrate their identity with Islam and protest what they see as the imperialistic West. In other words, traditional dress is a political symbol as well as a means of achieving personal freedom. It is for exactly this reason that the wearing of the headscarf in the university, the secular heart of Turkey, provoked such a strong reaction from Evren and others. It has been perceived as a political declaration against the secular foundation of the state and a call for the establishment of an Islamic order.

Between 17 and 20 January 1987 spontaneous non-violent demonstrations against the ban on headscarves took place in various Turkish towns. Some demonstrators were detained and later tried. This marked the beginning of a long public battle which ended in an Islamist victory. In May 1987 the Higher Education Committee (YÖK) decided following heavy pressure from the public and from MP members such as Mehmet Kececiler, the party's deputy general-secretary, to allow theology students to wear religious dress. At the end of 1988 an Islamist coalition succeeded in pushing through in parliament a law permitting the wearing of headscarves on university campuses. Evren vetoed the decision, but the parliament overrode his vote and it became law. On 8 March 1989, the Constitutional Court decided by a majority of ten to one not to allow the law's annulment.¹⁰⁸ The court decision was accompanied by protests and demonstrations. Both Demirel and Özal, who backed the Islamists on this issue, offered to hold a national referendum. On 28 December 1989, shortly after Evren ended his term as president, the Higher Education Committee announced the lifting of the ban on headscarves on campuses and all other limitations on wearing them in universities. This was the first major battle to

¹⁰⁷ Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 241.

¹⁰⁸ *Turkey 1989 Almanac*, Turkish Daily News Publications, Ankara 1989, pp.135-136.

be won by the Islamists through existing democratic institutions. This battle became a symbol for both the religious community and the secular. Both saw woman as a symbol for the society, and her headscarf as the political order demanded. The fight itself was seen as a symbol for the possible victories in the battle to establish a non-democratic regime through democratic institutions. The lesson of this battle for the Islamists was that the more liberalized and democratic the society, the easier it is to speak freely against it and to sabotage its core.

1.8 Islam in Turkish Foreign Policy

Traditionally, Turkish foreign policy was formulated in accordance with the country's internal interests and priorities. This meant a commitment to modernization, and socio-economic reforms. Accordingly, an alliance with one of the two superpowers was based not on ideological conviction, but rather on pragmatic needs. Since the 1960's this approach dictated a careful policy aiming to create balanced relations with both the West and the USSR.

Since the mid-1980's, Turkish foreign policy has moved away from its traditional conservative guidelines.¹⁰⁹ According to Selim Deringil, this is due to the direct intervention in foreign affairs by politicians rather than Foreign Office professionals in various Motherland Party governments.¹¹⁰ During this period, Özal advocated a more active foreign policy, even demanding Turkey's active military involvement in the Gulf

¹⁰⁹. Selim Deringil, "Introduction: Turkish Foreign Policy since Atatürk", in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy, New Prospects, (G.B: Eothen Press, 1992). (hereafter cited as: Dodd, Foreign Policy), pp. 1-8.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p.5.

war.¹¹¹ This incident led to a crisis with the chief of staff, Necip Torumtay, and the commander of the Fourth Army, both of whom handed in their resignations.¹¹² The Turkish official line in the 1980's continued to deny that the country had territorial claims beyond its borders. However, it was quite likely that they had some aspirations, mainly in the trans-Caucasia, where in the past it was only the watchfulness of the Soviets that stopped Turkey from pressing its claims. They also had claims in the Aegean sea, where an unfavourable response from the West to any attempt at aggression could be expected. The following was Özal's vision of Turkey's position in the world, as summed up by Deringil:

Turkey, is the only Muslim member of the European club; Turkey, the leader of the Middle East in economic and political terms; Turkey, the leader of the Turkic people in a Soviet Union which is now in disintegration.¹¹³

While the first idea is somewhat pretentious, and the second still a matter for future development, the third idea, that of Turkey as the leader of the Turkic people in the former USSR, is possible, if controversial. These options were well described by C.H. Dodd:

If not to become an integral part of the west, Turkey is forced to consider her position, and even her identity, in a regionalizing, but at the same time, newly nationalist world. With expansion of her Middle Eastern trade, with water conservation policies that greatly affect neighbouring Middle Eastern States, and with the steady revival of Islam prompted from the Middle East, Turkey might seem to have little choice but to opt for a Middle Eastern identity. But there is now a new, and rather heady, prospect on the eastern horizon - that of creating, or as some would have it of re-creating, some form of entity with the Turkic world. There, after all, are to be found the sources of Turkic culture and spirit that is a powerful ingredient in Modern Turkish nationalism, though played down by Atatürk, more western, and more Anatolian, and more practical patriotism.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ On the strategic importance after the war see: Shireen Hunter, "The Post-war Middle East: the Flaws in US thinking", *MEI*, (8 February 1991).

¹¹² Ibid., pp.5-6.

¹¹³ Ibid., p.6.

¹¹⁴ C.H.Dodd, "Preface", in Dodd, *Foreign Policy*, pp. x.

The Motherland Party's policy toward Islam affected the country's foreign policy as well.¹¹⁵ Efforts to improve relations with the Arab countries continued and were intensified. This was not a new phenomenon; as Andrew Mango notes, Turkey had made "friendly noises" to Arab and other Middle Eastern countries since the 1960's.¹¹⁶ These relations are determined by recent historical experience as well as current political and economic interests on both sides.¹¹⁷ The actions taken usually consist of joining Islamic organizations of minor importance and developing trading links with Islamic countries. The motives behind these were mainly to improve Turkey's financial, trade and commercial position, but since the 1970's they have also been aimed at gaining it support in the international arena over such issues as Cyprus and relations with Greece.¹¹⁸ Gestures such as Turkey's recognition of the state of Palestine in October 1989 were intended to help achieve this goal.¹¹⁹

While Turkish relations with the Muslim world have been friendly since the 1960's, Özal placed stronger emphasis on the religious factor than previous governments. The critical break in foreign policy appears in the mid 1980's when for the first time, a Turkish prime minister openly attended Friday prayers as well as performing the pilgrimage to

¹¹⁵ For more information on Turkish foreign policy see: Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, (London: Pinter or Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991) ; Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950-1974, (Leiden: Brill, 1975); Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

¹¹⁶ Andrew Mango, "Turkish Policy in the M.E; Turning Danger to Profit" in Dodd, Foreign Policy, pp.55-69

¹¹⁷ William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis", paper submitted to the Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association, University of Warwick, 16-18 December 1991.

¹¹⁸ On problems with relations with Syria see: David Kushner, "Conflict and Accommodation in Turkish Syrian Relations", in Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv, (eds.), Syria under Assad, (London and Sydney, Croom Helm 1986).pp. 35-104.

¹¹⁹ . Mango, op.cit., p.66.

Mecca.¹²⁰ Özal's pilgrimage caused alarm in the secularist community. "Turkey is secular but I am a Muslim", he declared, expressing his strong belief both in Islam and in the current political order.¹²¹ Özal's actions and policy resulted in stronger than ever connections with the Islamic world, even though his intention may have been different. This was clearly evident in the economic field as demonstrated below.

1.9 'Islamic' Economic Activity

The resurgence of Islam has manifested itself on the economic front as well.¹²² This is a sensitive issue for the secularists, who fear the possibility of dependency on Islamic countries followed by intervention in Turkey's domestic politics or society. The most far-reaching attempts to transform the economic system to conform with Islamic values have taken place in Iran and Pakistan. In the case of Turkey, the idea of an "Islamic economy" was introduced in the 1980's. Broadly speaking, the term "Islamic economics" refers to a complete system prescribing patterns of social and economic behaviour.¹²³ It covers a wide range of issues such as property rights, the incentive system and allocation of

¹²⁰ Deringil, *op.cit.*, p.8.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² For general information about the idea of an "Islamic Economy" see: Muhamad Abdul-Rauf, "The Islamic Doctrine of Economics and Contemporary Economic Thought", in Michael Novak (ed.), Capitalism and Socialism: A Theological Inquiry, (The American Enterprise Institute for Public Research, Washington, 1978). pp.129-151. Khurshid Ahmad, (ed.), Studies in Islamic Economics, (The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, U.K. 1980). Islam and the New International Economic Order. The Social Dimension, Documents presented at the symposium, International Labour Organization, Geneva, (7-10 January 1980).

¹²³ Mohsin S. Khan, "Islamic Interest-Free Banking. A Theoretical Analysis" in: Mohsin S. Khan and Abbas Mirakhor (eds.), Theoretical Studies in Islamic Banking and Finance, (U.S: The Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1987). pp. 15-35. (p.15.)

resources.¹²⁴ The overriding objective of the system is social justice and specific patterns of income and wealth distribution; economic policies are designed to achieve these ends.

The question of riba¹²⁵ became the central issue in Islamic banking.¹²⁶ The Islamic restriction against interest is quite explicit:¹²⁷ transactions based on riba are strictly prohibited in the Koran.¹²⁸ Accordingly, the Islamic economic and banking system has to operate within a framework which does not permit interest. However, while interest is not permitted, trade and profits are.¹²⁹ Instead of using the interest system, Islamic banking uses profit and loss sharing,¹³⁰ a financial mechanism linking investment capital to industry and commerce without the use of interest. Essentially it is a form of equity capital where lenders have a share in the profits of the borrowers, if any, and are also liable to share in the losses incurred during normal business practice. A share in the profits rather than a specific rate of return is specified in the contract.¹³¹

According to Yeşilada, during the 1980's Islamic organizations gained control of

¹²⁴ Ibid., p.16.

¹²⁵ Riba is the Arabic term for interest. See: R. Levy, The Social Structure of Islam. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p.256.

¹²⁶ Aside from the issue of a zero interest (riba) rate, Islamic economics also offers guidelines on such issues as tax policy and the orientation of government expenditures.

¹²⁷ Khan, op.cit., p.18.

¹²⁸ II:275.

¹²⁹ Khan, op.cit., p.20.

¹³⁰ See: N.U Haque, and Abbas Mirakhor, Optimal Profit-Sharing Contracts and Investment in an Interest Free Islamic Economy, manuscript, (1986). Z Haque, "Riba, Interest and Profit" Pakistan Economist, May 24, 1980, pp. 14-35 and May 31, 1980, pp. 13-30.

¹³¹ Shahrukh Rafi Khan, "An Economic Analysis of the PLS model for a Financial Sector" in Mohsin and Mirakhor, Theoretical Studies. pp. 107-139., p. 107.

financial institutions in Turkey as a result of government policy.¹³² The roots of this policy are to be found in the economic instability in the country caused by the oil crisis in 1973. In an attempt to close the large deficit created by the crisis, the Turkish treasury took short-term commercial loans beginning in 1974. In 1979 the government was unable to meet its loan repayment schedule. All attempts to stabilize the economy failed, and in 1980 Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel declared a new austerity policy, recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was referred to as the '24 January measures'. It called for a transition from a centralized economy to a free market system, free competition and encouragement of foreign investments. A special governmental authority to encourage and authorize foreign investment was established. Foreign investment during 1980-86 was around \$874.1 m., compared with \$228 m. during the entire 1954-80 period. Turkey's motivation for encouraging this investment was purely economic. However, as Yeşilada suggests, the Saudis also had an ideological motivation; they sought to strengthen relations among Islamic countries through the Saudi-based Muslim League Rabitat al-'Alam al Islâmi.¹³³ At the fourth conference of ISEDAK, the Committee for Commercial and Economic Coordination, President Kenan Evren was appointed chairman. The organization acted to widen co-operation between member countries and initiated what was called the 'Islamic economic-political age'. In 1983 the Turkish government revised the government regulations designed to encourage foreign investment.

The strength of the Motherland Party under Özal encouraged the rise of a new "Islamic sector" in the Turkish economy. The new Islamic enterprises enjoyed close

¹³² Birol Ali Yeşilada, "Islamic Fundamentalism in Turkey and the Saudi Connection" *Africa/Middle East*, No. 8. 988-89). Also see: David Baldwin, "Islamic Banking in a Secularist context" in: Malcolm Wagstaff, Aspects of Religion in Secular Turkey, (University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Occasional Paper 0.40, 1990) pp. 22-39.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 2.

relations with circles in the ruling party and benefitted from Özal's liberalization policy.

After the 6 November 1983 elections, two financial institutions were established: a branch of the Faisal Finance institution, considered to be the wealthiest Islamic bank in the Middle East and controlled by Kuwait, and the Al-Barka Türk, established by Shaykh Salih Kamil, a Saudi businessman. They were the dominant factors in the rapid growth of the Islamic sector in the Turkish economy, benefiting from tax breaks and many other incentives not given to other foreign investors.¹³⁴ The three Özal brothers: Turgut, the prime minister; Yusuf, a state minister, and Korkut, an advisor to the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), played an important role in the growth of Islamic (especially Saudi) capital flow to Turkey.¹³⁵

Yeşilada shows clearly the one-way flow of capital from Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries into Turkey's Islamic institutions. Foreign financial institutions investing in Turkey clearly received financial aid from large bodies such as ARAMCO, the Saudi-American oil company. Yeşilada estimates these investments in the millions of dollars.¹³⁶ The three most important financial institutions active in Turkey, are the rabita, DAMAA, and Al-Barka. Rabita supplied financial aid to the Turkish National Student Organization and the Islamic Student Organization at Istanbul University. It also financed the building of mosques throughout the country.¹³⁷ Two of the dominant figures in this organization are ex-MP's Salih Özcan and Ahmet Paksu. The second important institution is the Geneva-

¹³⁴ Sabri Sayn, "The Prospects for Islamic Fundamentalism in Turkey" published by the Rand Corporation, (July 1989). p. 29.

¹³⁵ Baldwin argues that there is a rapid growth in Islamic banking, indicating a demand for Islamic banking services. Baldwin, op.cit., P.36.

¹³⁶ Yeşilada, pp 4-6.

¹³⁷ Uğur Mumcu, Rabita, op.cit.

based Dar al-Maal al-İslami (DAMAA) bank, actually a group of 55 Islamic banks.

Turkish personalities such as former member of the neo-fascist Nationalist Action Party Halil Sivgin, who later joined the MP, play a role in this organization as well. The third financial institution is Al Barka, which has branches in Saudi Arabia, London, Tunis, Sudan, Thailand, Mauritania, Bangladesh, Jordan and Denmark. The Turkish branch is based on a partnership between the international Saudi group and the Özal and Topbaş families.

It is hard to accept Yeşilada's argument that Saudi Arabia invested in Turkey in order to strengthen the fundamentalists' bases in the country.¹³⁸ However, it can safely be asserted that the Topbaş, Özal and Peniz families, which controlled this activity, were not involved only in financial affairs, but used this power to realise social and economic aims in the spirit of Islam, usually through the institution of the Vakf. The Topbaş family established the Bereket Vakfı, which granted religious scholarships. The Özal family set up the Ozba Vakfı, the principal aim of which was to build mosques and Koran schools. The money passed through the hands of a complex web of key figures in the government and governmental institutions, including the prime minister's office.

Since 1984 the scale of Saudi and Iranian capital flow to Turkey increased dramatically. [see table below.] The government's policy of achieving a synthesis with Islam with regard to the economy as well as ideologically led to a certain dependence on foreign Islamic funds.¹³⁹ However, an analysis of the data shows that although the flow of Islamic funds to Turkey increased dramatically in the 1980's, its relative importance to the Turkish economy remains minimal, since the Turkish economy was heavily dependent

¹³⁸ Yeşilada, p. 6.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p.10.

on Western investments, as the tables below show.

Foreign Investments in Turkey

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number of Firms</u>			<u>% increase 1984-1986</u>
	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	
USA	37	61	74	100
West Germany	47	59	92	92
France	6	7	9	50
Great Britain	20	33	43	110
Holland	10	18	24	140
Switzerland	51	63	77	39
Italy	7	11	11	56
Austria	5	8	8	60
Consortium	23	37	50	115
<hr/>				
Saudi Arabia	1	28	46	4500
Iran	1	10	22	2100

Source: State Planning Organization Statistics for 1985-86.

Foreign Capital invested in Turkey (in millions of dollars)

<u>country</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>
I. EEC Countries	79.76	105.25	201.1	383.78
II. Other OECD Countries	46.2	90.69	215.92	325.4
III. Islamic Countries	22.06	96.74	35.44	50.95

Source: State Planning Organization, Ankara, 1989.

1.10 Government Response to Islamic Radicalism

At the same time that the government sought to encourage a degree of Islamic awareness, it also took legal actions against many religious activists. It wanted control over the expression of Islam in Turkey and acted to suppress independent religious activity. Various statutes were enacted to curb religious propaganda.¹⁴⁰ Articles 14, 24 and 68 of the 1982 Constitution, Article 163 of the Turkish Criminal Code and various articles of the Political Parties Law of 1983 and the Law of Associations of 1983 forbid the use of religion for political purposes.¹⁴¹

Anti-secular movements have been prosecuted under article 163 of the Turkish penal code since its introduction in 1926.¹⁴² But from 1983, and especially between 1987 and 1991, the number of people prosecuted for their religious activities increased substantially.¹⁴³ Though some of these trials resulted in acquittal, many defendants who did not use or advocate violence were sentenced to prison terms.¹⁴⁴ Among those charged were members of Islamic brotherhoods, political parties, participants in demonstrations and other protesters such as journalists and writers.¹⁴⁵ Most activists were tried under Article

¹⁴⁰ Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion", in Heper and Evin. op.cit., p.122.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p.122.

¹⁴² This article has never been used to prosecute those using violence and these should not be confused with members of militant Muslim groups operating in Turkey and other countries. See: Türk Ceza Kanunu no.765: English translation published as the Turkish Criminal Code (South Hackensack NJ., Fred B. Rothman and co: London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1965)

¹⁴³ At the Istanbul State Security Court alone 44 trials of 128 defendants began during the first seven months of 1987.

¹⁴⁴ Feroz Ahmad, op.cit. p. 752.

¹⁴⁵ See: Christian Rumpf, Laizismus und Religionsfreiheit in der Türkei, (Germany: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Ebenhausen, 1987).

163 (abolished in 1991), which prohibited "leadership and membership of an association for the purpose of converting the state to religious principles and beliefs, or propaganda for this purpose".¹⁴⁶

In January 1983 the sentences for these offences were increased substantially and they provide for a maximum prison term of 15 years. A draft amendment to the Turkish Penal Code published in February 1987 allowed for life imprisonment for anyone convicted of leadership in more than one of the Islamic organizations.

Article 24 of the 1982 constitution of the Turkish Republic guarantees freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction. Restrictions of this freedom refer mainly to the provisions of former Article 163 in the TPC, which stated that:

a. whoever, contrary to laicism, establishes, organizes, regulates or administers associations for the purpose of adapting, partially or entirely, the basic social, economic, political or judicial orders of the state to religious principles and beliefs, shall be punished by heavy imprisonment for eight to fifteen years.¹⁴⁷

b. whoever becomes a member of such associations, or attempts to persuade others to become members of such associations shall be punished by imprisonment for five to twelve years.¹⁴⁸

c. whoever, contrary to laicism, makes propaganda or suggestions for the purpose of adapting, partially or entirely, the basic social, economic, political or judicial orders of the state, or for the purpose of obtaining and installing a political aim or political benefit by making use of religion, religious feelings or things accepted as sacred by religion, shall be punished by heavy imprisonment for five to ten years.

d. Whoever makes propaganda or suggestions for the purpose of personal influence or benefit as sacred by religion, shall be punished by heavy imprisonment for two to five years.

¹⁴⁶ After the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1924 a new Penal Code was introduced in 1926. It went through various changes, including the addition of new articles. Article 163 of the Turkish Penal Code was originally a separate law but was later integrated into the Penal Code.

¹⁴⁷ Formerly two to seven years.

¹⁴⁸ Formerly not less than six months.

e. The punishment to be imposed on persons who commit the foregoing acts within government offices, municipalities, or within economic enterprises with its capital belonging partially or entirely to the state, trade unions, workers' enterprises, schools or institutions of higher education as civil servants or employees, shall be increased by one-third.

f. where the act mentioned in paragraph 3 and 4 of this Article is committed by means of publication, the punishment shall be increased by one half.

Article 163 did not refer to the means that might be used to establish a fundamentalist regime and the legislation never included specific mention of the need to punish acts of violence committed in the attempt to change the secular nature of the state. The Turkish Penal Code has other provisions covering violent attempts to change the constitutional system, namely Article 146 which provides for the death penalty for this crime. Law No. 2787 of 22 January 1983 increased the sentences for offence under Article 163 substantially. Membership of a fundamentalist organization, which formerly carried a minimum sentence of six months, was made to carry a sentence of five to twelve years. The punishment for leadership of such an organization, formerly a prison sentence of between two and seven years, was increased to an eight to fifteen years' sentence. The distribution of anti-secular propaganda carried a sentence of between one and five years until 1983, when the sentences was increased to between five and ten years.

On 12 April 1991, the Motherland Party government took an important step when it issued the "Law for the Struggle against Terrorism". The law, which was part of the government's hard line toward Kurdish separatism, contained an addendum stating that sections 140, 141, 142 and 163 of the Turkish Penal Code would be withdrawn.¹⁴⁹ This action indicated the government's intention to liberalise individual freedom of expression,

¹⁴⁹ Törör Mücadele Kanunu. No.3713, section 23 (c): text published in Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete) No. 20843, 12 April 1991.

but political parties did not necessarily benefit from this.¹⁵⁰

1.11 Conclusion

In September 1980 the military took power. The primary reasons given for this take-over were to end the political violence and terrorism which had increased throughout Turkey. However, after the coup the danger of Islam was presented by the military as one of the main reasons. After three years, in December 1983, the army returned power to civilian hands. During their rule, the commanders introduced Islam as a counter-ideology to the leftist ideology, which traditionally attracted youth, in hopes of encouraging a conservative, peaceful and apolitical version of Islam.

The Motherland Party, which came to power in 1983 with the end of military rule, continued to pursue this policy and to encourage more religious activities. Turgut Özal, the prime minister and, from 1989, president, sought to create the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, but did not neglect the West. The main tool for the introduction of this version of Islam was the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which had been used for this purpose since its establishment in 1924. The government's intention was manifested mainly in the areas of education, foreign affairs and the economy. In all these areas figures show a substantial increase in Islamic activity encouraged by the authorities. However, Islamic education and the Islamic economy played a relatively modest role. In addition, the policy was to encourage the quietist version of Islam, and any version of radicalism judged overly independent was suppressed. Between 1980 and 1991 many Islamic radicals were arrested and judged mainly under articles 163 of the TPC.

¹⁵⁰ Hale, MECS.

The government's policy was not completely united and determined. It seems to have resulted from an internal contest within the Motherland Party. The party was divided into three main wings; the liberal, Western-oriented wing led by Mesut Yılmaz; the conservative Islamist wing led by Dingerler, and the ultra nationalist wing, led by Hasan Celal Güzel. The fight between the different wings ended in 1991 with the victory of the liberals. It is likely that many Islamists, then transferred their votes to other parties, particularly the Welfare Party.

The Welfare Party did not play an important role in Turkish politics during the 1980's. This changed in 1991 when the party, through an alliance with Turkes, won 16.7 per cent of the votes and 61 seats in the general elections of 20 October 1991, becoming the third largest party in parliament. The victory of the liberal wing of the MP at the expense of the Islamists may have contributed to the change. In addition, the Islamic revival during the 1980's, social and economic problems, and the fall of the leftist movement, which traditionally attracted many from the underprivileged layers of society, all made it possible for the Welfare Party to regain strength.

The strength of the Islamic movement was not only translated into electoral power. In 1989 the Islamists won their first political battle using democratic arguments and tools. This was the battle over the right of women to wear headscarves in the universities. In addition, many more achievements were made in the fields of education and the economy.

During the 1980's many researchers were occupied with the question of Islamic reaction. To many of them the danger of Islam seemed more serious and real than in the 1960's and the 1970's. There were several reasons for this. First, the Islamic movement now had an ideological and intellectual base which gave the movement legitimisation and acknowledgment within the secular community. Second, was the growing possibility of collaboration with the leftist movement and the creation of common dialogue and interests

between the two. The movement is fragmented in its organization and therefore difficult to control. Attacks on secularism and on 'Atatürkism' became more frequent and pointed. The Iranian revolution made real the potential result of Islamic radicalism, both for the secularists, and more important, to the Islamists. The collapse of the USSR made the pan-Turanian option more attractive to many Muslims than the Anatolian based nation state.

The 1980's can be characterized as a period of Islamic revival taking various forms, not necessarily blessed by the government. The intention was a creation of a new ideology which would act as a "social cement" and would attract youth. Islam, then, was to be a tool of social control. The result, however, was very different. The next chapter will analyze the nature of the Islamic movement in the 1980's and its new aspects.

Chapter 2

THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT**2.1 Views and Attitudes**

Since its establishment the state of Turkey has been struggling with the problem of creating the correct balance between a secular society and a religious one. This struggle has sometimes become violent and at other times has been waged in secret. Researchers and other observers, both inside and outside Turkey have viewed and analyzed this struggle according to their own beliefs. These have been expressed in three distinct waves of literature. The first began in the 1950's, when it was thought that the shift to a multi-party regime led to an increase in the importance of the Islamic factor in Turkish politics.¹ This increase was the result of the battle between the two parties, the Republican People's Party (RPP), and the Democratic Party (DP), which competed for the popular vote.²

The second wave of writing began in the 1970's with the establishment of the Islamic oriented National Salvation Party (NSP), and interest in it increased during its short lived participation in the coalition government in 1974.³ For a brief period the religious party seemed to achieve a significant breakthrough in the country which was seen as the

¹ See; C. Dodd, Democracy and Development in Turkey, (Beverly, N.Humberside, Eothen Press, 1979), pp.76-77.

² Examples of the first wave of literature are: Howard Reed, "Revival of Islam in Secular Turkey", MEJ, Vol 8 No 3, (Summer 1954), pp. 267-282; Bernard Lewis, "Islamic Revival in Turkey", IA, Vol 28, No 1, (January 1952), pp. 38-48; Paul Stirling, "Religious Change in Republican Turkey", MEJ, 12 (Autumn, 1958), pp.395-408; Lewis Thomas, "Recent Development in Turkish Islam" MEJ, Vol 6 No 1 (Winter 1952), pp. 22-40. See also Karpas's fears, expressed in 1959, that nationalism in Turkey is in danger because of Islam. K. Karpas, Turkey's Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959)

³ See Jacob Landau, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey", AAS, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1976; Ahmet Yucek6k, Türkiye'de Örgütlenmiş Dinin Sosyo-Ekonomik Tabanı, (Ankara University, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayınları, 1971); Şerif Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution", IJMES, Vol. 2 (1971), p. 206; Nur Yalman, "Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey", Daedalus, (Winter 1973), 139-68.

symbol of the secular regime. In the 1973 elections, the NSP won 12 percent of the vote to become the third largest party, after the RPP and the Justice Party (JP), the latter being the continuation of the historic DP.⁴ In 1974, NSP leader Necmettin Erbakan became a deputy prime minister under Bülent Ecevit, the RPP leader. One year later, in 1975, he was appointed as a minister in Süleyman Demirel's coalition government, a move which gave his party more power and control in such areas as public education and communications. This increase in political power, in addition to the general political and social instability of the time, gave rise to growing fears regarding the strength of the Islamic movement and the roots of Islam in Turkish culture and society.

The third wave is that of the 1980's.⁵ The Iranian revolution, the spread of Islam within Turkish communities abroad and within Turkey itself, the relatively open public debate on Islamic issues encouraged by the government, as well as numerous other indications that Islamic activity was already widespread in a broad range of areas, all contributed to the heightened interest in the role of Islam in Turkey. This interest increased further in 1985. In January a new law proscribing the defamation of Allah, Muhammad and the Islamic religion was accepted. In mid-1985 prayer rooms were built inside government

⁴ A continuation party is a Turkish political phenomenon which should be noted. The legal limitation introduced by the military on former political parties with the intention to solve the problem of political anarchism and corruption in most cases was unsuccessful and the same parties were re-established under different names.

⁵ See: Dankwart Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-55" in: Richard Frye (ed.), *Islam and the West*, (The Hague: Mouton, 1987), pp. 69-107; Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), p. 57.; "Islamist Intellectuals of the 1980's in Turkey", *CTT*, No. 62 (1987); Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "Religion in Contemporary Turkish Society and Polity", *CTT*, No. 58 (1986); Metin Heper, "Islam, Polity, and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective", *MEJ*, Vol. 35 (1981), pp.345-; Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Secularism in Turkey", in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, (eds.), *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, (London: C.Hurst, 1981); "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey", in James P. Piscatori, ed., *Islam in the Political Process* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983); "Culture and Religion towards the Year 2000" in *Turkey in the Year 2000*, Turkish Political Science Association, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1989); Sabri Sayarı, "Politicization of Islamic Retraditionalism", in Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, (eds.), *Islam and Politics in The Middle East* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp 122-123; İlder Turan, "The Evolution of Political Culture in Turkey", in Ahmet Evin, (ed.), *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change*, (Leverkusen: Leske Verlag, 1984) pp. 105-108.; Emelie Olson, "Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: the "Headscarf Dispute", *AQ*, 58 (4), 1985.

ministries and parliament. In June Turkish newspaper readers were shocked to discover that a group of army officers calling themselves the "the Patriotic officers" circulated a memorandum arguing that Turkey protected the interests of the US rather than those of Islam.... and that like Israel, Turkey had become a front-line state against the Islamic nation.⁶ The same year the study of Arabic as a foreign language was introduced into the high school curriculum.⁷

The main question underlying this literature was, and remains, the cause of Islam's continuation as a dominant factor in Turkish society, both in its social and its political life. Many attempts have been made to understand the relationship between democracy, modernization, industrialization, political stability and political culture within Islam, in order to find an adequate explanation for the success of Islam in gaining such importance late in the twentieth century. The obvious assumption behind all these attempts was that this situation is an abnormal or unnatural one in the modern era. With this in mind, efforts were directed toward locating the faults of society and in the regime in order to offer an explanation to the resurgence of Islam. Others chose a different approach and sought to downgrade the importance of Islam and its role in Turkish society.⁸

The most favoured theories during the period from the 1950's were the modernization theories.⁹ The assumption behind these was that the Middle East is in a

⁶ Briefing, 8 December 1986.

⁷ Ha'aretz, January 1987.

⁸ See: Binnaz Toprak, "Is there a danger of Khomeinism in Turkey?", a paper presented at a Tel-Aviv conference on Islamic Revivalism, July 1987.

⁹ On modernization theories see: G. Almond and J.S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of Developing Areas, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Donald Cruise O'Brien, "Modernization, Order and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal: American Political Science 1960-1970", JDS, (1989) pp.351-377; D.E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965; H. Bernstein, "Modernization Theory and the Sociological Study of Development", JDS, Vol. 7, No. 2, (January 1971); S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968); "The Change to Change" in Comparative Politics, Vol. 3 No. 3, (April

process of transition, from a traditional society towards a modern one. A classic example of modernization theory is that proposed by Daniel Lerner in his The Passing of Traditional Society.¹⁰ Lerner suggested that there are two preconditions for modernity: the development of individuals who can 'empathize' and the balanced development of the society. Turkey, by his standards, was relatively more successful than other Muslim countries in fulfilling these preconditions. Hence, he believed, political stability was more likely. While Lerner's theory of the necessity of a 'mobile' person for a modern society, and that such a person can only be developed in the conditions he mentioned, such as urbanization, and their like may be accepted, it hardly proves that such a person will necessarily develop tendencies towards democracy, and not towards other political systems, such as fundamentalism. Lerner and other writers who believe in modernization theories assumed that the willingness to change necessarily means adopting secularism and rejecting religion. This assumption has proved to be wrong. The contemporary fundamentalist movement is seeking change, but it can not be described as secularist.

While these modernization theories have succeeded in understanding the connection between motivation and change, they have failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of the direction of the change or to show a correlation between modernity and stability, democracy or secularism.

Many observers of the Middle East, especially in the 1960's, assumed that the religious problems were caused by the lack of democracy. They argued that it explained the existence of radical ideas and activities, Islamic, Marxist or other. In reality, a necessary connection between democracy and progress, whether economic, social or in the area of

971).

¹⁰ Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, (New York: Free Press, 1958).

secularism can not be proved in the Middle East. On the contrary, it was under dictators such as Atatürk in Turkey and Reza Shah of Iran, that the level of education and of economic and industrial development was highest - and higher than the level of development in countries with a more democratic environment. Egypt, for example, was much less developed than either Iraq or Syria, but it was much more democratized. In the same way, the success of Islam cannot be explained by measuring its degree of democracy. In fact, as will be demonstrated below, it is democracy that was used best by the contemporary Islamic movement and provided a favourable liberal environment for its development.

As in the case of democracy, the argument that political instability has any relation with the rise of Islam is doubtful. It is, nevertheless, fair to claim that democracy or political instability are tools which are used by Islamic activists, although they do not explain the phenomenon itself.¹¹ The theory that democracy brings peace and that political stability necessarily results in peaceful regimes is an illusion, as the recent history of the Middle East and of other areas of the world suggests.

Another approach for understanding Islam was that of "political culture". Cultural heritage, it was argued, values local concepts and images of the past and present and must be taken into account if we are to understand the Middle East. Such attitudes, though claiming to be progressive, in fact led to the pessimistic views of researchers such as Elie Kedourie and Ernest Gellner, who saw the faults of societies in their cultural heritage.¹² While the democracy attitude saw a continuation of progress, the "cultural attitude" anticipated almost no change for the Muslim world.

¹¹ See, for example, the radical Islamic activity in Turkey during the 1977-1980 political crisis.

¹² E. Gellner, Culture, Identity and Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

The strength of Islam in Turkey, and probably in other areas of the Middle East, cannot be explained by theories such as those presented above. If there is an explanation, it is not to be found in the lack of democracy or political stability, or even purely in the cultural heritage. The same political and social-cultural conditions allowed the rise of many other ideologies and movements. At the same time, and under the same conditions, leftist, secularists, fascists, nationalists and Islamists emerged in Turkey. These theories fail to show why one person should adopt Marxist ideas and another Islamic beliefs. It is also doubtful if a further study of the Islamic heritage will explain this phenomenon. The Islamic heritage does not have the pluralistic rational, humanistic foundation which is necessary for a democratic society. In the Middle East, in a paradoxical way the political culture turns democracy into self-defeat. Or as cynical Thomaso in La Scuola Dei Dittatori of Ignazio Silone explains this phenomenon:

In the modern period the death of Democracy is in most cases, a camouflaged suicide.... The art of killing the modern democracy with the same equipment that democracy created has become perfect.¹³

The third wave of literature is that of the 1980's. The source of fear for the writers this time was what seemed to be an attempt by the regime, whether the generals from September 1980 until 1984, or Özal's governments thereafter, to create an Islamic, right-wing ideology as an alternative to the leftist ideologies widespread among students and youth, especially in the big cities. The leftist ideologies and activities were traditionally perceived as a threat to the country's existence. The ideology known as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was created as an antidote to the left.

In the 1980's we witnessed the continued growth of various types of Islamic

¹³ Ignazio Silone, La Scuola Dei Dittatori, (Hebrew translation, published by Am Oved, Tel-Aviv, 1974), p. 122. My translation- A.L.]

activities. All this raised grave fears among observers inside and outside Turkey as to the faith of the secular regime, which became the main motivation for writing about Islam. An examination of this literature reveals support for the argument that religion is negative, a leftover from the "dark ages". Thus, the critics seek a logical explanation for what they see as an interruption in the natural process of human development.

The second attitude expressed in this literature is one which views religion as a given, with a certain function in society. It says that religion is part of society whether we like it or not and therefore must be studied, not ignored.¹⁴ A better understanding of religion and its functions will lead to a better understanding of society and its political and social behaviour. As Richard Tapper writes:

much of this discussion [about religion] is abstract and speculative; what is usually missing is any detailed knowledge of how religion has been practised by the broad mass of the Turkish people during the decades of the republic, or of its meaning and importance in their lives today.¹⁵

But, as John Norton puts it "One man's saint may be another man's subversive", and indeed the third attitude holds that the role of religion in society is a positive one.¹⁶ This is a relatively recent current of writing, and most of its proponents are Turkish as will be demonstrated in chapters 5-7.

The first dominant current in the existing research is that which sees Islam in a negative light. The main questions, therefore, are as follows: First, is there a real danger of

¹⁴ Richard Tapper in his introduction to: R.Tapper, (ed.), Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991).pp.1-27, (p.1)

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 1.

¹⁶ J. Norton, "Turkish Sufis, Saints and Subversives" in Malcolm Wagstaff (ed.), Aspects of Religion in Secular Turkey, (University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Ocsional Paper No. 40, 1990) p.4.

an Islamic revolution,¹⁷ and second, to what extent have government efforts to nationalize Islam succeeded? Government attempts to nationalize Islam have been studied systematically, but no serious research has been done to determine to what extent the Islamic movement accepted the idea of the nation-state as an Islamic one. In addition, the existing literature suffers from other problems, such as the reliability of the information sources, and the reliance on tired clichés and impressions lacking supporting evidence. Another problem is that of confusion between different streams, opinions and organizations within the Islamic movement.¹⁸

2.2 The Islamic Movement

Defining the Islamic movement is a complex task. It is not a homogeneous movement, but rather a framework for different organizations, each of which operates in its own way and in accordance with its own beliefs toward the same goal: the establishment of an Islamic society.

The confusion in the existing relevant research is due to three main reasons: Firstly, most indigenous Turkish researchers belong to the secular elite in Turkey and are thus somewhat removed from Islamic activities. Secondly, legal prohibition during different periods, or open rejection of essential issues, such as the democratic system and Atatürk's

¹⁷ See for example the papers given by Binnaz Toprak, "Is There a Danger of Khomeinism in Turkey?", a paper presented at a Tel-Aviv Conference, Dayan Centre, on Islamic Revivalism, July 1987.

¹⁸ An example is in the confusion of using the term fundamentalism. A lot has been written about Islamic fundamentalism in last decade, but few attempts have been made to define what it is. For most writers - fundamentalism means radicalism or militancy. No distinction has yet been drawn between militants who are essentially, conservative, and the fundamentalists. For most journalists, and other writers, Islamic fundamentalism simply means active militant Islam. Islamic fundamentalism originated as a modern Islamic philosophy, and not as a degree of fanaticism. However, a misconception has been created by the fact that most of the fundamentalists would see the revolt against their "infidel" ruler as a holy war.

heritage, prevented the exposure of many organizations. Thirdly, there was no correlation between the ideological divisions and the organizational structures of the different parts of the movement.

2.3 Classification and Models

In his paper "Islam and Politics in Modern Middle Eastern History", Gabriel Baer shows that political manifestations of Islam have resulted in wide diversity.¹⁹ He notes that sometimes there is no relationship between religious doctrine and political struggle.²⁰ B.R. Wilson also points out that the theological or doctrinal classification of sects limits the possibilities for a comparative study of sects within different religious traditions.²¹ In addition, this classification prevents recognition of other significant aspects of the nature of sects, for doctrine may persist when the movement's social organization and orientation have changed.²² In other words, the sociologist's classification fails to recognize a connection between the ideological character of sects and the way of life of the sect's members, which necessarily affects their attitudes to the social and political order.

Wilson proposes a seven tiered classification of sects, (the Conversionist, Revolutionary, Introversionist, Manipulationist, Thaumaturgical, Reformist, and the Utopian), in which each type is defined in terms of its response to the world and the kind

¹⁹ Gabriel Baer, "Islam and Politics in Modern Middle Eastern History" in Heper & Israeli, op.cit., pp. 11-28.

²⁰ See: James, A. Beckford, "Explaining Religious Movements", ISSJ, XXIX No. 2 (1977) pp. 235-49; David G. Bromley & Anson.D. Shupe Jr. " Just a few years seems like a life time. A role theory approach to participation in Religious Movements", in: Louis Kriesberg (ed.) Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Vol. 2, (Connecticut: Jai Press Inc, 1979).

²¹ B.R. Wilson, "A Typology of Sects" in Robert Bocock and Kenneth Thompson (eds.) Religion and Ideology, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987) pp. 297-311.

²² Ibid., p. 297-8.

of reaction which dominates the customary practices and members' beliefs.²³ For each of these types he suggests its typical theological position. Although Wilson's classification was suitable only for describing Christian sects, his methodology can be adopted to the Islamic movement as well.

In a lecture given in Oxford in 1989, Ferhat Boratav suggested a different classification. He proposed dividing the movement according to "official Islam" and "popular Islam". This division confuses legitimacy with political and social behaviour. For example, if we take the case of the Mevlevi, it was a tarikāt but it is sponsored by the government which attempted to turn it into a tourist attraction. It also suggests that if one is not a member of a tarikāt then one must be part of the official framework. This division also gives the mistaken impression that the more official the group, the more likely it is to hold a traditionalist or "quietist" ideology. In reality, this is not the case. It can thus be suggested that a triple category classification is needed, which would be suitable for most groups and encompasses the theological, political and social view points. This new classification does not explain the existing political framework or the political tools used such as parties or other organizations, but it does take into account the political ideology which is advocated.

This thesis is concerned with the political theory of these groups and the individuals. Therefore, it will concentrate only on their political stand and the new aspects of political ideology as revealed in the 1980's.

²³ Ibid., p.298-303.

2.4 The Political-Ideological View

Many researchers have attempted to draw a line between traditionalism and radicalism. The traditionalists (gelenekçiler) are seen as the majority of the Islamic intelligentsia and as moderate. They are also considered to be local, a Turkish product, and Turkey is their source of identification. The radicals (radikaller) are the fundamentalist minority, and are considered to be the product of the Iranian revolution which inspired them.²⁴

This division does not correspond to reality and certainly does not include all parts of the Islamic movement. It is suggested here that the definitions used above do not match the reality in Turkey and therefore the focus should be on the political theories to which the movements' members ascribe. This approach reveals a clearer distinction between the two main currents.

The first current sees the take-over of the political institutions as its primary goal. They believe that once this is achieved, the existing institutions can help them change society into an authentic Islamic one.²⁵ The second current holds the same ultimate goal - the establishment of an Islamic society - however, its proposed method of achieving its goal is very different. There is a need, they argue, for social activities and the establishment of a socio-economic as well as a religious base. These will facilitate their full control over the Muslim community in the future.

Both currents, representing the majority opinions in the Islamic movement, propose achieving their goal not through militancy but rather by using democratic institutions, which

²⁴ See: Sayın Sabri, op.cit., pp.22-25.

²⁵ See: Refah Partisi, election pamphlets, 1987.(no details)

they oppose in principle. As in every ideological current, each of these currents also contains extreme factions which promote the use of militant methods. These groups, however, are the exception, and should be considered an irritation rather than a real danger. Examples to such groups are Hizbu't-Tahrir and the Islamic Jihad, which carried out a number of terrorist attacks and murders. On the other extreme are reports of tarikats members throwing stones and on several occasions even killing those who dared to eat in public during the Ramadan fast.²⁶

In recent history it has been proven that the second current - of those who believed in fundamental social change leading to political revolution - was not only more popular, but also more effective. It can also be argued that the democratic system has proved itself to be viable. This became clearer in the elections of 20 October 1991 and was not a solely Turkish phenomenon. The tactics of most groups who seek an Islamic solution changed in the latter half of the 1980's, from opposing the democratic system to waging democratic campaigns, in an Islamic version of "if you can't beat them, join them". Instead of trying to undermine the system, they came to the realization that under present conditions the best way to gain power is by participation in open elections. They have learned to use the system they opposes.²⁷

In the early 1980's the belief that the only way to achieve power was by violent revolution held sway. This belief has since been proven incorrect. A good example was the

²⁶ For example, the killing in Van of a Turkish student during the Ramadan of 1987.

²⁷ Recent events in Jordan and Algeria have proven that this new approach could be very successful. In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood gained 40% of the votes and in Algeria, 53% , in elections held on 8 November, 1989 and 12 June, 1990, respectively. In the 1989 Jordanian elections the Islamic movement won 34 seats out of 80; 22 of those were won by the Muslim Brotherhood. The other 12 by Islamic independent. Beverly Milton-Edwards, "A temporary alliance with the crown: The Islamic response in Jordan", in: James Piscatori, Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis, Fundamentalism Project, published by the American Academy of Art and Science, (US: Chicago, 1991). p.92; Hugh Roberts, "A trial of strength: Algeria's Islamism" in: Piscatori, Islamic Fundamentalisms., p.134.

revolution in Hama, Syria, in 1982, which was crushed by the horrific massacre of thousands of people.²⁸ When this tactic of violent revolution proved to be ineffective, the strategy had to be changed. The historical lesson was clear. The course of European history had demonstrated the possibilities of the democratic system, an approach which has indeed produced impressive results in Turkey. In the 1991 election 16.71 per cent of the participating electorate voted for the Refah party, which is identified with Islam. Never before had an Islamic party won so many votes in open elections.²⁹

The other ideological issue on which the Islamists were divided is the issue of nationalism and the legitimacy of the nation-state, as will be explained in later chapters. On this central issue, with the exception of those who accept the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (like the Aydınlar Ocağı), most Islamists are united in their rejection of the legitimacy of the current nation-state.³⁰ There is, however, a disagreement on the nature of the ideal Islamic state.

The methods adopted by the Islamists to achieve their political aspirations also deserve attention. The most prominent organization is the Islamic party, Refah Partisi (Welfare Party). However, it is not the only institution used for the promotion or execution of political ideologies. The organizations through which the Turkish Islamic movement operates are clubs such as the Aydınlar Ocağı and parliamentary and governmental circles such as the MP's Islamist wing. In addition, publishing houses such as Girişim and Birleşik are very active, while at the extremities of the movement terrorist groups, such as the Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah, operate. But perhaps the most interesting organizations are the

²⁸ See: MECS, 1982. Chapter on Syria.

²⁹ Although this was achieved by alliance with Türkeş.

³⁰ Norton, op.cit., p. 8.

tarikats (Sufi orders), whose role within the political and social systems has been strengthened.³¹

Although Atatürk banned the tarikats (dervish orders) in 1925, many of them continued to function in secret and were a significant influence in many parts of Turkey during the period under review. Among the most important were the Nakşibendi³², the Rûfai³³, the Bektaşî, the Mevlevî, the Kadiri³⁴ and the Halveti-Cerrahi, all of which are long-established Sufi mystic orders. In response to Atatürk's attempts to curb the power of Islam in Turkey, a number of non-Sufi religious movements arose with the avowed purpose of asserting the role of Islam in the Turkish state (and eventually beyond). Although they were not strictly speaking tarikats, they bore some similarities in their manner of operation and organization and were often referred to in the press and sometimes even in academic articles as tarikats. The most influential of these movements were the Nûrcus³⁵, the Süleymancîs and the Isıkçîs, all of which were frequently at odds with the authorities and caused alarm among the secularists. From the 1970s onwards these new movements became increasingly prominent, the Nûrcus, in particular, making strenuous efforts to recruit university students and seek influential political allies.

³¹ On the tarikats see "tarika" in EI.

³² On the Nakşibendi see: Şerif Mardin, "Myth, Literature and the Modernization of Nakşibendi Discourse", (paper at International round-table, Paris, 1987); "The Nakşibendi Order in Turkish History", in Richard Tapper, *Ibid.*, pp.121-142.

³³ According to Norton the Rûfaîs seem to have accepted the separation of religion and the state. Norton, op.cit, p. 6.

³⁴ On the Kadiri see an article written by Sencer Ayata, "Traditional Sufi Orders on the Periphery: Kadiri and Nakşibendi Islam in Konya and Trabzon", in Richard Tapper (ed.), Islam in Modern Turkey, (G.B: I.B.Tauris, 1991), pp.223-253.

³⁵ For more information see: Paul Dumont, "Disciples of the Light. The Nurju Movement in Turkey", CAS, Vol.5, No.2., pp.33-60, 1986; Şerif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey. The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursî, (Albany: State University of N.Y. Press, 1989).

Both the traditional *tarikats* and these new Turkish Islamic movements gained considerable experience in operating underground and managed to survive even under the most repressive secularist policies in the Republic. They were initially cautious about open political involvement, but the covert support given to right wing parties by Sunni *tarikats* and movements became an important element in Turkish politics from the 1950s onwards, and the left wing reacted by wooing the Bektashis and Alevis.³⁶

As Toprak points out, the tarikāt network provides a channel for upward social mobility for individuals of lower socio-economic status.³⁷ In recent years, especially, many Turks have found tarikāt connections useful when seeking employment, political positions, university scholarship or opening a new businesses. Indeed, it has been claimed that this new type of "network politics" seems to have replaced the clientele system which traditionally dominated Turkish political life until the 1980s.³⁸

The attraction of the *tarikats* to economically weaker members of society as well as to their traditional supporters may suggest that the tarikats and the new religious movements have an important future political potential. The question is to what degree this potential can be translated into a permanent political force. In a long run, Toprak argues, this outcome seems doubtful for these reasons.³⁹ First, the tarikats cannot present a unified force for any time beyond the immediate future as they are divided among themselves. Second, the tarikats find their growing strength in keeping their social and cultural orthodoxy in the forefront without making their political choices explicit. Thirdly, the ease

³⁶ See: Gencay Şaylan, İslâmiyet ve Siyaset. Türkiye Örneği, (Ankara: V Yayınları, 1987) pp. 85-104.

³⁷ Binnaz Toprak, "Religion as State Ideology in a Secular Setting: The Turkish - Islamic Synthesis", Paper prepared for the BRISMES Annual Conference, 10-13 July, (U.K: University of Leeds, 1988).

³⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

³⁹ Although only a minority of Turks belong to tarikats.

which the tarikats can operate is to no little degree due to the support sought by otherwise secular republican cadres from the traditional, community-oriented, religiously conservative, anti-modernist sector of society.⁴⁰

While it can be argued that the tarikats and new religious movements are divided not only on political issues but also on social, ideological and theological matters, their influence in Turkish society in many fields (education, daily social behaviour, politics) is nevertheless significant.

2.5 New Aspects of the Movement in the 1980's

Next to tarikats, the most significant new phenomenon of the Islamic movement in the 1980's is the development of its intellectual base. New political and social theories have developed within the movement which focus on issues such as social justice, personal liberation, human rights, Islamic feminism and environmental issues.⁴¹

One of the most interesting results of the Islamic activities in the 1980's is the appearance of a new wave of religious publications which have adopted a decidedly Western look. These journals are no different in their glossy format from their equivalents produced by the secular intelligentsia. While in the past, modern secular literature in Turkey has been the carrier of Kemalist, nationalist or Marxist views, religious publications now attempt to equal these secular publications in terms of style, appearance and subject matter.

What is most striking about these new publications is their attempt to imitate Western secular discourse. Most of these journals make references to, and discuss, topics

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

⁴¹ As is the case of Nabi Avcı, a professor of communications, and Deniz Gürsel, a psychologist and writer on ecology and environmental questions.

which are the centre of interest of the world intelligentsia. While not necessarily reflecting modern views, most of them refer to the existence of such views and discuss them. The different world views to which the periodicals appeal is reflected in their external appearance. They use the same techniques of contemporary graphics used by westernized magazines, in contrast to the traditional religious writings which try to duplicate the page format of manuscripts.

Many of the magazines were related to, and / or sponsored by tarikats.⁴² The Nakşibendi, for example was behind the publishing of Mektup, a women's magazine⁴³; the monthly Altınoluk⁴⁴; İslâm, magazine published in Ankara by Iskender Pasha branch since 1983 and with a circulation of 100,000 copies; Kadın ve Aile, a monthly targeted at women; and two monthly journals of philosophy, İlim ve Sanat and İnsan ve Kainat.

Magazines related to the Nurcular are: Zafer a scientific magazine focusing on Islamic issues; Sızıntı, a monthly with a circulation of 80,000 representing the Fethullah stream. Köprü, a literary magazine and the daily Yeni Nesil belong to a Yeni Asya group in addition to the monthly women's magazine, Bizim Aile, published since 1977. The daily Zaman has been the daily of the Fethullahcı Nurgus since 1988; it was previously independent.

Publications related to the Isıkclar, generally supported the MP until the end of the 1980's. They included two medical magazines Doktor and Medikal; Tekstil-Teknik a professional news magazine; the English-language Made in Turkey, intended for foreigners living in Turkey, with a circulation of 40.000; and one of the most succesful newspapers in

⁴² See the list of publications published by Gencay Şaylan, op.cit., pp 96-97.

⁴³ With an estimated circulation of 30,000 copies. Published in Konya since 1985.

⁴⁴ With a circulation of 25,000.

Turkey, Türkiye, a daily with 150,000 readers.

But not all Islamic newspapers are related to tarikats. Among those considered to be pro-Iranian are İstiklal and the newspaper İnsan. Others, which are considered to be independent are İktibas; Kitap; Ribad which is published in Konya; Atılım and Girişim a monthly radical magazine with an estimated 10,000 readers published in Istanbul since 1985. Others worth mentioning are Yazı of the NMP supporters, and the Milli Gazete with a print-run of 30,000 represents the opinions of the supporters of the Refah Partisi.

2.6 Conclusions

From its start, the Turkish republic struggled to create a balance between secularism and Islam. This struggle was observed by researchers inside and outside Turkey, whose main question was what causes Islam to be such a dominant and attractive factor for so many people in Turkish society. Different theories attempting to explain the connection between modernization, democracy, industrialization, political stability and Islam were examined, however, none has provided a fully adequate answer. The fear of Islamic reaction caused the rise of speculative research which has concentrated on attempts to predict whether an Islamic revolution poses a threat to Turkey. On the other hand, very little effort has been made to investigate the social, ideological and theological standpoints of the religious community. Such research is vital and is a precondition to a fuller understanding of political and social behaviour in Turkey.

The Islamic movement is an all-inclusive "umbrella" title applied to a wide variety of organizations, parties, charities, publication houses, and individuals sharing a common aim - the wish to establish an Islamic society, whether by passive or active means. This

very general description reflects the difficulty and controversy involved in defining both an Islamic society and the means to achieve it. Any attempt to systematically define the movement or classify parts of it, whether theologically, socially or politically, is bound to fail. Such attempts have been made in the Christian context, however they are not applicable to the Turkish case, perhaps because the movement is too fragmented. The demand for a more systematic presentation of the various parts of the movement has caused even greater confusion in the existing research. Since there is no necessary correlation between the theological, political and social positions of each of the groups, there is a need to examine each group's view on each issue separately.

As to the ideological-political view, a rough separation between the two main groups was made according to the method advocated to achieve an Islamic state. One group supports the takeover of political institutions as part of a programme to change the face of society. The other group, while standing for the same ultimate goal - the establishment of an Islamic society - believes in preparing the social and economic ground for a political change to come. In the period under review this stream was the more popular one in Turkey, as in other Middle Eastern countries.

In the 1980s a number of trends were evident regarding the activities of the Islamic movement. The democratic system itself became a means of supplanting the existing democratic regime with an Islamic one. The government policy toward Islam brought about an Islamic boom manifested in areas such as education, art, literature, economy and politics. The most significant difference between this boom and ones in the 1950's and 1970's was its intellectual and ideological base, and the gradual resurfacing of the role of the tarikats in social and political life. Finally, there has been a transition from struggle in the name of a political-national justice to a struggle in the name of social-political justice. This

phenomenon will be discussed in the following chapters.

Chapter 3

NATIONALISM AND ISLAM

Most published research on nationalism focusses on the phenomenon of nationalism in general, rather than discussing the specific aspect of nationalism and its compatibility with religion, which is our goal here. Recent trends in Europe shed light on the phenomenon of nationalism: the development of a sense of Europeanism in Western Europe, on the one hand, and on the other the revival of nationalist demands in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. These events demand a revaluation of the literature on nationalism. Studies such as E.H. Carr's Nationalism and After¹ and Elie Kedourie's Nationalism² which have been heavily criticised for advancing the view that nationalism is a temporary phenomenon, need to be reconsidered, as do those which hold the opposite view.³ These questions of the nature and origin of nationalism in western and central Europe have great relevance to this study, which attempts to understand the Muslim, and more specifically, the Turkish Muslim attitude towards the nation-state. The relationship between nationalism and Islam is the determinant of the future character of the Middle Eastern states. This has been the focus of public discussion in Turkey since the establishment of the Republic, and this study focus on the attitudes of specific authors towards the concept of nation-state.

¹ Edward H. Carr, Nationalism and After, (London: Macmillan, 1945).

² Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, (London: Hutchinson, 1985). See also: Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971)

³ See: K.R. Minogue, Nationalism, (G.B: B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1967); and B.Ward, Nationalism and Ideology, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966). Both hold similar views to Kedourie's.

3.1 The Definition and Nature of Nationalism

The word *nation* is derived from the Latin *natio*. In ancient cultures equivalent words were used to describe ethnic groups which were associated politically as well as culturally.⁴ There is no accurate definition of or agreed means of identification for the term nation,⁵ but it is nonetheless the most common label used to identify a large ethnic group.⁶

The absence of a precise definition of *nation* is due to a lack of agreement, both among intellectuals and different national movements, on this point. Two fundamental approaches can be discerned – the first searches for an objective criterion, while the second seeks for a subjective one. The first viewpoint proposes that the condition for the existence of a nation is the presence of a common bond such as language, customs, culture, geographical territory, religion or race. This view was widespread among German thinkers who emphasised an organic and biological determinism.

The second approach emphasises the subjective dimension.⁷ This attitude was more common in the writings of English and French authors than in those of Italian or Germans. It did not reject the existence of objective criteria, but rather devalued their importance. According to this view, the moment a group of people has a sense of collective belonging

⁴ It was gens in classical Latin and Am and Goy in the Hebrew Bible, as it says "Nation [Goy] shall not lift up sword against nation [Goy], neither shall they learn war any more". (Isaiah 2:4)

⁵ See: Aira Kemilainen, Nationalism, (Jyuaeskylä: Jyuaeskylan Kasuatusopollinen Korkeakoulu, 1964).

⁶ On the definition of a Nation as an ethnic group see: W. Sulzbach, "Zur Definition and Psychologie Von 'Nation' und 'Nationalbewusstsein'" in Politische Vierteljahresschrift, III, (1962), pp.139-158. In some languages such as English and French there is a distinction between simply an ethnic group- Volk, Peuple, and People- and an ethnic group connected legally and politically- Nation.

⁷ An excellent example of this viewpoint can be found in Ernest Renan's lecture, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation", at the Sorbonne, 1882.

and the will to maintain this sense of identity, the objective criteria lose their importance.⁸

The main difference between these two fundamental views is that one gives critical weight to measurable scientific facts, while the other focuses on the importance of voluntary individual decision and free will. The common factor is their belief in the nation as the best basis for political organization.

Ethnic groups and nations are not a modern phenomenon.⁹ Ethnic groups emerged in the ancient world. National consciousness, however, only came about in the last few centuries.¹⁰ There are various explanations for the absence of this consciousness in the past; each reflects the writer's view of the nature of nationalism. It should be borne in mind, though, that it is not the nation as a means of identification which is a new phenomenon but rather its representation as the source for political sovereignty.¹¹

The spread of democratic ideas in the modern period meant that feudalism, religion and dynastic attachments were no longer sufficient to justify the existence of regimes and states. The idea of the "natural right" of nations, the right of people to be organized politically according to their own will, became the origin of the principle of nationalism. This principle, which gained increasing support since the 19th century, held that every nation had the right to determine its own political system and to establish a sovereign state. Modern nationalist consciousness, at the outset, appeared therefore as an extension of the

⁸ See: Hans Kohn, Nationalism, Its Meaning and History, (N.Y: Macmillan company, 1944).

⁹ See the anthropological report, Nationalism, by a study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford-London, 1939.

¹⁰ In the case of the Jews, one might argue that this consciousness is not a new phenomenon.

¹¹ As an example, E.H. Carr believes that nationalism is simply a by-product of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Carr, op.cit. See also: Carlton Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism.(N.Y: Russell & Russell, 1968).

liberal democratic ideas that came into vogue soon after the French revolution.¹²

Nationalism, it can be said, was the adoption of liberal democratic ideas for the individual and its projection on to an ethnic group. Liberal democracy looked forward to a political system that would allow the individual to express himself and to determine the nature of the government under which he lived. Nationalism added to this the demand that the nation should have the same right. In order to guarantee that the regime allowed expression of the common values and rights of the nation, democratic "self-government" was translated into "national self-determination", and the freedom of the individual into the "freedom of the nation".

It can be argued that the idea of nationalism is divided into two broad categories. One retained the original liberal democratic line based on the freedom of the individual and a more international nature. The second became an authoritarian system where the individual is not important, and which is often described as a chauvinist or ethnocentric nationalism. The justification for an authoritarian regime in the latter case is not similar to that of medieval regimes but the outcome remains the same. This aggressive version of nationalism sometimes brings about irridentism and justifies attitudes of imperialist expediency. It shows no respect for the individual within the nation nor for the freedom of other nations.

¹² Ironically, it was the French who as a result of Napoleon's conquests provoked the increase in national consciousness among European nations.

3.2 The Academic Discussion

After the decline of the British Empire a new debate about nationalism began, encouraged by the publication of Nationalism by Elie Kedourie in 1960.¹³ Nationalism, argues Kedourie, "is a doctrine, which is to say a complex of inter-related ideas about man, society and politics. It is neither a reflection of particular social and economic forces, nor a powerful and inarticulate feeling which is present always and everywhere".¹⁴ In the Actonian tradition Kedourie regards nationalism as a doctrine, the unfortunate invention of some misguided German philosophers supported by the frustration of obscure middle class writers. This doctrine, he argues, introduced an extremist style into politics. In the past, conflicts had been conflicts of interest (over territory or dynastic succession) and therefore subject to compromise. Nationalism, because it represents politics as a fight for principles, is much less amenable to negotiation.¹⁵ As Kedourie sees it, nationalism claims that the political boundaries of a state must be made to coincide with the territorial boundaries of a group of people who speak the same language. Kedourie thinks this is absurd; since when does shared language entitle a group of people to share a political leader?¹⁶ Another nationalistic claim, argues Kedourie, is that the state must be coextensive with the nation, and that the criterion for the determination of a nation is anthropological. Rejecting this argument, Kedourie argues that the true nature of the doctrine of nationalism is ultimately

¹³ Kedourie, Nationalism. *op.cit.*

¹⁴ The same view was repeated by Kedourie in his book Nationalism in Asia and Africa, New York, 1970, and in "Arabic Political Memoirs", Encounter, 5 (1972).

¹⁵ A critical article on the views of Kedourie and Haim views was written by Eric Davis-Willard, "Theory and Method in the Study of Arab Nationalism", RMES, 3, (1978). pp.18-31.

¹⁶ On this issue see also: Carlton J.H. Hayes, Nationalism a Religion, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1960). p.23.

based on will, and will alone cannot serve as a foundation for a state. Nationalism annihilates freedom in the service of the state. It is, he argues, a form of political messianism.

A coherent criticism of Kedourie's book is found in Smith's Theories of Nationalism.¹⁷ His criticism is based mainly on Kedourie's ethics. He argues that Kedourie misrepresents the theory of nationalism as founded on only two ideas, namely language and the will of the people. Kedourie examined only the negative aspects of nationalism, wrongly neglecting to examine the benefits it provides in the field of culture. Smith continues by arguing that Kedourie selected only those features of nationalism which stress the elements of conspiracy, terrorism and the like, ignoring the contribution of nationalist theories to maintaining stability in developing countries. Smith posits that there is indeed an "original" doctrine of nationalism, but this is not the romantic-linguistic version which Kedourie presents. To this original doctrine were added supplementary theories which were then used to justify certain political actions. Kedourie, Smith suggests, confuses the German romantic version of nationalism with the "original" doctrine itself.

Is nationalism a negative doctrine or is it essentially positive, as Smith argues? Perhaps, as Bernard Crick wrote, "Nationalism has no special relationship to political justice, but neither does it have a particular relationship to injustice. The most obvious thing about it is, after all, that it exists."¹⁸

The argument about whether nationalism is negative or positive is only one part of the debate about the nature of nationalism. Opposing Kedourie's view, that nationalism is merely a political doctrine, writers such as John A. Armstrong and Ernest Gellner believed

¹⁷ A.D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism, (London: Gerald Duckworth & Company Ltd, 1971).

¹⁸ Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics, (G.B: Penguin, 1964), pp.74-91.

that it is an ideology which reflects social evolution.¹⁹ Since nationalism is such a general and widespread phenomenon we should look for a general cause and reason for its appearance, which must lie in an understanding of the life and evolution of societies. According to Kedourie, such a search for a general explanation necessarily involves a generalization, or what he call a "sociological temptation".²⁰ Kedourie argues that it is often more accurate to say that national identity is the creation of a nationalist doctrine rather than a nationalist doctrine, being the expression of national identity. In addition, Kedourie's attempt to devalue nationalism by labelling it as a doctrine rather than as an ideology seems pointless.²¹ Against this stands the Marxist view that nationalism appears at a particular stage of economic development, when the bourgeoisie are in the ascendant and as an expression of their interests.²² Although, according to Marxism, it is an unavoidable stage of the process, ironically it has similarities with the view of Kedourie, who sees the Marxist view as a manifest absurdity. Both believe nationalism is a negative development and a reflection of false consciousness.

Bernard Crick's explanation for the appearance of nationalism is based on "natural selection",²³ according to which nationalism represents a system of authority which filled the vacuum left by the double failure of the French revolution and the failure of the autocratic legitimacy which preceded it. Modern nationalism clearly fulfills a need.

¹⁹ John A. Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism, (Carolina: University of Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1982); Ernest Gellner, Nation and Nationalism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

²⁰ Kedourie, Nationalism, p.145.

²¹ Ideology by nature, is negative, since it is based on the logic of an idea and provides answers rather than encouraging questions. Ideology is not concerned with historical events but with its idea; ideology is the presentation of a myth in the language of science and philosophy.

²² On the Marxist approach to Nationalism see: C.H. Herod, The Nation in the History of Marxism, (The Hague: M. Mijhoff, 1976).

²³ Crick, op.cit, p.79.

Nationalist rulers may be as bad as the regimes they replace, but they arise out of the failure of these regimes.

In summary, there are three fundamental views of nationalism: a) as a reflection of nature or social evolution; b) as a political doctrine; c) as a natural choice which came to fill a vacuum. The purpose of this discussion is to emphasise two points: first, that nationalism is not a definitive concept and may be interpreted in different ways; second, that there are two primary, but quite different, models of nationalism which are prevalent today, the Eastern-Central European model and the Western liberal model. In the following section an attempt will be made to demonstrate the interaction between these two theories of nationalism and Islam, in general, and specifically within the Turkish context.

3.3 Nationalism and Islam

To clarify the question of the compatibility of Islam and nationalism, it is first necessary to assess the relationship between religion and secularism.²⁴ The common definition of religion is the "recognition on the part of man of some higher unseen power as having control of his destiny"²⁵ while secularism is defined as the "doctrine that morality should be based solely on regard to the well being of mankind in the present life, to the exclusion of all considerations drawn from belief in God or in a future state."²⁶ In other words, religion is characterized by the belief in something that is superior to man,

²⁴ For an interesting historiographic study of secularisation see: Joshua Arieli, "‘Modern Age’ and the Secularization Problem - An Historiographical Study" in Isaiah Gafni and Gabriel Motzkin (eds.) Priesthood and Monarchy, Studies in the Historical Relationship of Religion and State, (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar Centre, 1987) pp.165-216.

²⁵ Oxford English Dictionary.

²⁶ Ibid.

which determines his destiny and in secularism the emphasis is on man, on man's actions or will. However, in reality, a complete distinction between secular and religious is difficult and a total separation is impossible. In some religions the drive to find such separation created monasteries or other mystical forms of celibacy or asceticism. It is more natural, though, that the connection between the secular and the religious exist.

It is argued that nationalism, being essentially secular, cannot find an accommodation with religion in general and with Islam in particular. Indeed, nationalism is an ideology founded on a secular base and man, his will and his actions were the only motivation and reason for thought and action. However, nationalism should not be confused with secularism or seen as purely secular. Moreover, it has already been pointed out that nationalism has no single meaning and is understood differently in different areas and cultures. In the Middle Eastern context it should be seen as a political ideology, meaning an ideology which proposes a political order.

This raises two obvious questions. The first concerns the general connection between religion and ideology. Some scholars, such as Marx, believe that the main function of religion is to provide legitimation to the ideology of the ruling class. Others, like Nietzsche believe the situation is in fact the reverse, that religion is the hidden ideology of the oppressed class which uses it to limit the power of the rulers.

Ideology claims to be empirical and does not claim to be anything other than historical experience, while religion asks for a place in a world of super-empirical symbols and in mythological time. Religion is emotional and spiritual, ideology is based on indoctrination, argument and propaganda. While in the past the difference between the two was obvious, in modern times a synthesis known as secular religion has emerged. Some of the ideologies of modern societies such as communism and some forms of nationalism are

good examples of secular religion. A more relevant example to our case is the use of the concept of a national destiny and mission, which determine the progress of history. In nationalism, as in communism, there is a comprehensive interpretation of past, present and future. Its concepts have their roots in an idealized past and point towards the realization of an equally glorious future.

Countless efforts have been made to separate the religious from the secular; it seems that their union is unavoidable. The search for an explanation of the world has always been and continues to be the motivation behind the creation of religions, ideologies and science. In this connection it is interesting to examine the argument presented by theologians of all religions who claim that activities driven by a secular motivation are the worship of another God. This false God can be the human mind or the nation.²⁷

The second question that needs clarification concerns Islam more directly. This is the claim that Islam's universalism prevents it from accommodating a particularist ideology such as nationalism. It can also be argued that it is this universal outlook which enables Islam to embrace a particularist political or social ideology, since the more universal a religion is, the less it dictates a specific political or social order. It is clear that Islam is a faith and a cultural commitment. It remains to be seen whether it can provide a framework for political order.

3.4 The Question of Compatibility, Views and Attitudes

The dispute about the compatibility of Islam and the nation-state has divided researchers, as well as the faithful, into two opposing groups. The first group assumes that

²⁷ See Chapter 6 for Ali Buluç's view on this issue.

Islam and nationalism, being different in origin and inspiration, are contradictory almost by definition. Islam is a universal religion and therefore cannot be compatible with an ideology based on the nation-state.²⁸ The second group believes that the two can be and are compatible.²⁹

The basic argument of the first group rests on the common assumption that religion and state, din wa dawla³⁰, are inseparable in Islam. Many conclude from this assumption that believers must be unified, and thus there is neither justification nor legitimacy for the idea of the nation-state. They believe that Muslims are all equal in the eyes of Allah as part of the umma.

Mankind was a single nation³¹, and God sent Messengers with glad tidings and warnings, and with them he sent the book with truth, to judge between people in matters wherein they differed, but the people of the Book, after the clear signs came to them, did not differ among themselves except through selfish contumacy. (2:213)

The members of the first group posit the view that if there is a division in the world it is the division of dar al-harb (the infidel realm) and dar al-Islam (the believing realm).³² There is no reciprocity between the two worlds, and infidels do not enjoy equal status with Muslims. Though the tradition of dar al-islam and dar al-harb is a later concept, it is based on an early conviction that the only basis for separation between people could be that of righteousness.

²⁸ For an example see: M, Ghayasuaddin (ed.) The Impact of Nationalism On the Muslim World, (London: The Open Press, Al-Hoda Publishers, 1986).

²⁹ See: James P. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States, (Cambridge University Press, 1986).

³⁰ In Turkish: din ve devlet.

³¹ Can also be translated as community.

³² Until the entire world is under Islamic rule the umma is obliged to conduct a holy war (jihad) against the infidels. This war can be active or passive according to the political situation.

Another argument is based on the principle of tevhid.³³ For Muslims, Allah is the central fact of reality. The Muslim's main duty is obedience and submission to the will of God. God is one and therefore an Islamic community, the umma, should be his reflection on earth as the realization of the divine in society.

Members of the second group (which believes that Islam and nationalism are compatible) base their argument on one or the other of the following two arguments: the first is that Islam, from its origin, was based on a particular nation (the Arabs). This argument was founded on the Koranic verse stating that Allah divided mankind into nations and tribes for the purpose of knowing one another better.³⁴ In addition, some writers hold the view that Islam was a religion for the Arabs, in the same way that Judaism was a religion for the Jews. The second argument is that Islam has always been flexible and always tolerated various traditions. According to Piscatori, classical and medieval theory indicates that territorial pluralism is acceptable in principle.³⁵ Al-Ghazzali, as well as Ibn Taymiyya and others, envisaged an Islamic order which incorporated the reality of division and multiple centres of power. Piscatori argues that Muslims' beliefs are connected integrally with their conduct.³⁶ Muslims today are able to accept the premises of the international system for three reasons: their historical experience, the theory which allows territorial pluralism, and the intellectual consensus of speech (ijma al-qawl). This consensus, which has become wider and more influential than the consensus of action (ijma al-fil), sees

³³ See Chapter 5, pp. 130-132.

³⁴ Sura 49:13.

³⁵ Piscatori, op.cit., pp.40-75.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 145.

the nation-state as part of the natural order and perhaps even as inherently Islamic.³⁷

Piscatori's well-argued view must be examined carefully. First, his understanding of ijma is in some ways different from the way ijma is understood in Muslim law. The principle of ijma is based on a hadith which assumes that the entire Muslim community cannot be wrong. Ijma literally means consensus and it is one of the four usul principles on which the Muslim faith is based. It is defined as the agreement of the mujtahidin on the people. For a while at least, attempts were made to prevent its limitation to a particular time and place and to define as ijma whatever proved to be the consensus of the companions of Muhammad, or the consensus of early Medina. In the end a formula was found and ijma was defined as the concordant doctrines and opinions of those who are acknowledged doctors of Islam in any given period.³⁸ Agreement on any point is only seen in hindsight, at which time it is consciously accepted and called an ijma. In any case the ijma can be given only by recognized alims, not by politicians, philosophers, intellectuals or others.³⁹

Second, in Piscatori's view, politics and religion are bound together. The fact that Muslims live within nation-state boundaries does not mean that this was adopted in Islam any more than nationalism was ever accepted by the Catholic Church. The nation-state is contradictory to Catholicism in principle. The Church has learned to live with it but has not adopted it as an ideal. This accommodation gives hope that Islam may do so in the future. For the present, however, there is no consensus on this issue, as Piscatori argues.

The battle between those who support nationalism and those who do not is not over yet. Furthermore, there is not even consensus in the political sphere. In dealing with the

³⁷ Ibid., p.146.

³⁸ See: Prof. I.Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1981), Hebrew. pp. 22-25.

³⁹ See: EI2, "Idjma".

question of the compatibility of Islam and nationalism, three points should be borne in mind: First, nationalism is not necessarily understood in the Middle East in the same way as in Europe. It is therefore essential to examine the origins of nationalism in the Middle East, through an examination of not merely the political movement but also - and principally - the writings of Muslim thinkers. Second, Islam is not static and it is observed differently in different places. Different communities had to confront other cultures and beliefs during various periods. Accordingly, it is more accurate to speak about Islamic traditions in the plural than to point to a single tradition of Islam. Third, while the Islamic literature deals extensively with every detail of individual behaviour, such as how to pray, what to eat and what to wear, it only vaguely addresses the ideal method of ruling the community. This seems all the more surprising considering that the Muslims had an empire that ruled over a vast area for several centuries. Historically, Muslims fought among themselves more often than they cooperated with each other. This absence of a tradition concerning the ideal state caused considerable confusion and provided the opportunity for different interpretations of the method for ruling the community.⁴⁰

Muslims have always believed Islam to be a complete and perfect whole in which spiritual and temporal matters cannot be isolated from each other. Fundamentalists and other contemporary Islamic thinkers seem to think that Islam contains a specific kind of politics which is derived from and follows Islam's own unique precepts. In other words, a separation between the religious and the secular does not exist. All aspects of politics are included in Allah's commands as contained in the Koran and demonstrated in the practice of Prophet Muhammad - as documented in the hadith.

⁴⁰ On this issue see: Ann Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Islam, (Oxford University Press, 1981).

3.5 The Concept of the 'State'

The discussion about nationalism is a modern one and as was demonstrated before it is connected with another academic discussion - on the concept of the state. Like nationalism the term 'state' is a relative newcomer to the political Western debate. Until the nineteenth century, political thinkers have used terms such as 'sovereign power' and 'government' to denote what we would call today - 'the state'. Political scientists tend to view the nature of the state in different ways. Evidently, ideological convictions condition our understanding of the state, its origin, and its limitations.⁴¹

Barbara Goodwin identified four basic views of the state: The first is the contractual view, in which the state derives from the voluntary agreement between men, via the social contract, whose task is to promote the interests of the people as individuals or as a collective.⁴² The second view sees the state as an arbiter and a night watchman. This view attributes to the state a minimal role because state intervention impedes individuals in the pursuit of their own interests.

The third view identifies the state as an organism. In this view, the state is conceived as an integrated organism set above individuals, a whole greater than its component parts. The state is viewed as if it has its own historic interest, far above the interests of individuals.⁴³

The last view regards the state as an oppressor. This view is shared mainly by Marxists and anarchists, who see in the state an instrument of the ruling class, built on force

⁴¹ Barbara Goodwin, Using Political Ideas, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, third edition, 1993), p. 267.

⁴² Ibid., p. 267.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 268.

and usurpation and not on a contract. The state in this analysis is "a product and a manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonism."⁴⁴

Despite the Marxist dismissal of the state as a class instrument, many Western theorists still wish to regard the state as a neutral arbiter with no interests of its own. In the 1980s we have witnessed a flood of researches that in different ways, reached a consensus that the states are important and active independent players.⁴⁵ Researchers who wish to return the state to centre stage, argue, that it is necessary to reexamine the tendencies which narrow down politics to aspects of political culture, political sociology or political economy; these are no longer satisfactory, although they have not lost their importance.

What is the attitude of Islam towards the 'state'? We often hear the demand to establish an Islamic state in countries where the majority of the population is Muslim. In one country, Iran, this wish was fulfilled. However, if we investigate what was the attitude of Islam towards the state during the Middle Ages, and what is the Islamic theory in regard to the state and to politics, we are faced with a paradox. On the one hand it is clear that Islam does not leave any aspect of life outside the boundaries of religion and the Shari'a. On the other hand it is striking that in the important field of politics there is almost no theological discussion in Islam. Islam hardly deals with such issues as the regulations of governing and the ideal character of the Muslim state.⁴⁶

In the times of the Islamic empires, Muslims were organised in polities. But none of those polities was a particular political order specific only for Muslims. If there is a

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 268. An account of the Marxist view of the state is in V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution, (Progress Publishers, 1974).

⁴⁵ On this issue see: G.A. Almond, "The Return of the State", American Political Science Review, 82, 3 (1988), pp. 853-874.

⁴⁶ Lambton, op.cit., p.12.

unique political system for Muslims it must be proved, either by a proof that Allah chose a special system and supplied his believers with a blueprint to be used as a guide, or by an imitation of Muhammad's system, if there is proof that Muhammad actually thought it necessary to have a particular system. The Koran does not mention words such as law, politics or state. It does not deal with public order, institutions or any political structure. Even religious structure is not addressed. During the time of Muhammad the political order of the Arabs was based on blood relations. Concepts such as nation, state or political system were foreign to them. Muhammad did not provide a political blueprint for his followers to establish an Islamic state since this was not the object of his mission.⁴⁷ The Hadith, the collected form of Muhammad's sayings and traditions, were collected two and a half centuries after Muhammad's death but even it does not deal with matters such as constitution, state and government.

Qureshi argues that this discussion of the question of the ideal political system is beset by myths.⁴⁸ One is that Islam is a political religion. This myth was so widespread that it was not examined or questioned until 1925, when 'Ali 'Abd al Raziq began to examine the issue of political power in Islam. He argued that Islam has nothing to do with political power. The difficulty in reaching a clear answer lies in the imprecise nature of Islam. In fact, as argued by Qureshi, the only precise thing in Islam is the Shahadah.⁴⁹ Beyond that, it can be argued, a Muslim can interpret Islam in any way he sees fit.

Not only there is no record of a Muslim state in the Middle Ages, what is more important to this discussion is that no political philosophy or theory of an ideal state exists

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.12.

⁴⁸ Saleem M.M. Qureshi, "Political Community and Religious Pluralism in the Middle East. An Islamic Perspective", MEF, summer/Fall (1990), pp.20-27. (p.22).

⁴⁹ The Shahadah is the dictum that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger. Ibid., p. 24.

in Islam. In fact, political thought as a theoretical discipline is an alien concept to Islam.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, Muslim thinkers drew upon Greek political works, when translations became available at the beginning of the ninth century, in their attempt to delineate the contours of the ideal ruler. These philosophers were given the name faylasuf (from the Greek philosophos), and the discipline was called falasafa. Among the most important of these medieval philosophers were Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi, who influenced many subsequent works.⁵¹ Al-Farabi's philosophical literature, was influenced by Plato, and paints the portrait of an ideal state where the learned (read the philosopher), is the ruler. The second important Sunni author who dealt with the issue of politics was Al-Muwardi, who lived during the middle of the eleventh century. Al-Muwardi edited and organized all the rules and customs which existed in the past in order to clearly determine what the Caliph should be like, what his duties were, and his virtues. However, most of his instructions are theological and not political. The Caliph must put into practice the Islamic law and protect it. He should fight to export Islam and ensure an effective army exists to do so. But to the questions of how he should do this, how the state should be governed and on what institutions it should be based we have no answers.⁵²

The political culture of Islam was not translated into a detailed theory of the state, therefore its political characters remains somewhat amorphous. Only during the modern period, when Islam comes to confront the Western world and its values, does the concept

⁵⁰ Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 94.

⁵¹ On these writers see: Erwin J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam. An Introduction Outline, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962).

⁵² It is interesting that the Ottoman empire, like earlier states, adopted political theories the roots of which lay in Greek ethics and Persian literature. The best known among these works are the siyaset name of Nizam ül-Mülk (1092), the kutadaqh bilik (1070) and the kabus name (1082). The first was most influential and its arguments were repeated in many other works. See : Bernard Lewis, Islam in History: Ideas Men and Events in the Middle East. (Jerusalem: Hebrew Rights, 1984) [Hebrew].

of the Islamic state appear as a political ideology. It can be argued that the West pushed Islam in the last 150 years to a return to its roots where it seeks its theoretical political character, and even implements it in the modern states established in the Middle East.⁵³

The Islamic modernist movement, introduced in Islam the Western political consciousness along with its democratic values. Generally this process was accompanied by the emergence of apologetic literature which has tried to prove that Western democratic foundations already existed in the ancient Muslim culture and history.⁵⁴

It is not easy to explain why Islam did not develop a detailed political theory during the Middle Ages. It is easier to explain the reasons why contemporary Islam is interested in these issues, by using as background the Western influences in literature and practice. Many of the people who carry today the flag of the Islamic state, especially among extremist fundamentalists, are Western educated. Ironically, the influence of the West and its emphasis on politics is more evident when they turn their back on the West and return to Islam hoping for solutions to their needs and doubts resulting from the modern age.⁵⁵

But when we talk about Western influence we do not necessarily mean a secular influence. In this field of political theory and the theory of the 'state', it can be argued that Western, or more precisely, Christian religious thought has influenced modern Islamic thought significantly, especially in the Shi'ite world.

The most developed model of the state within the Islamic world is that developed by Shi'ites and, not by accident does their model resemble the model developed in the

⁵³ Hava Lazeros-Yafe, *Islamic Culture*, (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1982) [Hebrew], p. 22

⁵⁴ Lazeros-Yafe, *op.cit.*, pp. 26-28.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-26.

Christian world. Both religious Christians and Shi'ites acknowledge the existence of two models of state that exist in the Western world; the classical liberal Western model and the command socialist (Marxist) models. Whereas liberal systems seek to maximize the autonomy of individuals and groups, the Marxist system seeks to eliminate this autonomy through an institutionalized programme of collectivism.⁵⁶

In both cases, the Christian and the Shi'i, a model known as 'organic-statist' developed to suite the needs and beliefs of the community. This model, developed by Latin American scholars is based on Catholic doctrine and philosophy and is prevalent in third world Catholic countries. The 'organic-statist' system is quite different from either of the two models presented above, the Marxist and the liberal.⁵⁷ Its fundamental premise is a normative one. The *raison d'être* of the state is moral in nature and the end is considered to be of more importance than either the means or its justifying procedure.⁵⁸

The 'organic-statist' model stresses the common good. The community takes precedence over the individual, since it is only in this community that human beings can attain their moral good. This necessitates a strong state - one that can not only protect the communal well-being but one that will also have the strength to promote the common good. The state, then, is what guarantees a unified society and a political community.⁵⁹

There are many similarities between the 'organic-statist' and 'populist Shi'i' models of government; the rejection of both Western liberal and Eastern Marxist models of the state; the preeminence of the concept of the community and the common good; the

⁵⁶ J.A. Bill and J.A. Williams, "Shi'i Islam and Roman Catholicism", in Kail Ellis, O.S.A (ed.), The Vatican, Islam and the Middle East, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987)pp. 69-105. (pp. 90-95).

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.91.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 98-100.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 92.

fundamental normative nature of politics and the system of law derived from divine precepts; the coexistence of two realms of power, including the authority of the state as the centre and the participatory power of the people at the periphery; the increasing contemporary concern for the downtrodden and oppressed as witnessed both by the growth of populism in Shi'ism and of liberation theology in Catholicism.⁶⁰

The Sunni world of thought is much more reserved in its development of a detailed plan for a state, in spite traces of influences from Shi'i political thought. In other aspects of political thought, the relation between Shi'i and Sunni thought is much more evident. Arguably this relationship was tightened due to the rise of fundamentalist Islamic thought, in both Shi'i and Sunni circles, which transformed Islam from a purely religious ideology to a political ideology, and in the examples of Iran and Pakistan, into state ideologies.

3.6 The Emergence of Nationalism in the Middle East

As demonstrated above, nationalism is an ideology of Western origin. The ideological/intellectual background of liberal democratic ideas which preceded nationalism in the West made only a weak impact in the Middle East. It was nevertheless a popular ideology which attracted Middle Eastern intellectuals as well as politicians who either advocated it or strongly opposed it.

The details of the appearance of nationalism in the Middle East are a matter of dispute. Some writers, such as George Antonius, date its beginning as early as the Wahabi

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 97-101.

movement and Muhammad Ali's attempt to found a Near Eastern empire centred on Egypt.⁶¹ Some other writers date it much later, after World War II. Most historians, however agree that nationalism as a coherent ideology was introduced into the Middle East, at the beginning of the present century. Nonetheless, it is true that certain vital elements of nationalism were introduced during the nineteenth century in most parts of the Ottoman Empire.

The metamorphosis of the idea of nationalism in the ex-Ottoman areas has been traced from both the initial idea of al-Afghani's Pan-Islam to pan-Arabism and to pan-Turanism. The reason for the attractiveness of nationalism is not yet clear. According to many writers, nationalism in the Middle East is a response to Western imperialism but as Elie Kedourie argues, this is a myth.⁶² Imperialism is political in its essence and has been exercised by military, political and cultural means. Economic exploitation is a minor factor; imperialism was not primarily a question of economic dominance and so nationalism was not a revolt against economic subjugation.⁶³ In a way, Kedourie argues, Europe supplied the ideas which helped others express hostility toward the West.⁶⁴

Kedourie's point seems valid. Nationalism was a response, but not to imperialism. An examination of the development of various nationalist movements which are not European in origin might provide a broader perspective. Analysis of the origins of such movements as Zionism, Arabism and Turkism reveals some common features.

One consequence of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt was the confrontation between

⁶¹ George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938).

⁶² Kedourie, Asia, pp. 24-27

⁶³ On this issue see: Nikki Keddie, Islamic Response to Imperialism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

⁶⁴ Kedourie, Asia, pp. 23-24

Islam and Western culture. The awareness of the obvious inferiority of the Muslims in warfare, technology, medicine and the arts caused a shock to the Muslim community which roused it from its tranquillity and created a discourse on how to respond to the challenge of the West.⁶⁵

While some opposed the new cultural challenge, others adopted its symbols. The latter can be divided into two groups, secularists and nationalists, which are frequently confused. It is true that while in the first days of their development in the Middle East these two movements were associated, nationalism and secularism were not identical. Not all secularists advocated nationalist ideas, and not all nationalists were secularists. In fact, as the next chapter will show, taking Turkey as an example, nationalism in the Middle East was inspired and built upon religious consciousness. Nationalism, like fundamentalism, is a political response to the challenge of the West, while secularism and modernism are cultural responses.

According to Sylvia Haim, nationalism, while not in perfect harmony with strict religious orthodoxy, is the least incompatible of modern European doctrines with the political thought and experience of Sunni Islam.⁶⁶ Her explanation is based on an examination of the literature of the Arab national movement.⁶⁷ By tracing alternatives to certain Islamic terms, which have developed as a result of the infiltration of Western ideas into Arabic thought, Haim argues that the "mental interpretation" of purely Western theories of nationalism into Islamic concepts is easy.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ See Chapter 5, pp. 120-122

⁶⁶ Sylvia Haim, "Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism", in W.Z. Laqueur, (ed.), The Middle East in Transition, (1958).

⁶⁷ See also Haim's book : Arab Nationalism, An Anthology, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962).

⁶⁸ Haim, "Islam and the Theory", pp. 10-15.

The foreign nature of many political theories disappears when words with a specific Islamic connotation are substituted. For example, the meaning of the concept watan shifted slowly away from "the place where one is born and resides" to take on the definition of patrie. Nevertheless, the question of why those ideas were so attractive in the first place must be raised.

At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that there are two models of nationalism, the Western, which is based on the rights of the individual, and the Central-Eastern European, which is more communal. If individualism, is associated with the modern political phenomenon of liberalism, even if anachronistically, then it is difficult to implement the Western model of nationalism into Islamic thought. The Eastern model, where the community is more important than the individual, is more compatible. According to Goitein, Islam demands conformity.⁶⁹ The Sira (biography of the Prophet) recounts an incident in which Muhammad lines up his soldiers into a straight battle line. The Prophet approached the only man not in line, pricked his belly with an arrow and ordered him to step back into the line.⁷⁰ The scene symbolised the demand for conformity and the suppression of individualism in Islam. For practical reasons, conformity was necessary in order to hold the empire together, since the Muslim Arabs were a minority in their empire and thus the only link between them and the wider population was Islam. While Western culture has progressively encouraged outward individual action and the Far East emphasised the interior life of the individual, Islamic culture has laid stress on the communal, social aspects of life above all else. In Islamic culture, man was viewed as part of the total

⁶⁹ S.D. Goitein, "Individualism and Conformity in Classical Islam", in Amin Banani and Speros Vryonis, Jr. (eds.), Individualism and Conformity in Classical Islam, (Fifth Giorgio Levi Della Vida Conference, May 23-25, 1975, University of California, Los Angeles).

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.12.

scheme of society. Furthermore, while in the West individual responsibility is emphasised, in Islam, man is not responsible for world events. Nationalism then, as Haim suggested, was the European political doctrine which was the least incompatible with Islam. The reason lies in the common basis of the two: the position of the individual in relation to society. The adoption of nationalism required a dramatic change neither in the believer's view of the world nor in his actions.

3.7 Conclusions

The fact that there is no precise definition for nation or nationalism reflects disagreement about its nature. Nations and the criteria for attachment to them are perceived differently in different societies and by different researchers. The discussion about the nature of nationalism centres around the questions of whether nationalism is negative or positive, and whether it is a reflection of society or purely a political doctrine. The views can be divided into three main groups: the first sees nationalism as a reflection of social evolution or nature; the second views nationalism as simply a political doctrine; the third holds that it arose through natural selection to fill a vacuum.

Discussion of these issues is not limited to European society, but extends to the Middle East and to research on the area. Nationalism as understood in Europe was practised both according to the Eastern-Central European model, and the Western, liberal model. While the consolidation of the nation is not a modern phenomenon, national consciousness as such came about only in the last few centuries. Nationalism is the demand that the nation should have the right to express itself and determine the nature of its own regime.

Although its origin is in secularism and liberalism, nationalism is not a substitute

for religion. It should be seen rather as a proposal for a political order. The compatibility of such an order with religion is uneasy, since Islam is universal and nationalism is particular. Nevertheless, such a synthesis is theoretically possible and has actually occurred. The question must be asked whether there is a certain political order determined by Islam, or whether this is an issue to be determined by man. The answers are varied both in the research and among Muslims. It can be argued that the more religion is occupied with the hereafter, the less it is concerned with the political system and order in this world, and vice versa. Hence, nationalism is more likely to be accepted by the conservative ulema and rejected by the modern Muslim intellectuals who have replaced the traditional leadership of the ulema, and who are more occupied with current problems.

The nationalist idea emerged in the Middle East in a religious context, as a by-product of the pan-Islamic vision. The political reality and the need for reform started a process of thought and activity in all parts of the Middle East which aimed to improve the gloomy situation in which the Islamic world found itself. The first step was the pan-Islamism of al-Afghani, who sought a return to the "original Islam". The second step was the demand for reforms in Islam and the rejection of foreign elements, whether Persian and Turkish in the Arab case, or Arabic and Persian in the Turkish case, in order to discover this "original Islam". Later it was established that Islam was in fact a national religion.

Nationalism was promoted in most new Middle Eastern states. As long as the combination was between the conservative quietist version of Islam and the central-eastern European version of nationalism, it seemed to work. But the moment this combination changed it ceased to work. This point is taken up in the following chapter.

NATIONALISM AND ISLAM IN TURKISH POLITICAL THOUGHT

After explaining the difference between the two models of nationalism and suggesting that the Eastern, ethnic model is the more conducive to the integration of Islam, this chapter will argue that Atatürk's territorial-based nation-state was a new idea forced upon the Turkish people by circumstance. The argument to be presented here is that Turkish nationalism was originally both ethnically based and strongly associated with Islam. Nationalist ideology and modern Islamic political thought emerged during the same period and in many ways were interrelated. They were caused by the same forces and had the same goals. Both aspired to the same political condition and both attempted to create a new system of morals which was based on the past and which would provide answers to the questions concerning life in the modern world. The relationship with Western civilization is central to the theories of both. The Kemalist experience was in fact a deviation from the "natural" course of development of nationalist ideology. As a result of Atatürk's policy ethnic nationalism was pushed aside, but ethnic aspirations never completely disappeared, reemerging in periods of social instability, difficulty and security-related unrest. Another result was the ebbing of Islam, which could not accommodate itself to the territorial scheme. Both the pan-Turanian and the Islamic movements continued, emerging in the 1970's as part of mainstream politics.

4.1 The Tanzimat's Literary Figures and Fundamentals of Nationalism

Political thought as a theoretical discipline is an alien concept to Islam. Nevertheless, Muslim thinkers drew upon Greek political works, when translations became available at the beginning of the ninth century, in their attempt to delineate the contours of the ideal ruler.¹ Since its beginning, the Ottoman empire, like earlier Islamic states, adopted political theories the roots of which lay in Greek ethics and Persian literature. But the necessity of a coherent state philosophy which could act as a blueprint for the rulers became obvious in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries when Western military superiority was demonstrated on Ottoman land.²

During the nineteenth century, European advisers as well as publications were allowed to enter the empire.³ This did not mean, however, that the sultans believed in European political institutions or ideologies; at best, they were enlightened despots. The first constitutional movement was formed secretly in 1859, and managed to achieve the first constitution only in 1876. Bernard Lewis argues that from about the middle of the 19th century the spread of Western ideas and the acclimatization of Western social and political attitudes among the Turks was greatly enhanced by the rise of a new Turkish literature, influenced by French and other Western literatures.⁴ He mentions, as pioneers in this field, İbrahim Şinasi (1821-1871), Ziya Paşa (1825-1880) and Namık

¹ For more information on Islamic political thought see: Erwin J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam. An Introduction Outline. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958). Also see: Franz Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography. (1952) p. 102.

² On 18th century reforms see: Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Vol.I, (Cambridge University Press, 1977), Chapter II.

³ On 19th century reforms see: Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 1856-1876. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963); C. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); D. Kushner, The Place of the Ulama in the Ottoman Empire in the Age of Reform, Turcica, No.19, 1987, pp.51-74.

⁴ Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968). p.136; B. Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution on Turkey", Journal of World History I, (1953)

Kemal (1840-1888), all members of the Young Ottomans.⁵

In contrast to Lewis, Murad Wahba argues that the Young Ottomans were sincere and devoted Muslims.⁶ Further investigation, he argues, reveals that these three were clearly conservatives. According to Wahba, Şinasi's political ideas contained no radical criticism of the existing order. Ziya Paşa attacked the fashions of his time, while Namık Kemal tried to reconcile the ideas of Montesquieu with the Shari'a. Wahba concludes:

...one could say that the three did not touch the central problem, which was the religious basis of the Empire. The one who touched this central problem was Mustafa Kemal.⁷

Though it is true that members of this new movement did not attack the religious basis of the empire, it would be incorrect to see them simply as conservatives. They were an important link in the development of modern ideas in Turkey.

In a way, they were presenting some ideas which they had derived from the West in Islamic terms. Ideas such as popular sovereignty, natural rights of the people, liberty, public opinion, national consciousness and constitutional government were presented by them for the first time in the history of the Ottoman empire. The way in which they tried to justify their ideas was by showing that these were in harmony with Islam. This apologetic attempt still exists in current Muslim writing, and is still the most common intellectual method of dealing with the 'Western challenge'. For the first time there was a recognition that the European supremacy in technology and the military was the result of supremacy of ideas, and that there was a need to emphasise those liberal-democratic elements which existed in Western culture but were dormant within the Islamic religion. For example, parliamentary democracy was well known to Islam, they argued, through the

⁵ For more details on Şinasi, Ziya Paşa and Namık Kemal, see throughout Şerif Mardin's The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).

⁶ Murad Wahba, "Influences of Occidental Ideologies on the Ottoman Empire" in Bacque-Grammont and Paul Dumont (eds.) Economie et Societies dans l'empire ottomane, (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1983). pp.167-171.

⁷ Wahba, op.cit., p.168.

concept of shura.⁸

Of all the members of the Young Ottoman movement, Namık Kemal is perhaps the most famous. Kemal was born in December 1840 in the town of Tekirdağ to an upper class family with a long tradition of serving the state. His father was the Sultan's astronomer, his mother the daughter of a governor. At the age of 17 he started his service in the Translation Bureau of the Customs Office, and later worked in the Porte. As a result of his friendship with Şinasi and his writing as a journalist he spent much time in exile.⁹ In Turkey he is known particularly for promoting the ideas of fatherland and liberty. Throughout the writings of Kemal two themes recur: the divine justice of religious law and the observance of the principles of Islam.¹⁰ In fact, few of the ideas in his writing are of purely European origin. His interest in 'the people' and their participation in the political process, for example, was not only a product of European liberalism. The origin of his interest in the people may have been in religion, and very probably in his interest in mysticism.¹¹ It is interesting to note that as Mardin relates, Kemal's family was called 'a bektashi family' and undoubtedly they had connections with the bektaşhi order, a mystic order whose contribution to the intellectual life of the Ottoman Empire is well known.¹² This background of Islamic mysticism (tasavvuf) made the elaboration of liberal European ideologies easier. His ideology was a product of two sources - Islamic philosophy and European thought.

Kemal believed in the Shari'a as the perfect means to achieve justice, which included all that could be considered a constitution, including the principle of government structure and the

⁸ Shura means in direct translation- council. For more information see: "Shura" in EI2.

⁹ On Kemal see; Bernard Lewis, Emergence, Chapter 6; Şerif Mardin, Genesis, pp.283-336.

¹⁰ Mardin, Genesis, p.287.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.287-288.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.288.

rights of the governed. He therefore demanded the implementation of the Shari'a. Kemal identified the Shari'a as being the equivalent of Volney's concept of natural law. His conclusion was that ceasing to observe the Shari'a had led, and would continue to lead to further cultural and political decline.¹³ By dealing with such matters as the decline of civilizations and empires, an issue which had concerned many scholars before and after him, Kemal's approach broke new ground. His conclusion was the same as that of the traditional writers. His conception of progress shows obvious European influence. Progress, he argued, comes as part of the dynamic movement within every society and is irreversible. Western progress was a result of events in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its main attribute was the achievement of a "lasting order" by the separation of existing laws from "superstitions" and "abstractions".¹⁴ The use of science had led to the declaration of human rights in France. In other words, Kemal argued that the implementation of the Shari'a must lead to the liberation of the people - an argument that is still dominant in Islamic circles. His belief in progress as a self-perpetuating process activated by human reason is, nonetheless, unacceptable to conservative Islam, where Good is omnipotent.¹⁵ It was only in the twentieth century that such ideas penetrated Islamic thought [see chapter 6].

As to government, he argued, its duty is to put into practice religious law – the Shari'a. The government is in power by the consensus of a group of people representing the entire population. Governments are appointed in order to perform a duty. No single person has the right to break this contract between the Muslim people and the caliph; this right is not an individual one, he argues, but rather that of a community which can execute a decision made after meeting

¹³ Volney, like other writers such as the historian Edward Gibbon, based his argument on assumed moral decline.

¹⁴ Mardin, *op.cit.*, p.321.

¹⁵ The problem with his argument is that he places the Shari'a as parallel to God, limiting his power to a systematic order which can be understood by a human.

together.¹⁶ His position in this matter is similar to that of Islamic jurists who opposed the right to rebel, and can be described as the "quietist" version of Islam.

While Namık Kemal was introducing new concepts like "fatherland" and "freedom" in his work, Ahmet Mithat and Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem were criticising the "over-westernization" of upper class Ottomans. The ambivalent attitude of the Young Ottomans toward "westernization" was reflected in daily newspapers and in magazines, where both political attitudes were discussed. As Emre Kongar suggests

They [the young Ottomans] borrowed the main concepts of 'national identity' from the West, but they feared Western culture as a threat to that very identity which they wanted to create around the concept of Ottomanism.¹⁷

In fact, Islamic revivalism and nationalism were two schools of thought that had developed alongside each other since the beginning of the "westernization" process.

The new constitution advocated by the Young Ottomans was issued in 1876, by Sultan Abdülhamit II, but was in place for only five months when the chamber of deputies (the Meclis) was dissolved. In spite of the despotic nature of Abdülhamit's regime or perhaps because of it, a new Western-like elite emerged. They had absorbed the liberal ideas of the Young Ottomans, including ideas of European origin such as nationalism and secularism. These ideas played an important role in the events that subsequently led to the establishment of the modern Turkish state and which, along with Islam, still dominate Turkish politics and thought.

¹⁶ He based this theory on the Islamic notion of bay'a (oath of allegiance).

¹⁷ Emre Kongar, "Turkey's Cultural Transformation" in Günsel Renda and C. Max Kortepeler (eds.), The Transition of Turkish Culture. The Atatürk Legacy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

42 The Seeds of Turkish Islamic Radicalism

A new and no less important Islamic intellectual trend emerged in parallel to the emergence of Western ideologies in Turkey. This trend had two currents: pan-Islam, and Islamic radicalism. Under Abdülhamit II pan-Islam became official Ottoman policy, a useful weapon in the armoury of the Ottoman state which was adopted for both internal and external reasons.¹⁸

At home it helped the Sultan in his appeals to Muslim and especially Arab loyalty against liberals, nationalists, reformists, and other dangerous dissidents; abroad, it enabled the Sultan's emissaries to mobilize support among Muslims all over the world, and provided a lever for use against the Christian empires if needful.¹⁹

Ali Suavi is best known today as the first modern Turk to die for democratic ideals.

Whether these ideals were indeed what motivated him, or whether he was in reality a charlatan and a crank, as Mardin suggests, is debatable.²⁰ The real reason he deserves attention, however, is because he was the first modern Turk to develop a theory of revolt against a ruler based on Islamic principles. For the purpose of the present study, Suavi is perhaps the best example of the coexistence of religious thought and nationalism.

Ali Suavi was born in Istanbul in 1839, the son of a paper merchant. His education included primary education at a rüşdiye school followed by studies in religious science. Suavi served in a government bureau for a certain period and then taught in a rüşdiye school in Bursa. He was later appointed to an administrative post in Filibe (Plodiv), and then to another teaching post. A conflict with his regional administrator regarding radical activities led to his dismissal. Upon returning to Istanbul he became involved in Young Ottoman circles and began writing for the

¹⁸ Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963) p.102; On Abdülhamid's foreign policy see: S. Deringil, "The Ottoman Response to the Egyptian Crisis of 1881-1882", MES, 24, (Jan 1988).

¹⁹ Lewis, "Middle East", op.cit. p.102.

²⁰ Mardin, op.cit., p.360.

Muhbir and Ulum newspapers. His activities were not welcomed by the Grand Vizier, who deported him to Anatolia. Suavi's ideology and political activity were also not in line with the Young Ottomans, and he soon parted from their camp.²¹ Unlike Namık Kemal, whose theory emphasized the concept of popular sovereignty, Suavi found the concept meaningless from the perspective of Islamic political theology. He replaced the principle of separation of powers, introduced by Namık Kemal, with the Unity of the Imamate. Perhaps the most important aspect of his theory is his willingness to support it not only verbally, but with an act of civil disobedience.

As to the idea of popular sovereignty, Suavi argued that no human being possesses sovereignty. Such sovereignty can only be in the hands of the divine power. As to the separation of powers, Suavi saw it as already in existence in Islam - the division of labour between the müftü (the interpreter of the Shari'a), the kadı (the judge in the Islamic court) and the vali (the governor who acts as the executive). But unlike Kemal, he does not accept this division as a necessary component of a system of checks and balances, but rather as a separation of functions. The idea that those functions should work at cross-purposes with one another as required in a checks and balances system is unacceptable to Suavi.²² The principle of the unity of the imamate required that the three different functionaries should carry out different tasks. However, their link to one another is part of a hierarchical chain. The Islamic state should be based on this order, or more specifically, the divine, the Ulama, the Emirs and the people.

In his writing, both in Muhbir and in Ulum, three points stand out: first, his readiness to call for drastic measures to speed the recovery of the Empire, second, identification with the underprivileged; and third, a readiness to resist authority. Ali Suavi believed that eventually the Turks would begin to take matters in their own hands. He also believed that hard work was needed

²¹ For more details on Suavi see: Mardin, op.cit, pp.360-366.

²² Ibid., p.368.

to match European educational advances. Muslims should devote themselves to the development of industry and should study mathematics and science. Economic and commercial enterprises should be taken out of the hands of foreigners:

what is this ignominiousness that has befallen us, what is this inability to stir ourselves, what is this sweepingness, what is this effeminateness ? Why should it be that the Franks who are not congenitally smarter than we should hold their government to account for state expenditures while we contribute our dues and then do nothing but stupidly stare ?²³

Was Suavi the first Turkish nationalist, as some tend to see him, or was he the first radical Muslim? His fame as the first Turkish nationalist is based mainly on his being the first to use the term Turk, and additionally, for the attention he gave to the situation of the Turkic peoples of central Asia. He had demanded that the codification of Islamic law be accompanied by a Turkish translation. His dramatic death perhaps contributed to his being adopted as a national hero. Did his concerns stem from a consciousness of nationality? His own words do not substantiate this assertion.

Do our ministers realize that the question of nationalities is one special to Europeans and that we do not have a nationalities problem? Nationality questions would cause our ruin. To gather Muslims together could at most be a religious question of national origin.²⁴

It can be argued that Suavi's radical approach is of critical importance in the development of Islamic modernism and radicalism, and merits attention for its originality. Suavi's defence of the right of civil disobedience was based on three types of Islamic sources: traditional attributions of the earliest Caliphs; the Koranic obligation imposed by the prophet on his community to conform to the good and to avoid evil; and arguments taken from selected late medieval jurists. Suavi's type of argument was used by others; it was the main source for the arguments of the Muslim modernists and to a greater extent of the fundamentalists who came later. It is suggested that Suavi did not

²³ Suavi, Muhbir, editorial, 5 December 1867, p.4. quoted by Mardin, op.cit., p.370.

²⁴ Quoted by Mardin, op.cit., p.372.

make a distinction between being a Muslim and being a Turk, as most Turkish people of that period did. For him, being a proud Turk meant first of all being a Muslim, and the attention and concern he gave to other Turkic people in central Asia derived from their being Muslims.

4.3 The Emergence of Turkic Nationalism

While European ideas spread within the Ottoman Empire²⁵, Turkish nationalism, argues Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, had developed earlier into a more coherent formula among Turks living in Russia.²⁶ One of the most important of the intellectuals responsible for this was the Crimean Tatar İsmail Gasprinsky (1851-1914), also known as Gaspıralı İsmail. In 1883 Gasprinsky began publishing the newspaper Tercüman in Bahcesaray, Crimea. He was convinced that the survival of Muslim people in Russia depended on their closing ranks, and that all Turkish people should unite linguistically and spiritually.²⁷

The most influential and active Russian-Turkish ideologue was undoubtedly, Yusuf Akçura.²⁸ Akçura (1876-1935) was of Volga Tatar descent. He came to Istanbul at an early age and studied at a military school. Later, he continued his education in Paris at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques. He was strongly influenced by the French national ideologists Maurice Barres and Ernest Renan, as well as by German racial theories.²⁹ A year after returning to Russia, Akçura published

²⁵ See: Kemal Karpat, An Inquiry into the Social Foundation of Nationalism in the Ottoman State, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973)

²⁶ Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, "The Ultra Nationalist Right" in Shick and Tonak (eds.), Turkey in Transition, (N.Y: Oxford University Press, 1987). p.180.

²⁷ Ibid., p.180.

²⁸ Ibid., p.181.

²⁹ Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967). p.38.

his famous article "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset" [Three Kinds of Policy] in the Cairo journal Türk.³⁰ This important article rejected both Ottomanism and pan-Islam as possible solutions. Akçura argued that they were impracticable and that the only viable option was the implementation of Turkism. His Tatar origin influenced his choice; Turkism, as he suggested, was based on race, and its aim was the unification of all Turkic groups.³¹ He analyzed the possible paths of Turkic political ideology in the light of the previous evolution of the Ottoman empire, and categorically rejected the political theories upon which both Turkish liberals and conservatives based their programmes. He believed that the pan-Islamic ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Gasprinsky had become obsolete in this era of secularization in Muslim lands. He regarded as equally unsound the theory of Ottomanism proclaimed by the Young Turks, which aimed not at reconstructing the Ottoman empire on a religious or national basis, but rather at transforming it into a multinational state patterned after Austro-Hungary. According to the Young Turks' theories, all Ottoman subjects were to be equal citizens of the Turkish empire, which they promised to reconstruct on a liberal basis after their seizure of power, abolishing all religious or racial discrimination. Akçura, however, believed that the growth of nationalist forces among the various Muslim and Christian groups of Ottoman Turkey would jeopardize, if not actually thwart, any attempt to achieve recognition for the empire. Rejecting these theories, he suggested a third way - the political unification of the Turkic peoples of both the Ottoman and the Russian empires. Although this new doctrine appeared unrealistic, other Turkic Russian journalists expounded the unification of all Turkic and Muslim peoples. Two Azerbaijani politicians, Ahmed Bey Agaev and Hüsesein Zadeh, are worthy of special mention. Huseyinzade Ali (1864-1941), who later took the surname Turan, defined in 1907 the objectives of

³⁰ Yusuf Akçura, "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset" (translated in unpublished form at McGill University, Montreal in 1953 by Niyazi Berkes and Bill Edmonds as "Three Policies"). For more information on Akçura see; David S Thomas, The Life and Thought of Yusuf Akçura, 1876-1935, (Ph.D Dissertation, McGill University, 1976).

³¹ Ağaoğulları, op.cit., p.181.

Turkish nationalism as "Turkism, Islamism and Europeanism", and proposed the spiritual unification of all Turks under Ottoman leadership and language.³²

In the Ottoman empire, the Tanzimat literary figures can be considered the first Turkists. Their interest, however, lay not in political activities but rather in developing a national language by purifying Ottoman Turkish. Ahmet Vefik Paşa, author of the Ottoman Lexicon (1876), was the first to distinguish between Turkish and Ottoman Turkish. More importantly, Turkish history, according to Ahmet Vefik, did not start with the Ottomans, and should include all Turkic peoples. These ideas were further developed by Şemseddin Şemsi and others.³³ The focus of the Turkish intellectuals during this period was on such questions as the origin of the Turks, their language and history. It was only after 1908 that Turkist-nationalist thinkers began to articulate political ideas and to form a systematic ideology.

The restoration of the constitution on 23 July 1908, after the defeat of Abdülhamit, was the dawn of a new era.³⁴ Taking advantage of that freedom, the Turkists in Istanbul founded various associations. The most important of these was the Türk Ocağı (Turkish Hearth).³⁵ The organization was initially founded in June 1911, by students of medicine and other disciplines as a semi-secret club. It was officially established on the March 12 1912. Among its members were Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, Ahmet Ferit, Fuat Sabit, Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp. According to Hamdullah Suphi, the organization had two duties: to defend the cultural heritage of the nation [meaning: to purify the language] and to guard and defend the new reforms. The Hearth became

³² Ibid., p.180.

³³ Ibid., pp.181-182.

³⁴ It should be noted that historians call the era of the first constitution (1875-76) birinci meşrutiyet devri, and the era of the second constitution (1908-18) ikinci meşrutiyet devri.

³⁵ On the Türk Ocağı see: Landau, Pan Turkism in Turkey; Frank Tachau, "The Search for National Identity among the Turks", DWI, New Series, VIII (3) 1963, pp.165-176.

the focal point of pan-Turkist activities, but after the war of independence there was a need to shift the emphasis toward reconciling the old pan-Turkist ideology with the new outlook of a territorially limited national state. Like Gökalp, the club insisted that nationality must be based on cultural and ideological unity and held strict criteria for ethnic identification. Naturally this would include the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, while excluding such Anatolian groups as Circassians, Laz, Kurds and others. It was this outlook that brought about the closure of the club by the Kemalists in 1931 (it was reopened in 1987). Since the Kemalists sought the establishment of a strong state with a limited territorial base, it was natural for them to object to ethnic or racial standards for inclusion.

4.4 The Young Turk Period

The faction which emerged as dominant after 1908 was the Society of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti). Their main concern was to maintain the unity of the empire.³⁶ Theoretically, they objected to any attempt to divide the empire's inhabitants on racial, national or religious grounds.³⁷ This should have meant the abolition of the traditional millet system.³⁸ After the empire's loss of almost all its remaining European territory, the Committee for Union and Progress strengthened its hold on the government. From 1913 until 1918 the empire was ruled by a dictatorial triumvirate: Enver, Cemal and Talat. What had begun in a new mood of liberalism

³⁶ For more information on the Young Turks see: Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics: 1908-1914, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, Jr., The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (reprinted in Beirut: Khayyas, 1965); Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp.304-428; Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp.266-339; S.S Aydemir, Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya: Enver Paşa, 3 vols (Istanbul, 1970-72); Şerif Mardin, Jon Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri: 1895-1908, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1964) pp.42-43.

³⁷ Their views were ambivalent. They were divided between a liberal wing under prince Sabaheddin leadership and a more ethnic oriented groups that finally came to power.

³⁸ Millet was the system under which religious minorities had been organized as separate, protected communities, governed according to their own law by their own religious authority. See: "millet" in EI.

ended with a strong, centralised ruling junta. In their efforts to restore Ottoman greatness the three leaders were prepared to use both Islam and Turkism as political tools.

The Young Turks were sceptical of the approach that Islam was the solitary glue holding the Ottoman population together. Hence, they entrusted Ziya Gökalp with the task of finding a different common denominator.³⁹ Mehmet Ziya was born in 1875 (or 1876) in Diyarbakır, into a family of Ottoman officials. After the Young Turk revolution in 1908 he was invited to represent his home town in the Union and Progress Party committee in Salonika. In 1912 he moved to Istanbul where he taught sociology and participated in intellectual clubs as well as in politics. After World War I he was deported by the entente, along with other party leaders, to Malta. He came back only in 1921 and died in October 1924.⁴⁰

Gökalp's ideology was a synthesis of three existing ideologies: Ottomanism, pan-Islam, and pan-Turanism.⁴¹ It was based on the belief that three principal factors should mould the character of the Turkish modern state: the national Turkish culture, the Islamic religion, and European civilization.⁴² Influenced by the French sociologist Emile Durkheim, Gökalp focused on the concepts of civilization and culture.⁴³ According to him, civilization consisted of technological tools and scientific knowledge which can be shared by different societies. Many Western societies,

³⁹ Mardin, in *Özbudun*, *op.cit.*, p.207

⁴⁰ On Gökalp see; Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teaching of Ziya Gökalp*, (London: Luzak and The Harvill Press Ltd., 1950). another excellent analysis is by Taha Parla, *The Political and Social Thought of Ziya Gökalp (1889-1924)*, (Leiden: Brill, 1989).

⁴¹ Which he never managed to reconcile.

⁴² See: Ziya Gökalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, Niyazi Berkes (ed.), trans by R. Devereux, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1959).

⁴³ Gökalp's work must be understood in the context of German and French sociology. It was Emil Durkheim (1858-1917) that influenced Gökalp more than anyone else. Durkheim was a leading figure in the formalization of sociology as the science of society. Active during a period of rapid transformation in French society, Durkheim sought to provide a scientific basis for social legislation. In works like *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915), *The Division of Labour in Society* (1893), and *The Rules of Sociological Method* (1895), and *Suicide* (1897), Durkheim laid the theoretical basis for his last major works on belief and knowledge, particularly in religious systems.

with differing nationalities and cultures, but typically industrialized, share the same social institutions that constitute the Western civilization. Civilization, in other words, is international in its nature. Culture, however, is essentially national; it is the combination of values, beliefs and institutions which define a group of people. Gökalp's criticism of the tanzimat reformers was based on this differentiation. His argument, which was very similar to those of Abduh and other modernists in the Arab world, held that the reformers were trying to adopt not just the tools of Western civilization, a positive goal, but also to adopt its cultural values. Gökalp concluded from this that their ideology was out of step with the modern world, since a modern state must be based on a single culture.

On the role of Islam, Gökalp's writings bear some similarity to other Islamic modernists in the Middle East. He did not propose the abolition of religion, merely its reform. The reform he suggested is based on distinguishing between those commandments which were integral to religion and those which were not.⁴⁴ Gökalp argued that what was generally considered the Islamic order of society was actually derived from Arabic culture. Islam, he claimed, is a religion that insists only on its followers' faith. Social organization is a matter of choice for each culture. It is important to emphasise that Gökalp's aim was not the separation of religion from the state, but rather the purification of religion (perhaps following the example of Martin Luther or Muhammad Abduh), which he saw as a significant component of the Turkish culture/nation. Like other modernists in the Middle East in the last century, he was influenced by the rational approach, which can be summed up in Hegel's words: "What is reasonable is true and what is true is reasonable." Gökalp's theory was inconsistent in certain respects and is open to serious criticism. Nevertheless, he is considered the father of the Turkish national movement and one of the most significant thinkers of modern

⁴⁴ He distinguished between nas, commands of Allah that were given in the Koran, the sunna, which are permanent and unchangeable; and örf, which are the creation of mankind and therefore changeable.

Turkey. Gökalp was the first Turk to use Western sociological discipline in his search for the Turkish identity. His ideology became the intellectual basis for the modern state although his writings do not indicate a willingness to relinquish Turkic solidarity.

While the theories examined here helped to create a common national identity, the idea of a territorial nation-state based on the Turkish people of Anatolia appeared in a coherent version for the first time during World War I. The bitter political reality that was the aftermath of the war left no other choice, as the ideological retreat to Anatolia remained the only option.⁴⁵

The concept of the homeland was introduced by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder and first president of the Turkish republic.⁴⁶ One of the most controversial issues in scholarly writings on the modern history of Turkey has been the assessment of the presidency of Atatürk and the Kemalist drive for secularism and nationalism efforts.⁴⁷ This is not so much due to disagreement about the evidence, but is mostly the outcome of differences in interpretation. As is often the case, these have stemmed from ideological differences formed by personal experience, cultural outlook, and political pre-commitment. Since few writers dispute the importance of the leader's personal impact on the course of events during his tenure of office, a great deal of the discussion centres on the evaluation of his character and actions, especially his view of Islam and the separation between state and religion.

While the motives remained uncertain, the actions were documented and from them it is

⁴⁵ On the occupation of Turkish lands by the Allies and the war of liberation see: Aydemir, Tek Adam, vol.2; Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp.340-372; Samih Nafiz Kansu, İki Devrim Perde Arkası, (İstanbul, 1957); Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizin Esasları, (İstanbul: Sinan,1951); Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Milli Mücadele Hatıraları, (İstanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1953).

⁴⁶ See: Lord Kinross, Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey, (New York: William Morrow, 1965).Chapter 5.

⁴⁷ Ergun Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist, Political Regime" in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (eds.), Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State, (London: C.Hurst, 1981)

clear that Atatürk was influenced by Gökalp's and Namık Kemal's ideas.⁴⁸ He was familiar with the works of Rousseau, Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim, and was a great believer in the influence of nature on mankind. Man is seen as the creation of nature, equipped with intelligence for survival. He despised Islamic orthodoxy as much as he did the primitive sufi tarikat ceremonies. Their belief in miraculous events or fortune seemed absurd to him. "Luck is only the approach of events which we have not been able to calculate beforehand", he once said.⁴⁹

After defeating the Sultan and achieving recognition by the Great Powers of the sovereignty of the new state, Atatürk's main task was the creation of a bond between the Turkish people and the land of Anatolia.⁵⁰ The contact between land and people is the basis, he argued, for patriotism in the western national state. A new theory was developed to support this bond but the historical connection with the Turkic people in central Asia was already significant. The "sun theory" was presented in Ankara in 1932 at a congress of the National Historical Society. This theory developed into the fanciful claim that the Turks constituted a white Aryan nation whose origin was central Asia, the centre of human culture.⁵¹ As a result of natural disasters, the Turks began to move in waves to different parts of Asia and Africa. This was how the Sumerian and Hittite cultures were created, and also explains why Anatolia, the centre of the Hittite culture, is historically a Turkish land. This theory, based, as Lewis quite rightly argues, on wrong assumptions and half-truths, has no scientific basis. It is a myth, but a very important one. Anatolia has become the centre of this new nationalism. In order to emphasise Anatolia's importance, Ankara, located in the region's

⁴⁸ Though Atatürk was reluctant to recognise the debt.

⁴⁹ Özbudun, op.cit., p.14.

⁵⁰ See the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923.

⁵¹ B. Lewis, "History-Writing and National Revival in Turkey", MEA, June-July 1953, pp. 224-225.

centre, replaced Istanbul, which represented the Islamic Ottoman past, as Turkey's capital.⁵² While many efforts were made to create a new past for the Turkish nation, its real past - the Islamic Ottoman past - was under severe attack.

4.5 The 'Age of Ignorance' 1924-1949

In the first Grand National Assembly, approximately twenty per cent of the deputies were ulema. However, the cooperation between the ulema and Mustafa Kemal's forces was short-lived. No new deputy with a clerical background was elected to the fourth, fifth, sixth or seventh assemblies. As Binnaz Toprak pointed out, once in power the Kemalists immediately undertook a program of secular reforms which dealt a heavy blow to the institutional power of Islam.⁵³ The republic was proclaimed on 29 October 1923; from 1924 many laws redefining the role of Islam were introduced.⁵⁴ In 1924 the caliphate was abolished, along with the office of Seyhülislam, the Shari'a courts, and the medreses. In 1925, the Gregorian calendar replaced the lunar and solar rumi calendars. A year later the Swiss civil code was adopted, in 1928 the Arabic script was changed to Latin, and the second article of the 1924 constitution mandating Islam as the state religion was deleted.⁵⁵ These reforms continued until the 1940's, when the political balance changed. In political terms, the most important aspect of the Kemalist reforms was the principle of basing the

⁵² There were also military reasons for this transfer.

⁵³ Binnaz Toprak, "The Religious Right", in Schick and Tonak (eds.) Turkey in Transition, (N.Y: Oxford University Press, 1987). pp. 218-235. (p.222).

⁵⁴ For more details on Kemal's reforms see: Karpas, Turkey's Politics, pp. 40-76; Lewis, The Emergence, pp.256-293; Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 365 and 373-396; N. Yalman, "Some Observation on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey" Daedalus, Vol.102, No.1 (1973). Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution", IJMES, Vol.2 (1971).

⁵⁵ Toprak, op.cit., p.223

legitimacy of political authority on the sovereignty of the nation, rather than on Islamic law.⁵⁶

Generally speaking, the laws relating to religious matters promulgated by Kemal's successor, İsmet İnönü, between 1938-50, were in the same spirit as those enacted in the time of Atatürk.⁵⁷ The 1924-50 period is described by Salih Tuğ, Dean of the Faculty of Theology, Marmara University, as the "Age of Ignorance".⁵⁸ As far as Islam and Islamic education were concerned, this name is certainly apt. Islamic political activity was banned and the generation that grew up during this period was almost totally ignorant of tradition and the history of the Turkish Islamic past. The Islamic torch of that time was carried by the sufi movement, which alone was able to survive and keep alive the spiritual dimensions of Islam. The groups which dominated the Turkish intellectual scene then and later were influenced by the positivism of Auguste Comte, social Darwinism, biological materialism, the individualism of La Play, political collectivism and the secularism of Durkheim.

Although nationalism defeated religion as the basis for the state, and religious practice was often a target, paradoxically it soon became clear that the criterion for being part of the nation was first of all a religious one. The war against the Kurdish leader Sheikh Sait in 1925 confused those who concluded that it was caused by ethnic differentiation or others who attributed it completely to the war between the Kemalists and the Sufis.⁵⁹ The real reasons could have been both or neither of those cited above, however, examination of many other incidents also leads to the conclusion that religion was the first and the most important condition for being part of the nation. Non-

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.224.

⁵⁷ For instance, law 4055 of 2 June, 1941, brought heavier penalties for wearing the fez and using Arabic script. See: Geyikdağı, op.cit., p.65.

⁵⁸ MET, 8 August 1983.

⁵⁹ R.W. Olson and W.F. Tucker, "The Sheikh Sait Rebellion in Turkey (1925) DWI, Vol.18, Nos. 3-4 (1977-1978)

Muslims were Turkish citizens but not 'Turks' in the popular perception. The first example was that of the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in 1923. Officially it was an exchange of Greeks for Turks, but in practice, the criterion used was not ethnic but religious; Muslims were exchanged for Christians. The second famous incident which supports the view that religion was the true basis for Turkish nationalism was that of the varlık vergisi in 1942.⁶⁰ Payment of this property tax was decided according to religious affiliation. Under foreign pressure, this tax was finally repealed in 1944, but the attitude towards religious minorities remained basically the same. In some periods it was positive, and in some negative, but nevertheless the fact remains that religious minorities were never seriously accepted as part of the Turkish nation.

The year 1949 marked the end of the "age of ignorance" for the religious community in one aspect. After the Second World War, many politicians adopted the cause of religious education and eventually succeeded in establishing special middle and secondary schools known as "İmam-Hatip" schools, (i.e. schools for preachers and leaders of religious ceremonies). For the first time in over thirty years, the teaching of the Koran and its commentaries, hadith, Islamic law, history and philosophy, in conjunction with modern science and ideas, became common. These institutions were an alternative to the secular middle and secondary schools. In 1975, a reform act transformed and recognized the İmam-Hatip schools as lycees with a full teaching curriculum. After the 1980 military coup, the graduates of İmam-Hatip schools were given permission to enter universities for higher education.

In the 1960's, Muslim intellectuals launched a translation campaign. Classical Muslim scholars such as al-Ghazali, Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, and Ibn Taymmiyah were introduced for the first time to the Turkish audience, as well as more modern scholars such as Jemaluddin Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, Maulana Maududi, Sayyid Qutb and Malik bin Nabi. The

⁶⁰ Edward Clark, "The Turkish Varlık Vergisi Reconsidered", MES, VIII (May 1972), pp.205-216.

availability of classical and contemporary works of Islamic thought led Muslim intellectuals to think about the common problems of Muslims throughout the world. The direct result was the emergence of a neo-salafī intellectual generation that argued that Muslims have no future without opening the gates of ijtihād.⁶¹ At the same time sufī groups, mainly the the Nakṣibendi, began rendering the classical sufī works into Turkish.⁶² Dergah Publications, a sufī publication house, published over 150 classical works. The works of the Swiss sufī Rene Guenon and his followers, Martin Lings, Titus Burkhardt and Hossein Nasr were all translated into Turkish in the seventies.⁶³ These works were especially important because they were seen as a critique of the West from inside. This encouraged many readers, inspiring their confidence in Islam and the belief that it offers an alternative to Western civilization.⁶⁴

4.6 The Reemergence of Turkic Nationalism (pan-Turanianism)

Although many researchers anticipated that pan-Turanian ideas and feelings, would disappear with the reemergence of religious education and its reinstatement in political and cultural life, Turkic nationalism, became part of the mainstream political scene during the 1970's.⁶⁵ In the 1980's Islam and nationalism joined together to constitute what became the original ideological stream of nationalism based on religious, ethnic and linguistic affiliation.

⁶¹ See: Khaudhin Karaman, Ijtihad in Islamic Law.

⁶² Including the works of the Nurcus who are not Sufis.

⁶³ Ziauddin Sardar, "Refloating the Intellectual Enterprise of Islam", Afkar Inquiry, (1986) Vol. 3 part. 2, pp. 32-37. (p.35)

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ This was possible mainly because of the relatively liberal attitudes in the pre-1960s military intervention. See: Landau, Pan Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentalism, (London: Hurst, 1981), p.166.

Even before the collapse of the USSR, the connections of the Turkish people with their neighboring Turkic "brothers" were emphasised in various Turkish political and cultural circles. Pan-Turanian clubs that had been closed by the Kemalists in the 1930's were reopened; one example was the Türk Ocağı, which was reopened in 1987.⁶⁶ But even before, in the 1960's and 1970's, many clubs of 'Outside Turks' and Turkish pan-Turkists were established. One was the Türkçüler Derneği (Association of pan-Turkists). Established in 1962, branches were soon opened in Ankara, Istanbul, Kayseri, Adana, Mersin, Tarsus, Polatli, Boğazlayan, Antalya, Izmir and Yeşilhisar.⁶⁷ But undoubtedly glasnost and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet empire opened wide the door for the pan-Turanists and their claims. The mass demonstrations Turkey and the ongoing declarations of politicians regarding the background to the Armenian-Azerbaijani clash over Nagorniy-Karabakh and the poor economic situation of the Turkic people of the Muslim Republics in central Asia and the Caucasus indicated the popularity of pan-Turanian ideology. Moreover, government ministers as well as opposition leaders could not ignore the strong sympathy felt by many for those they considered their relatives.⁶⁸

Turkish solidarity on a nationalist basis was not new to the 1980's. Turkey had previously voiced protest against the situation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus and Yugoslavia, and has long showed concern for the position of the Turkish minority in Iraq. For practical reasons Pan-Turanian demands after World War II increasingly turned toward the "Outside Turks" living in Cyprus, Greece, Iran, Iraq and Syria but never neglected the 'captive Turks', the large majority of outside Turks, living under communist regimes in the Soviet Union and mainland

⁶⁶ It was reopened once before in 1947.

⁶⁷ The name of the club was changed on 26 August 1964 to Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği (Union of Nationalists of Turkey).

⁶⁸ It is also possible that after years of rejections by the EC, this gave Turkey a new sense of importance in the world.

China, which then seemed permanent.⁶⁹

Relations with Bulgaria had been tense since the 1950's, when large numbers of Turkish Muslims were forced out of Bulgaria and settled in Turkey.⁷⁰ The situation of this minority in Bulgaria became a cause for tension between the two countries again in the mid-1980s, when Turks were forced to adopt Bulgarian-Slavic names. Turkish villages which resisted what they considered a stripping of their national identity came under machine-gun fire.⁷¹ In Cyprus, the concern for the future of the Turkish minority led to the occupation of northern Cyprus and the establishment of the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. But the situation of the Muslim minority in ex-Yugoslavia is perhaps the most interesting one for this study, since the community there is in fact Muslim but not ethnically Turkic. Nevertheless, they are seen as Turkish by locals and by Turks in Turkey, another sign of the confusion between religious and ethnic ties.

Another interesting fact is the emphasis on Turkish-speakers and the spread of the Turkish language in central Asia. Preparations have begun on a Turkic languages dictionary and the Turks have even agreed to add five more letters to their alphabet. Cultural centres and language schools have been built both in Turkey and in the republics of Central Asia. About 8,000 students from the republics study in Turkey on scholarships. In addition, Zaman, a right-wing Islamic newspaper is distributed in central Asia in local languages in addition to Turkish. The distribution of Zaman is another example of the strong connection between ethnic nationalism and conservative religion.

These cultural relations with the Turkic peoples are motivated not only by ideological and nationalist reasons; economic factors also play a role. Turkey sees in the republics a great potential market, although trade with them now stands at only one per cent of overall Turkish trade.

⁶⁹ Landau, Pan Turkism in Turkey, (Hamden, 1981), p.144; See: Deringil, "Turkish Foreign".

⁷⁰ On the Turks of Bulgaria see: Alexandre Popovic, "The Turks of Bulgaria (1878-1985)" CAS, Vol.5, No.2, pp.1-32, 1986.

⁷¹ Türk Kültürü, No.263, March 1985, pp.129-131.

Nevertheless, there is an opportunity for development and investment, and no less important is the aspect of political insurance in this post-cold war age. This political and economic view has been manifested in visits of prime ministers, presidents and ministers on both sides, in opening of embassies, and construction, communications and transportation contracts. Azerbaijan and Turkey are planning to build oil and gas pipelines and Turkish companies have won drilling concessions in the region. In October 1992, a summit conference of the Turkic heads of state was held in Ankara.

4.7 Conclusions

This chapter describes the modern evolution of Islamic political thought in Turkey, emphasising the emergence of two significant ideologies: Islamist and nationalist.⁷² Thus, the transition of intellectual ideas in accordance with the political change is demonstrated. It is argued that the significance of the reform period lies not only in the evolution of secularism, as described in the existing literature, but also in the appearance of Islamism and nationalism as ideologies which dominated the intellectual scene. These ideologies emerged during the reform process and flourished during the period of the national liberation movement.⁷³

Atatürk's revolution retarded the evolution of Islamic modernism and ethnic-religious nationalism. Gökalp's research could have developed into an interesting reform movement, as could the works of other Islamic-oriented nationalist intellectuals. The authoritarian regime slowed this development, but did not eradicate it. Islamic radicalism, introduced by Ali Suavi, flourished later in the writings of modern Muslim ideologists such as Necmettin Erbakan. The mystic theosophists,

⁷² In referring to Islamists, I do not refer to the traditional orthodox Islam, but rather to modern Islamic trends such as modernism and fundamentalism.

⁷³ On intellectuals trends of this period see; Mohammad Sadiq, "Intellectual origins of the Turkish National Liberation Movement", *International Studies*, (Delhi) 1976, Vol 15 no. 4 Oct-Dec 1976. pp.509-529.

whom Atatürk persecuted in particular, have not disappeared either. Said-i Nursi is an excellent example of the continuation of this line of intellectual thought, which influenced Turkish thought and not less important - its politics until the present day. As for the Islamic-national synthesis, introduced for the first time as a systematic work by Ziya Gökalp, it also has not declined. On the contrary, it has continued to develop and was adopted as the state ideology by the Turkish authorities in the 1980's. But most important, this chapter showed that from its start, the nationalist ideology was related to and integrated with religion. The Kemalist territorial nationalism was unnatural and may be temporary. Even in periods of intensive Kemalist policy pursued by Turkish governments, the natural base of belonging to the Turkish nation was the definitive belonging to the Turkic race and the Islamic religion.

Chapter 5

MODERN ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT

Historians tend to divide the world into historic stages based on geographic historic units. It is believed that these stages are created by years of colonization and integration. New historic stages do not supplant earlier ones, but rather absorb the achievements of their predecessors. In other words, the stages are linked, constantly evolving into new forms. The contact between the Phoenicians and the Greeks enabled the exchange of ideas and methods which led to the creation of a new European scene. In the same way, the Turkic people were integrated into the Islamic world. The achievements of Europe, the Ottoman or the Atlantic scenes in different historic periods were obvious in two interconnected areas: the spiritual and the material. One could not have come about without the other.

Conversely, the cultural introversion of the Muslims, coupled with their unwillingness to examine new ideas and scientific methods, led to a stagnation of Islamic thought.¹ This "cultural embargo" was one of the main reasons for the decline of the Ottoman Empire,² preventing the interchange of new ideas so important for continued cultural development. This was the result of the medieval Muslim view that Europe was barbaric, a culture which had nothing to teach Islam.³ This "embargo" was set against the background of European prosperity. The physical occupation of Muslim lands forced the

¹ See: Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p.34; also see: Basam Tibi, The Crisis of Modern Islam, A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific- Technological Age, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988).

² Bill Williamson, Education and Social Change in Egypt and Turkey: A Study in Historical Sociology. (G.B: Macmillan Press, 1987), p.46.

³ Lewis, op.cit., p.34. On the refusal of Muslims to acknowledge Western superiority see; W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Chapter. 3 ; H. Kraemer, World Culture and World Religion: The Coming Dialogue, (London, 1960). p.107.

Muslims to examine new ideas.

At the time when Western civilization penetrated the Muslim East, as H.A.R. Gibb noted, was woven of a cloth of many threads.⁴ He suggested that there seemed to be a law of history that whenever two civilizations meet there is an exchange of ideas, and that each civilization tends to accept those parts of the other that are closer in spirit to their own way of thinking and rejects the rest.⁵ Gibb argues that the similarity between the intuitive nature of Muslim thought and the romantic streams of European thought led to the widespread adoption of romantic attitudes originating in the West by Muslim scholars rather than scientific historical methods.⁶

The main problem which confronted Muslim thinkers for many generations was that of cultural decline. This ongoing irritation was as much a problem for Islam as it was for other classic cultures. The founder of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad, was regarded as "the seal of prophets". In a sense, anything after Muhammad was anti-climatic. The shadow of decline and degeneration began to loom over Islam more strongly after its contact in modern times with the West, the Muslim self-image was badly damaged in the 19th and 20th centuries. This civilization, which once saw itself as destined to rule the world, reeled under successive blows from the West.⁷

The second question with which Muslim thinkers were preoccupied was that of westernization. Why, despite over almost two hundred years of reforms and westernization, had the Muslim world not succeeded in gaining the respect of Western nations? Why was it

⁴ H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, (The Haskell Lectures in Comparative Religion, delivered at the University of Chicago in 1945).

⁵ Gibb, Modern Trends, p.117.

⁶ Ibid., p.117.

⁷ Bernard Lewis, op.cit., pp. 34-36.

that, generally speaking, it had not succeeded in eradicating its widespread poverty and developing a strong economy, technology and science?

Many attempts have been made to answer these questions. There are several different theories seeking to explain problems. They are expressed in one of two ways: the first is through the popular new religious movements, the second is through individual, independent thought. Though international interest has focussed on the first, it can be argued that significant progress in the Islamic world depends on the implementation of alternative intellectual endeavour to guide the Islamic activists. The existence of such new, alternative thought among Muslim thinkers which would allow the traditional spiritual world to accommodate the demands of the modern world must be examined.

Ziauddin Sardar believes that if there is such an alternative thought, it will be discovered in Turkey. According to Sardar:

The establishment of imam-hatib schools where Islamic studies are combined with modern scientific thought, and the emergence of a contemporary school of young intellectuals, who are concerned with issues of Justice and equity, science and values, the epistemological basis of Muslim civilization and ecological and environmental problems, is an indication that the next decade Turkey will become intellectually the most exciting country in the Muslim World⁸

5.1 Intellectuals and Tradition

The term "Muslim intellectual" often needs to be clarified. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an intellectualist is one who holds the doctrine of intellectualism, that is, that knowledge is wholly or mainly derived from the action of the intellect, in other words pure reason. However, while a religious person cannot by definition be an intellectualist, he

⁸ Ziauddin Sardar, "Refloating the Intellectual Enterprise of Islam", Afkar Inquiry (Turkey), February 1986. (pp. 32-37). p. 32.

can surely be an intellectual, "a person who possesses a high degree of understanding".⁹

The term "intellectual" is used here to describe three thinkers who have political claims and were able to put them into a coherent theory.

Sociological literature is preoccupied with the question of defining an intellectual and his/her role in society.¹⁰ Intellectuals are usually considered to be the creators of new ideas and critics of the existing social and cultural order. They are held to be the conscience of society, but only if this conscience is seen as contrary to the existing order.¹¹ Thus, "carriers of culture" such as theologians are very rarely seen as intellectuals, and if they are described as such they are seen as conservative intellectuals.¹² Even then, they are characterized by their objection to liberal and rational claims, which gain power in modern society. Very little attention has been given to the intellectual creators of tradition. Their relations with the authorities and their independence has only rarely been connected with their attitudes.¹³

For many years sociologists described traditional society as static and modern society as dynamic, educated, urbanized and exposed to mass media.¹⁴ Traditional society

⁹ Ibid. It is interesting to note that Turkish writers themselves prefer to refer to themselves as aydın and not entelektüel or alim, because of the common misuse of the concept. Entelektüel is perceived as being too secular and alim as traditional.

¹⁰ A review of the literature can be found in: S. N. Eisenstadt, "Intellectuals and Tradition" in S.N Eisenstadt and S.R. Graubard (eds.), Intellectuals and tradition, (N.Y: Humanities Press, 1973), pp. 1-19. Also see: Talcot Parsons, "The Intellectual: A social role Category", in P. Rieff (ed.), On Intellectuals: Theoretical Studies, Case Studies, (N.Y: Garden City, 1969), pp.3-24; J.P. Nettle, "Ideas, Intellectuals and Structures of Dissent," On Intellectuals, pp. 53-122.

¹¹ A work in this spirit is that of G.B. de Hussar, (ed.), The Intellectuals. A Controversial Portrait, (New York: Free Press, 1960).

¹² See: Karl Mannheim "Conservative Thought", in P. Keskemeti (ed.), Sociology and Social Psychology, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963) pp.74-165.

¹³ See: E. Shils, "The Intellectuals and Powers: Some Perspectives for Comparative Analysis", Comparative Studies in Society and Culture, 1 (October 1958) pp. 5-23; Shils, "Intellectuals" International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (N.Y: Macmillan, 1960).

¹⁴ Eisenstadt, op.cit., p. 34.

has been seen as being based around a traditional elite, which governs by using a 'divine mandate', while modern society was based on mass participation.¹⁵ This assumption, that tradition and traditionalism are one and the same and that traditional society necessarily objects to change was first challenged in the 1960's. Cultural creation, as Edward Shils suggests, is impossible without tradition.¹⁶ Rather than limiting creation, tradition can provide a framework for it.

Similarly, the assumption that intellectual claims stand opposed to all traditions, and, equally, that intellectuals always see their mission in terms of creating a society in which tradition is unimportant, is doubtful. Moreover, as Eisenstadt points out, there is no necessary connection between intellectual activity and critical claims.¹⁷ In fact, the majority of productive intellectuals in different societies were, he argues, conformists, either active or passive, politically and culturally.¹⁸ The degree to which the autonomy of religious institutions influences the intellectuals' participation in the political struggle is indeed an important point for research, as Eisenstadt notes. The more the state institutions were identified with the religious institutions, the less the religious intellectuals tended to step outside the bounds of the legitimate.¹⁹ Moreover, the more the religious intellectuals were occupied with things beyond this world, the smaller the chance of their participation in independent political activities. This is the case with some sufi orders in Turkey and with many orthodox ulema. However, the more the problems of this world become the centre of

¹⁵ Ibid., p 34.

¹⁶ Edward Shils, "Tradition and Liberty: Antinomy and Interdependence", *Ethics*, 68 (April 1958) pp. 153-165.

¹⁷ Eisenstadt, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 36.

their attention, then the stronger their connection with political life.²⁰ This point is particularly important to this study since modern Islamic intellectuals seem to neglect the heavenly order and are very much involved with the earthly social and political order.

Before examining the thoughts of some leading Turkish intellectuals (Chapters 6-8), it is vital for us to understand the intellectual background in which they operate.

5.2 The Turkish Intellectual Background

In Turkish society, intellectuals seems to play an important social and political role.²¹ Since the state's establishment, intellectuals have been involved in politics and were consulted by the politicians, perhaps as a continuation of the Ottoman tradition in which thinkers were called to diagnose the problem of the 'sick Empire'²² and to devise a plan for its recovery. This involvement was based on individual contribution, but more often it was a group of intellectuals, such as the Kadro movement (1932-34) from the left, or the Türk Ocağı,²³ (1912-1931) from the right, which acted as a pressure group.

The history of the republic indicates the existence of an intellectual elite and the importance which Turkish politicians attribute to them. Almost every major political movement or party in Turkey had an intellectual thinktank, which helped it to develop a

²⁰ Ibid., p. 36-7.

²¹ Kemal H. Karpat, "Ideology in Turkey after the Revolution of 1960" in K. Karpat, Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis, (Leiden: Brill, 1973). pp. 317-366.

²² See: Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).

²³ On the Türk Ocağı see: Jacob Landau, Pan Turkism: A Study in Irredentism, (London: C.Hurst, 1981); and in Chapter 4.

coherent ideology and provided it with legitimacy. The kadro movement and the Türk Ocağı were not the only examples of such cooperation between politicians and intellectuals. Members of the secularist, nationalist, Republican People's Party established the Türk devrim ocakları ²⁴ ("Turkish Reform Hearths") early in the 1950's to promote the party's liberal and social ideas.²⁵ At the same time the Democratic Party, under the leadership of Menderes, financially supported Fazıl Kisakurek and his Büyük Doğu club which promoted an irredentist ideology.²⁶ In the 1960's, the military encouraged members of the Milliyetçiler Derneği ("Society of Nationalists") to devise an ideological formula to "fight the spread of Communism". This group of urban intelligentsia, which was established in 1953, grew during the 1960's and eventually had offices in Turkey's major cities.²⁷ The intellectuals helped the different parties to establish a blueprint for their ideology. Later, in the 1970's, their major task was to develop economic programmes for the government as the State Planning Organization during a serious social and economic depression.

Until the 1980's, as David Barchard points out, the leftist secularists dominated intellectual life.²⁸ This was aided by the disgrace of the right wing ideology after the atrocities of World War II. But this was not always the case. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, right wing thinkers such as Herder, Pareto and Mosca were seen as intellectuals. It was only later that Turkish thinkers from the right were named as

²⁴ Karpaz, "Ideological Developments in Turkey Since the Revolution of 1960" in Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, (Ankara: The School of Political Science, 1966), p.332.

²⁵ Ibid., p.333.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 334.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 334.

²⁸ David Barchard, "Turkish Intellectual Background", in W.M. Hale (ed.), Aspects of Modern Turkey, op.cit. pp. 21-34.

ideologists and leftists as intellectuals. In the case of Turkey, religious thinkers were automatically excluded from this circle. It is only from the 1980's onwards that religious thinkers such as İsmet Özel, Ali Bulaç, Rasim Özdenören and other Islamists gained the acknowledgment of the secular elite as intellectuals. This may have derived from the fact that some of those intellectuals were originally leftist themselves, as in the case of İsmet Özel, a famous ex-Marxist and one of Turkey's best-known poets. People like Özel helped the Islamists to gain a respect they never had before in the history of modern Turkey. Another possible reason is that new modern Islamic intellectuals used modern Western terms. They were familiar with Western sociology and other social sciences and did not tend to use terms which required a previous knowledge of Islam. In this way they created a common ground for dialogue.

5.3 The Sunni-Shi'i Division

Each of the intellectuals examined in the next chapters differs from the others in his beliefs, knowledge and understanding of Islam. It is vital, therefore, to be familiar with the variety of Islamic trends and their origins in order to evaluate the writing and contribution of these intellectuals.

Researchers tend to divide Islamic thought into Sunni and Shi'i. However, in contemporary thought this division is no longer completely justified, nor does it help in the understanding of radical ideologies in Islam. As Olivier Carre points out, both contemporary radical Shi'i ideology and the Sunni neo-Hanbali radical doctrine are close to

the early Shi'i position and to the Ismaili groups in their violent stage.²⁹ Moreover, Shi'i radicalism such as that of the Ayattollah Khomeyni, and Sunni radicalism, like that of Qutb, share an almost identical vocabulary. In both, there are tendencies toward both quietism and activism. In the last century, as Hamid Enayat points out³⁰, the modernization reconsideration "has greatly diminished Shi'i differences with the Sunnis".³¹ In fact, from as early as the time of Al-Afghani, there was a confusion between Shi'i and Sunni ideas.³²

According to Carre, the Islamic experience in Egypt demonstrates the existence of four stages in the development of militant Islamic thought.³³ The first was during the 1930's and 1940's and was represented by Hasan al-Bana. The main goal in this stage was the Islamisation of political and social institutions; the second was to mount a holy war (jihad) for national independence. The second stage was that of the 1950's, represented by Sayid Qutb.³⁴ His main aim was Islamic social justice and the Islamisation of existing laws. The third stage, in the 1960's, was Qutb's later phase. It involved an attempt to form a political-religious underground targeting education, as well as to establish the Hakimiya against Cahiliya. The final stage defined by Carre was that of the 1970's and 1980's. Its main speakers were Abdel Salam Faraj and other "Qutbists". Their main aim was a jihad

²⁹ Olivier Carre, (et.) Paul Dumont, Radicalismes Islamiques Tome I: Iran, Liban, Turquie, (Paris: editions L'Harmattan, 1985). pp. 5-22; 215-256.

³⁰ Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, (G.B: Macmillan, 1982).

³¹ Ibid., pp. 163-164.

³² See the case of Hasan Hanafi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950's who supported the Iranian revolution on the ground that this is the continuation for Afghani ideas.

³³ Carre, op.cit.

³⁴ On Qutb works see: Yvonne Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideology of Islamic Revival" in: John Esposito (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam, (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

against the kafer rulers followed by the establishment, as soon as possible, of an Islamic state.

The reasons for such a deterioration in Islamic thought are varied, but it is suggested that the 'Taymiyan' environment that dominated religious teaching contributed to the creation of a radical vocabulary and prepared the ground for accepting radicalism.³⁵ As a result the neo-Hanbali tradition, originally marginal, became the most dominant contemporary stream of Islamic thought. The economic problems, the disappointment of Nasser and Nasserism and the achievements of Islamic movements in other places, drove many to notice the great potential which still existed in the Islamic struggle.

If this was the case in Egypt, then an analogy with the Turkish case would point to a shift from a fight for social justice, which currently characterizes the Turkish Islamic movement, to a fight toward political rights. The writings of Ali Bulaç, İsmet Özel and other currents may help to widen understanding and recognition of radical Islam, even if these writers expressed no wish to advocate political rebellion. They contribute to the spread of concepts which were foreign to the Turkish audience. In fact, the first two stages described by Carre, the nationalistic one and the fight for social justice, had already been demonstrated in Turkey, and political demands were beginning to be voiced more than ever before.

Khomeyni's revolution in Iran put the issue of Shi'i-Sunni relations in the spotlight. However, although his ideology aimed to present an undivided Muslim world, and it may have helped to increased closeness between Shi'i and Sunni thought,³⁶ it was actually Ali

³⁵ For more information about Islamic radical thought see: Yvone Haddad, "Muslim Revivalist Thought in the Arab World: An Overview", The Muslim World, Vol XXVI, (July 1986), pp.143-166.

³⁶ Enayat noted that the doctrine of wilayat al faqih turned out to be as important to the Islamic Revolution as the Proletarian Dictatorship in the Bolshevik revolution. See: Hamid Enayat, "Iran: Khomeyni's Concept of the 'Guardianship of the Jurisconsult' " in James Piscatori (ed.), Islam in the Political Process, (Cambridge, Cambridge

Shariati (1933-77)³⁷, who, while not being a recognized learned alim had a great influence on thinkers in the Sunni world, especially in Turkey.³⁸ His original thought was translated into Turkish and published in many editions and copies. Shariati's thought had great influence on Turkish modern thinkers. One aspect is particularly vital to an understanding of contemporary Turkish thought - that is of the tevhid.

Ali Shariati's understanding of Islam has a strong sociological flavour.³⁹ He perceives religion as idealism, which calls constantly for struggle.⁴⁰ In his scheme, all facts of Islamic culture, mythology, history, and theology, and even some elements of jurisprudence, are subordinated to the compelling necessity of this fusion between 'theory' and 'praxis', which is but one manifestation of the principle of tevhid (oneness of God). He was the first to turn this theological doctrine into a 'world view'. Tevhid means much more than the 'oneness of God', which is of course accepted by all monotheists. For Shariati, tevhid means the entire universe as a unity, not divided it into this world and the thereafter, physical and metaphysical, substance and meaning, matter and spirit. He further spells out the social and political implications of tevhid by declaring that such a unitarian outlook involves the negation of all contradictions hampering the development of man, whether "legal, class, social, political, racial, ethnic, territorial, cognatic, genetic, intrinsic or even economic".⁴¹

University Press, 1983), pp.160-180.

³⁷ On Shariati's biographical notes see: Abdulaziz Sachedina, "Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution", in Voices of Resurgent Islam, John L.Esposito (ed.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1983). (pp.191-214)

³⁸ See : Ali Shariati, On the Sociology of Islam, Lectures by Ali Shariati, translated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley, 1979)

³⁹ Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, (G.B: Macmillan, 1982).p. 154.

⁴⁰ On the connection between Shariati's thought and Liberation Theology see Chapter 6.

⁴¹ Hamid, op.cit., p.156.

Shariati set out to establish a discipline of "Islamology" (Islamsinasi), that is, to apply Islam to the needs of contemporary society, rather than contribute further to the perfection of traditional Islamic studies (maarif-i Islami). For him, Islam was a multi-dimensional religion which could meet the challenge of modern times. Islamic studies as taught in the medrese was a discipline founded on the institutionalized version of the original message of Islam, and preoccupied with the abstraction and theorization which had engaged the energies of traditional scholars up to pre-modern times. Islamology in contrast, sought to provide practical guidance to modern Muslim society through an understanding of Islamic revelation based upon a reinterpretation of the religion.⁴²

In Shariati's Islamology, tevhid gained a new significance. For him, it was not merely one of many fundamental principles of Islam, it was the foundation on which all the other principles were based. For Shariati tevhid was the basis of the personal and social life of all Muslims. All human activities and relationships, whether political, economic or literary, ought to be firmly founded on tevhid.⁴³

The Prophet Muhammad established his social order on tevhid, thus creating nizam-i tevhid (order based on unity). A muvaḥhid (believer in tevhid), is not afraid of privation, poverty or even death. Tevhid prevents fears. All the ills of society, according to Shariati, are due to lack of faith in the one God. This lack of faith results in a confused or even absent personality. In the case of dictatorship, a situation is created in which all other personalities are absorbed into the sole strong one, that of the dictator himself. It is this kind of society which becomes poor but tevhid does not permit such a situation to occur. By

⁴² H.E. Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism. The Liberation Movement of Iran under the Shah and Khomeini, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990). pp. 67-73.

⁴³ See: Shahrough, Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 149-150.

affirming tevhid man becomes free, secure and fearless, able to depend on his own personality at all times. Islam, according to Shariati, based its message upon tevhid, which demanded a just social order; nizam-i tevhid. But all men need an example to follow, and this was provided by Muhammad, who showed the path to truth.

Ali Shariati and his Islamology focus on harmony, social justice and personal liberation, all derived from the idea of tevhid, and all of which should be implemented in social and political life. His ideas contributed to the development of new Islamic thought in Turkey; however, the emphasis on harmony placed limitations on critical and scientific future work and research. On the other hand, he turned Islam into a means for achieving social goals, not an end in itself. His Islamology dealt with Islam as a new sociological fact, a new practical Islam, markedly different from the one about which the traditional preacher spoke.⁴⁴ His new interpretation of Islam, argues Amir Arjomand, had a strong influence of Durkheim sociology, and what he called "ideology" corresponded to Durkheim's Collective Consciousness.⁴⁵ Shariati's thought, in consequence, has a remarkable appeal for the younger generation who found in his Islamology a viable and reassuring alternative to Marxist and Western conceptions of society, expressed in the familiar terminology - that of Durkheim.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Chehabi, op.cit., p.70.

⁴⁵ Said Amir Arjomand, "A la recherche de la conscience collective: Durkheim's ideological impact in Turkey and Iran", American Sociologist, 17 (1982) p. 98.

⁴⁶ Durkheim's thought influenced the Turkish education system from its early days.

5.4 The Problem of Stagnation: A Re-evaluation

From an early period, two main theological streams have existed in Islamic thought, both address the basic questions of every theology - one stream was the rational and the other - traditional. The first rational stream in Islam is known as kadaria. The kadaria opposed the dominant opinion in Islam that everything is determined by God.⁴⁷ One of the most famous movements influenced by the kadaria is the mutazile.⁴⁸ However, the stream which has dominated Islamic theology since the Middle Ages is the Ash'arism, which leans toward the traditionalist. Their non-rational viewpoint determined the main development of Islamic thought. Rational movements such as the kadariya remained on the fringes, and never dominated Islamic thought. From this, the conclusion can be reached that in Islamic culture there is no central place given to human reason, as in Western thought.

This does not mean that Islam did not make important scientific advances during the Middle Ages. But the ulema always disapproved of scientists. There was a conflict between the basic assumption in Islam that God is almighty, and the scientific rationale. That is why the modernists led by Muhammad Abduh tried to attach more importance to human thinking in religious thought, and tried to demonstrate that there is no contradiction between Islam and science. But the modernists were weak and created little more than apologetic literature. They did not establish tools for new religious thought. After the modernists the Ash'ari anti-rational point of view reasserted itself to rule Islamic thought, whether through conservatism or modern fundamentalism.

A similar point was made by Gibb, who argues that the true reformist impulse

⁴⁷ "Kadaria", EI.

⁴⁸ See: "Mutazila", EI.

came to life as a result of moral problems, and that the social institutions were paralysed by the intrinsic logical contradictions; the zealous ambition to formulate apologetics was an obstacle in the reformists' way.⁴⁹ There are two reasons, he states, for the failure of the modernists: first, they were incapable of presenting facts and claims in a convincing and clear manner, since a consistent social ideal, suitable to the Muslims as a whole was yet to be formulated. Second, their apologetics exaggerated, on one hand, the social virtues of the Islamic order in the past, and on the other hand, the social evils of Western societies. By doing so, they strengthened conservative public opposition to their own claims.⁵⁰ On top of the confusion caused by the modernists' inability to define their position in their own minds was now added another confusion, which had its origin in the historical romanticism that was mixed into their thought.⁵¹

With the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate, three options presented themselves. The modernists, wished to create a new kind of caliphate by turning it into an institution of spiritual guidance. This, it was hoped, would bring a gradual reform the Islamic institutions.⁵² The secularists and the nationalists, for their part, accepted the termination of the caliphate as final and dedicated their energies to the creation of national units, separate Muslim nations in the Western model. The third option was that represented by the fundamentalist Mahdi movement. They believed there was an urgent need to purify the Muslim world in preparation for reunification with the help of the sword. Unlike the modernist and the nationalist solutions, which represented various Western solutions to the

⁴⁹ Gibb, Modern Trends, p.114.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.115.

⁵¹ Ibid., p.115.

⁵² Ibid., p.119.

problems of Islamic politics and society, the Mahdi movement is popular and reflects the natural impulses of the Muslim spirit.⁵³ It is difficult to imagine, argues Gibb, that there is any real hope for solving the Muslim world's problems through any of these three options. All of them are destroyed by emotional impulses, typical of the romantic attitude, and which ignore historical thinking.⁵⁴ Gibb's conclusion is that the external threat to the Islamic heritage is less than that from the three internal forces: modernism, nationalism and Mahdism.⁵⁵

The first force, the modernist, aims to change the strict discipline of the transcendental religion with current social attitudes and utilitarian morals⁵⁶. In fact, argues Gibb, the modernists repeat the same mistakes made by the mutazile, by explaining God's ways in their own terms. The nationalists accept other gods beside Allah and try to worship them all. By allowing the penetration of foreign institutions and thoughts into the social experience guided by Islamic universalism, they created a confusion of ideals.⁵⁷ The third, Mahdism, is the most dangerous because its followers believe that it is possible to control people's minds and wills by force, and that the truth can be proved by the sword.⁵⁸

A different view is that of Abdul Fazlur Rahman who sees the hope for Islam in the fundamentalist impulse:

But whatever we have said about the negative aspects of neo-fundamentalism - its lack of a viable methodology, or indeed, of any methodology at all for the

⁵³ Ibid., p.120.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 120.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 125; Mahdism =Fundamentalism in Gibb's terminology.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 125.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 126.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p.126.

interpretation of Islam, the absence of an integral vision of Islam, and the general poverty of its intellectual content - must not make us oblivious to its intensity. It is vibrant, it pulsates with anger and enthusiasm, and it is exuberant and full of righteous hatred. Its ethical dynamism is genuine, its integrity remarkable. Some of its expressions may be disconcerting or even grotesque, but should it find enough content, it could prove to be a great, even decisive, force in a world torn by individual, national, racist, and communal selfishness and narrowmindedness.⁵⁹

One of the points of agreement between modernists and fundamentalists is their mutual attack on the ulema's position, which is seen as "conservative" or "reactionary". The view of the orthodox ulema, which argues that traditional or ancient institutions usually express existing trends of society, is not welcomed by revolutionaries or reformists.⁶⁰ But while the modernists generally spoke with a learned knowledge of tradition, most neo-fundamentalists had had little traditional education and, in fact, sometimes did not even know what the tradition was. Although Islam has no priesthood, it does have individuals who have specialized in Islamic jurisprudence and theology. The neo-fundamentalists are basically laymen, many of whom are professionals: lawyers, doctors and engineers.⁶¹

Islam, according to Gibb, has not become fossilized. It is not the religion that has become paralysed, but rather its orthodox formula, its systematic theology and its social apologetic. The question today is how to re-formulate the basic principles of Islam without damaging its essential pillars.⁶² The key to the solution of this problem, Gibb suggests, can be seen by examining the development of orthodox thought. Until the third and fourth centuries after the hejra, Islam adapted itself through theology to the scientific method and ways of thinking. At this point, orthodox thought ceased to develop and the process of

⁵⁹ Fazlur Rahman, "Roots of Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism", in Philip H. Stoddard, David C. Cuthell and Margaret W. Sullivan (eds.), Change and the Muslim World, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), pp. 23-36 (p.35).

⁶⁰ Gibb, op.cit., p.127.

⁶¹ Fazlur Rahman, op.cit., p.34.

⁶² Gibb, op.cit., p. 128.

stagnation started.⁶³ Gibb and Bowen point out in a discussion of madrasa education in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that addresses the narrow outlook of teachers and pupils in the Al-Azhar University, that:

Neither teacher nor pupil regarded it as anything other than the acquisition of a certain amount of knowledge, all such knowledge being a considerable quantity with strictly defined boundaries.⁶⁴

The inevitable result of such a system was narrowness. Williamson argues that the failure of education to adopt to changes in knowledge accounts for the failure of Islam to respond creatively to developments in medicine, law, science, and economic life.⁶⁵ The outcome was an intellectual inability to conceive of the necessary adjustments which the modern world required of the Ottoman state.⁶⁶

If the dead point of society is reached when the educational forces are no longer effective to influence or to direct its development, it must be admitted that the dead point has long since passed in Islamic society.⁶⁷

If the Muslims had understood the historical form of thinking, Gibb argues, this stagnation could have been brought to an end. Reuben Levi, making a similar point in a discussion of Islamic attitudes to science, blames developments during and after the fifth century of Islam, that is, during the medieval period, for the growing influence of the ulema and the hardening of dogmatic feeling in the various 'schools' of faith.⁶⁸ In this account, the

⁶³ Ibid., p. 129.

⁶⁴ Gibb and Bowen, op.cit., p.160.

⁶⁵ Williamson, p. 47.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 48.

⁶⁷ Gibb and Bowen, op.cit., p. 160.

⁶⁸ Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957). p. 501.

doctors of Islamic law, as the upholders of the central traditions of Islam, were the group who sought to guard their faith from modern developments in science and philosophy. Almost from the beginning of Islam, Muslim historians used critical principles to examine their materials. Soon, however, their methods and historical thought became subjugated to the demands of religious feeling and faith. It was not only the end of development but a regression, a return to the jahiliya, the period characterised by Muslims as one without a scientific historical approach.⁶⁹ This approach has a dramatic structure, definite sentences and, worst of all, eliminates unfavourable details which do not fit the desired picture. This compulsion, forced upon history by the ulema, locked the gate against the last element that could have preserved some flexibility in Islamic thought and prevent its stagnation.⁷⁰ The conclusion, argues Gibb, is that the attempt to reconcile orthodox Islam with modern trends is not a compromise with modern scientific assumptions. However, there is a need to reevaluate characteristics of thought and at the same time to adopt historical thinking.⁷¹

While Gibb recommended to the Muslims to look back to their own history of the first centuries of Islam to find out what went wrong, a comparative analysis can also be suggested. The paradox of Christian science was that its best scientists came from a religious background. It was only in a later stage that religion saw science as a danger. The same thing happened in other cultures, such as the Chinese. Chinese science was highly advanced, but it stopped at a certain point. What was this point and why, in Christianity, Islam and Chinese Buddhism, was science stopped by the religious institutions? The answer suggested is that science was seen as a positive tool up to the point where the harmony of

⁶⁹ Gibb, op.cit., p. 130.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

the world order seems to collapse.⁷² Harmony, and the limitation of thought which resulted, were not problems unique to Islam; they occurred in China as well. In fact, the Chinese case is very similar to the Islamic. As Rafi Israeli writes, the key terms for understanding social, political and religious contexts in China are hierarchy and harmony:⁷³ hierarchy, since there are ruled and rulers, harmony, because it is not one way. The Chinese ruler sits on his throne only as long as there is a moral justification for his rule. Harmony is the condition for the existence of the hierarchy. This harmony was manifested on both the individual and the class system levels.

But while in Europe the Reformation succeeded in breaking the barriers put up by the Church, this was not so in Islam, and it was only in the 1920's that rationality and science penetrated Chinese thought. In the France of the 18th Century, Diderot and DeLamber came out explicitly against European traditions and against the 'truths' held by the Church. The publication of the Great French Encyclopedia was contemporary with that of the great Chinese encyclopedia of K'ang-hsi (1728). However, while the former aimed to concentrate science in the rational way, the latter aimed to guarantee that no new idea would penetrate and spoil traditional thought. Using methods similar to those of Muhammad Abduh, the Chinese K'ang Yu-Wei attempted to prove that the real Confucianism core was perverted, and to reinterpret Confucius's classical works to show that they had contained theories of evolution and progress.⁷⁴

Fear of the breakdown of the unity and integration of the world led the religious hierarchy to fight against creativity and enquiring methods. If this is the case, it must be

⁷² Peacy, The maze of ingenuity, (UK, 1974).

⁷³ Rafi Israeli, "Religion and State in China" in: Isaiah Gafni and Gabriel Motzkin (eds.) Priesthood and Monarchy: Studies in the Historical Relationships of Religion and State, (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar, 1987).pp. 93-103. (p. 93).

⁷⁴ Israeli, op.cit., p. 101.

concluded that contrary to what Gibb suggested, the answer is not in religion but beyond its boundaries. Original thought based on the beliefs of a harmonious world order cannot supply the desired breakthrough.

There are thus two main problems - that of harmony and that of rational thought. Gibb believes it is likely that original thought would possibly have risen among the conservative ulema circle,⁷⁵ perhaps in places such as Al-Azhar university,⁷⁶ which has been the leading religious spiritual institution of the Islamic world since its establishment in 969.

The future of Islam rests where it has rested in the past - on the insight of the orthodox leaders and their capacity to resolve the new tensions as they arise by a positive doctrine which will face and master the forces making for disintegration.⁷⁷

But as Hava Lazeros-Yafe argues, this does not counter the possibility that original new thought will develop outside Al-Azhar and outside ulema circles.⁷⁸ In order to recognize such new original thought Lazeros-Yafe offers an examination of the response to contemporary questions which demands a new approach. These questions concern such issues as secularism and blasphemy, state-religion relations, religious law in the boundaries of modern civil law in Islamic countries and the demand for ijtihad, and religious renewal.

After examining thoughts in contemporary Al-Azhar, Lazeros-Yafe comes to the conclusion that the only field where such seeds of new thought existed is that of the Shi'i-

⁷⁵ On progressive ulama, see: Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman ulama and westernization in the time of Selim III and Mahmud II", Scripta Hierosolymitana, (Jerusalem, 1961), Vol 9. pp. 63-96.

⁷⁶ For more information on Al-Azhar thought see: B.Dodge, Al-Azhar - A Millenium of Muslim Learning, (Washington, 1961); J.Kraemer, "Tradition and Reform at Al-Azhar University" MEA, Vol 7, (1956), pp. 89-94.; J.Jomier, "Al-Azhar", EI 2.; D. Creelius, "Al-Azhar in the Revolution", MEJ, Vol 20, (1966), pp.31-49.

⁷⁷ H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, (Chicago, 1947), p.122

⁷⁸ Hava Lazeros Yafe, "Is there a Current New Religious Thought among Al-Azhar Ulama?" in: Gabriel Baer, (ed.), The Ulama and Problems of Religion in the Muslim World, Studies in memory of Professor Uriel Heyd. (Jerusalem: Magness Press, 1971).

Sunni relationship.⁷⁹ However, this was not a new phenomenon. Such attempts to bridge the gap between the two Islamic sects had been made in the eighteenth century. Today there is a new positive attitude to the Shi'ites, but there is still no open discussion of the problems and differences between them.

Is Turkish intellectual life, as Ziauddin Sardar thinks, revealing new alternative thought, freed from romanticism and are historical criticism and scientific methods used, given that they are essential for a breakthrough according to Gibb? It can be argued that there is some original work, but it cannot really be described as a breakthrough in Islamic thought.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, if the question is whether this new era of thought raises the possibility of scientific achievement, the answer is negative. Such achievements can be achieved only with the institutionalization of rational thinking, which these new intellectuals lack. Their attitude is that instead of arguing that rationalism exists in Islam, we should determine that Islam is the rational. Both in fundamentalist thought and in Islamic liberation theology the emphasis is in shifting from the community to the individual. The fundamentalist point of view, not by deliberate intention, is leading to a change in the position of the individual in society. Individuals have more responsibilities and must make their own critical evaluation. This change will bear fruit only in the long term. In the short term, however, we can observe a change in the way Islam is perceived in certain Turkish circles.

⁷⁹ F.R.C. Bagley, "Al-Azhar and Shi'ism", Muslim World, Vol 50, (1960), pp. 122-129.

⁸⁰ On a more traditional Islamist thought see: İsmail Kara, Türkiyede İslâmcılık Düşüncesi, (İstanbul: Risale Yayınları, 1986).

5.6 Conclusions

It can be argued that in order to create the innovative and original way of thinking needed for scientific achievement, a rational and a logical approach must first appear. In Islamic tradition, both rational thought (represented by the kadariya, and traditional thought ash'ariya), existed. The second approach dominated Islamic thought for centuries, and the rational approach was pushed to the fringes. This was the state of affairs until the reform movement began. The modernists attempted to combine rational methodology with that of Islam – however, this attempt has failed, partly because of its apologetic stand. After the modernists no attempt to re-establish rational methodology was made.

While the world of Islam was once divided into Sunni and Shi'i communities this division is not entirely applicable to modern political and theological thought. Islamic political thought is more accurately divided between the "quietists" and "activists" than between Sunni-Shi'i worlds of thought. The fundamentalists, which symbolized in the past the "activist" approach, are no longer its standard-bearer. To the emphasis given by the fundamentalists to Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Hanbal was now added the sociological thought of Ali Shariati from the Islamic circle, as well as and Marxist ideas, concepts, and terminology.

I would argue that Islamic political thought, due to its contact with Western ideas and culture, has passed two important stages. The first was the interaction with nationalist ideas in an era of national struggle; the second is the current era, which is marked by the interaction of Marxist ideas resulting in the creation of an Islamic version of liberation theology. [see chapter 6].

Since the establishment of the Republic, Turkey has witnessed the interaction of

nationalism with Islam, resulting in a modernist theology and attempt on one hand to nationalize Islam and Islamicize the nation state idea. Starting in the 1960's, thanks to the 'civilization movement', a different attitude started. In the 1980's three different political cum theological strands existed. The first was the quietist strand, which will be analysed in Chapter 8, on the Aydınlar Ocağı and the Turkish Islamic Synthesis. The second is the fundamentalist strand, represented by Necmettin Erbakan, the result of the interaction with right wing ideologies (Chapter 7). The third, a new approach, was that of Ali Bulaç and the 'new Muslim intellectuals' representing Shariati's conviction of the necessity for Liberation struggle and theology. (Chapter 6).

Chapter 6

ALİ BULAÇ AND 'ISLAMIC LIBERATION THEOLOGY'**6.1 "New Muslim Intellectuals"**

In the last decade there has been much discussion of what is commonly known as the "New Muslim Intellectuals" in Turkey.¹ The term is used to identify a body of writers who share a common interest and who are preoccupied with the problems confronting contemporary Muslims, and, more generally, the problem of cultural decline and its effects on Islam. They are called "new" for their originality, "Muslim", to differentiate them from the secular intelligentsia, and "intellectuals",² in recognition of both their knowledge of Western thought and the high quality of their work. The questions they are concerned with are not new, however their approach differs from that of their predecessors. Their familiarity with scientific terminology, Western philosophy, and sociology has rewarded them with the acknowledgement of the secular Turkish intelligentsia, a recognition manifested in the latter's willingness to publicly debate their ideas.

Vis-à-vis the regime, the "New Muslim Intellectuals" pose an ideological challenge during a period in which the Muslim world is seeking alternative political systems. The failure of the Turkish regime to provide the masses with immediate socio-economic and psychological relief has left a void in which the writings of these intellectuals are enjoying popular appeal. Indeed, the socio-political nature of their writings became a popular subject in conversation in both secular and religious circles during the 1980's.

¹ Among them, Sadık Albayrak, İsmet Özel, Hüseyin Hatemi, Rasim Özdenören, Abdürrahman Dilipak, İlhan Kutluer and Ersin Gündoğan should be mentioned. See article by Binnaz Toprak, "Islamic Intellectuals at the 1980s in Turkey", *CTT*, 62, İstanbul Redhouse Yayınevi, (1987).

² Regarding the connotations of the term "intellectual" in Turkey, refer to Chapter 5, pp.125-127

Among the outstanding figures of the "New Muslim Intellectuals", Ali Bulaç stands out as one of the most influential writers. His books and articles have achieved great success among two groups - students and youth - traditionally influenced by leftist movements and theories.³

This chapter seeks to examine the reasons for Ali Bulaç's success and the textual elements that distinguish him from other Islamists. It is suggested here that Bulaç's emphasis on social justice and personal and social liberation, expressed in modern Western terminology, contributed to his success. Indeed, he has become an alternative to both leftist ideology and the more conservative religious urban leadership.

6.2 Background

Ali Bulaç was born in 1951 in Mardin in southeastern Turkey,⁴ into a very poor family of seven. At the age of seven, his mother sent him to a Kuran kursu (religious school), then an illegal institution. It was not until two years later that he began attending an authorized primary and middle school. Later he was sent to an İmam Hatip school, at the same time studying the material taught in the national school, in order to matriculate. After moving to Istanbul, he graduated in 1975 from the İstanbul Yüksek İslâm Enstitüsü. He continued his studies in the Sociology Department of Istanbul University's Faculty of Literature, graduating in 1980.

Since the middle of the 1970's Bulaç has been active as a contributor to and editor of various journals, newspapers and publishing houses. In 1976 he established the Islamic magazine

³ Among his well-known books are: İslâm Dünyasında Düşünce Sorunları (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1985); İslâm Dünyasında Toplumsal Değişme, (İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1987); Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1987), Gündemdeki Konular (İstanbul: Akabe Yayınları, 1988), Ortadoğu Gerçeği (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1988) and Bir Aydın Sapması, (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1989).

⁴ Details on Bulaç's background can be found on the covers of his books and in Meeker's article. Further details were obtained in my interview with him on 21 September 1992.

Düşünce ("Thought"). After the 1980 coup the magazine was closed and Bulaç, along with other writers, was detained for 29 days. In 1984, following the transfer of power to civilian hands, he established the İnsan ("Mankind") publishing house, which published hundreds of books and articles on Islamic topics. Later he wrote for the daily newspaper Zaman ("Time"), but when the management changed and the religious pluralist line turned nationalist, he decided to leave the editorial staff, according to his own account.

In 1990 he joined the Birleşik ("United") publishing house as editor of Kitap Dergisi ("The Book Magazine"). Bulaç has published books on religious issues for the practising believer⁵ and on current problems facing Islam. His educational background gives him an extensive knowledge of both Islamic and Western philosophy. He is as familiar with the works of Maulana Maududi and Ali Shariati as with those of Balzac, Dostoyevski and Marx.⁶

6.3 Ali Bulaç and Liberation Theology

In Chapter 5 the influence of Shariati on modern Islamic thought was explained. Kemal Abdel Malek suggests that Shariati's thought should not be viewed, as Nikki Keddie and Yann Richard⁷ argue, in the general context of Third World liberation struggles, but more specifically in the context of "liberation theology".⁸ The influence of Shariati's work on Ali Bulaç is clear. This

⁵ For example see: A.Bulaç, Kur'an-ı Kerim'in Türkçe Anlamı (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 1983); Kur'an ve Sünnet Üzerine, (Beyan Yayınları, 1985).

⁶ His knowledge and understanding of various foreign writers was evident in his book Bir Aydın Sapması, (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1989).

⁷ Nikki Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretative History of Modern Iran, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

⁸ Abdel Malek, "Ali Shariati and Liberation Theology", a paper presented in Toronto, 1991. Although Shariati never pointed out his connection with liberation theologians, it is known that he studied at the Sorbonne between 1959-64, the same period that the Argentinian liberation theologian Enrique Dussel studied there.

suggests that a better understanding of Ali Bulaç's work could be achieved along the lines of the Abdel Malek analysis, that is by examining Ali Bulaç in the light of "liberation theology".⁹

The application of the term liberation theology in an Islamic context needs some clarification. Both Liberation Theology ideologues and modern Islamic thinkers claim that their respective religions are not fatalistic or apolitical creeds concerned merely with pietistic performance, but rather an ideology that permeates all fields of life, offering solutions to their societies' inherent social, economic and political problems.¹⁰ In other words, both ideologies are concerned, not with other-worldly salvation, but rather with the predicament of the simple believer, here and now, in the real world. Liberation theology, it can be determined, is in fact a religious ideology, mainly concerned with political and social injustice. Therefore, there is no harm in using the term liberation theology to describe Muslims' work. Moreover, this demand, so essential in liberation theology, that the Church should be a "source Church", in other words, a fighting Church and not a pastoral quietist "mirror Church" is very similar to the demands of Muslim activists. The term liberation theology serves to describe the use of religion as a vehicle of political, social, and economic change for the people of the third world. Thus, although I am perfectly aware that the term liberation theology is alien to the socio-political experience of Islam, it nonetheless exemplifies the essence of Bulaç's Islamic thought.

What is "Islamic" liberation theology" and how is it viewed by Muslims? Many unorthodox believers find that traditional theology is today largely monopolized by those who support the status quo. Therefore, they believe it tends to be highly ritualised, dogmatic and incomprehensibly metaphysical. Muslim liberation theologians, like many others who seek religious reforms, reject

⁹ For more information on liberation theology see; D.W. Fern, Third World Liberation Theologies, (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis books, 1986).; Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1971).

¹⁰Even in the Christian context it was only in the 1970s that this ideology began to be referred to as the "theology of liberation".

medieval Islam and believe in its reinterpretation to enable the establishment of a just society in which exploitation of people would end.¹¹ Economic, social and political justice is central to the teachings of Islam. As Asghar Ali Engineer explains:

Liberation theology concerns itself primarily with the here and now of human life and only then with the hereafter. Secondly, it does not support the status quo which favours those who have as against those who do not. Liberation theology in other words would remain antithetical to the establishment, whether religious or political. Thirdly, it would play a partisan role in favour of the oppressed and dispossessed and provide these sections of the society with a powerful ideological weapon to fight against their oppressors. Fourthly, the liberation theology does not merely emphasise one single polarity of metaphysical destiny beyond the historical process but also takes due cognizance of its opposite polarity, i.e. human freedom to shape temporal destiny.¹²

Most Muslim reformers since al-Afghani have divided the people of the world into two categories: the oppressors and the oppressed. As was pointed out by Mohammad Yadegari, the philosophy of history as expounded by Black American theologians and Latin American theologians is very similar.¹³ For Islamic liberationists, Islam remained what can be called a revolutionary force during the lifetime of the Prophet and for a few decades thereafter. In their analysis of history, the Prophet had presented a powerful challenge to the rich traders of Mecca. When he began to preach his divine message, it was the poor and the oppressed of Mecca, including many slaves, who joined him. Unfortunately, argue liberation theologians, revolutionary Islam was transformed into status quo Islam soon after Muhammad's death, and the ulema came to support the powerful establishment. They were preoccupied by ritual, forgetting social justice; they came to identify themselves with the powerful (mustakbirin), and losing in sympathy with the weak and oppressed (mustad'ifin).¹⁴

¹¹ Asghar Ali Engineer, Islam and Liberation Theology. Essays on Liberative Elements in Islam, (New-Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1990), p.64.

¹² Engineer, *Ibid.*, p.1.

¹³ Mohammad Yadegari, "Liberation Theology and Islamic Revivalism", JRT, 43 (2) 1986, pp. 38-50. (pp.38-39).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.5-6.

Discussing liberation theology, George Baum¹⁵ states that there are four themes in the thought of the liberation theologians of Latin America (the critique of ideology, dependency theory, the preferential option for the poor, and humans as the subject of history), all of which can be clearly identified in Ali Bulaç's work.¹⁶ Liberation theologians call for a critique of both the contemporary dominant culture and the religious institution's inherited legacy and practice.¹⁷ Similarly, throughout his works Bulaç engages in a double critique of both the Islamic legacy and the dominant Western culture. He makes a sharp distinction between authentic, progress-oriented Islam, which is a movement of change and revolution, and the state religion, which serves as a tool to ensure political subjugation.¹⁸ As will be explained below, Bulaç also criticises the dominant Western culture, and especially its impact on Turkish society, beginning in the Tanzimat era. He criticizes dominant Western political systems and ideologies such as democracy, liberalism, capitalism, Marxism and humanism. These ideologies, he argues, claim to liberate man, but in fact, they enslave him.

Muslim liberation theologians make use of this theory to explain that the needs and dynamics of their society differ from those of Western society. They reject the notion that the poor countries of the Third World can develop and accumulate wealth simply by adopting Western economic systems and by attracting Western investment and capital, since this would result in the poor countries becoming poorer and more dependent on the West.¹⁹ Similarly, Bulaç wants

¹⁵ Gregory Baum, "Liberation Theology and Marxism", Montreal McGill CDAS Discussion paper No.43, (November 1986). p.2.

¹⁶ Although he does not identify himself as a liberation theologian he no doubt is familiar with the works of Latin American and Black theology. See his discussion on Third World countries in Bir Aydın Sapması, pp. 91-93.

¹⁷ Baum, op.cit., p.2.

¹⁸ Compare with Shariati's distinction between 'Alid Shi'ism' and 'Safavid Shi'ism'.

¹⁹ Baum, op.cit., pp.4-5.

Turkey to be independent of the West, economically and culturally, a familiar demand voiced often in Third World countries.

The notion of the preferential option for the poor, which is central to liberation theology, involves a dual commitment: to view society from the perspective of the poor and powerless, and to give public witness of solidarity with their struggle for liberation. This category is important in Bulaç's work and may be the reason for his popularity. Islam liberated the poor and powerless of Mecca from their subjugation to the powerful and the rich,²⁰ and the poor and powerless are the focus of his thought. Religion in Turkey, in other societies is shaped simultaneously by social, political and economic factors. The question is whether the notion of social justice and the poor and powerless are rooted in Islam or perhaps, as Mardin suggests, "It is because social justice per se is such a powerful concept in our time that the idea of Islamic social justice also has considerable attraction for the Turks."²¹

One of the interesting things about liberation theology is its emphasis on the role of the people as a whole in taking charge of their own destiny. Liberation theologians hold that people at the bottom and on the margin of society are destined to be agents of their own liberation. God is presented to them as a source of enlightenment and empowerment of their wills. God delivers them from the sins of apathy, hopelessness, fear and false respect. People are meant to be the subjects of their history.²² According to Shariati, al-Nas ("the people") should be the prime factor in social change and development. The people are accountable to God for their deeds, therefore they hold the responsibility for society and history. The people should control their own destiny through

²⁰ The equivalent for Shi'ite would be the liberation from the Ummaya's.

²¹ Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey", in: James P. Piscatori (ed), Islam in the Political Process, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.157

²² Baum, op.cit., p.6.

education, knowledge, and awareness.²³ Bulaç, following Shariati, also focusses his attention on the people. He departs from the classical division in Islamic history between elite and masses, ulema and ordinary Muslims, as did before Muslim fundamentalists. The practical result which the reader should notice is that a call for the people to be agents of their own liberations could be interpreted as justification for armed struggle against the rulers.

6.4 The Heritage of the Civilization Movement

In order to understand Bulaç's work, attention should be given to his Turkish intellectual background. It is argued that from all the known literature, the most influential on Bulaç was that of the Turkish 'civilization movement'. This movement came into vogue in the early nineteen fifties and blossomed into full maturity in the sixties.²⁴ It is not a particularly cohesive movement, but there is a single concept which binds it. The followers of the movement see Islam as not just a religion and a culture, but also as a civilization - one which is no longer recognised as such but is waiting to regain this recognition.

One of the main problems which confronted this school of thought, as other intellectual movements, was that of cultural decline. This ongoing problem is as troubling for Islam as it was for other classical cultures. The Prophet Muhammad was crowned 'the seal of prophets'. In a sense, anything after Muhammad is anti-climactic. The shadow of decline and degeneration began to loom over Islam more strongly since its contact with the West in the modern period; the Muslim self-

²³ Yadegari, p.44.

²⁴ The term Civilization Movement was used for the first time in the literature by Mehmet Davetoğlu, "The Re-Emergence of Islamic Thought in Turkey - Intellectual Transformation", BRISMES, (G.B, 1986).

image was badly damaged in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. This civilization, which saw itself as destined to rule the world was reeling under successive blows from the West.

Necip Fazıl was in the vanguard of the civilization movement.²⁵ His books, Sahte Kahramanlar ("Spurious Heroes") and Bab-ı Ali ("The Sublime Porte"), were a breakthrough. They were the first indication of a deviation from the Durkheimian approach which was popular in republican educational institutions and dominated pro-Western intellectual thought in Turkey. Fazıl rejected the common argument that Islam was the fundamental reason for the underdevelopment of the country. His ideology, the "Great Orient" (Büyük Doğu) as he called it, criticized both the scholastic structure of the medreses, which had induced inertia in the ulema during the period of Western challenge, and the superficial attempts at westernization after the Tanzimat. This, he believed, resulted in the substitution of the bigots of the medreses by the bigots of the Tanzimat.²⁶ Fazıl and other prominent 'civilization' intellectuals, such as Cemil Meriç and Sezai Karakoç, were united in their criticism of both the traditional way of thinking and the modern westernized intelligentsia. They believed the opinion that Islam is not merely a religion or a culture, but rather a civilization.

The main influence of the civilization movement on Bulaç's work is the awareness of Islam as a civilization which is incompatible with Western civilization, since it is based on a different value system. Their conclusion becomes Bulaç's starting point. Like other Muslim thinkers throughout the Islamic world, Bulaç is preoccupied with the question of why, despite over a hundred years of westernization in the late Ottoman period and over 60 years of unhindered modernization after the formation of the republic, Turkey has not succeeded in becoming a cohesive modern state and achieving economic, technological, and scientific development. Why, in

²⁵ Davetoğlu, op.cit. p. 13.

²⁶ Ibid.

spite of all efforts, has it not succeeded in eradicating its rigid class structure and mass poverty and gaining the respect of Western nations? His conclusion is that westernization has failed in Turkey as elsewhere in the Middle East. He then considers alternative options for responding to the problems of the modern world. Bulaç's answer is clear - they should place their trust in Islam, or more precisely, in his vision of Islam.

6.5 Analysis of Bulaç's Work

Bulaç's target audience, as he confirms in one of his book, is the younger generation, whose problems he addresses.²⁷ His ideas appeal mainly to young urban people, university students or graduates, from varied backgrounds and very often with no formal Islamic education. This group has generally been exposed to western theories and is familiar with their terminology. Bulaç's arguments attract them because they do not seem inferior to those of Western writers.

Bulaç, like other writers of the new movement, does not ignore Western scholars. On the contrary, he often refers to the works of Marx, Weber and Hegel and employs the Western sociological jargon which is familiar to his audience. Bulaç may argue with Western scholars but he neither ignores nor totally rejects them.

In the Middle East, he argues, there are three kinds of regimes: the monarchical regime; the military or bureaucratic dictatorship; and the democratic regime (all three being represented in Turkey or Pakistan). They are all equally bad. In the first two cases the individual has no right of self-determination; in other words, there is a lack of liberty. In criticising the democratic regime, he echoes Shariati, arguing that the opinion of the majority is imposed on the minority, even when the minority comprises 49 percent of the population. Here again, the individual has lost his liberty. This

²⁷ Bulaç, İslâm Dünyasında, op.cit; and Çağdaş Kavramlar, p. 10.

situation can be changed by adopting a new social and political order.²⁸

In Concepts and Orders of Our Time, Bulaç analyzes the three major theories which have been tested in the West: fascism, socialism, and capitalism.²⁹ Bulaç analyses these three popular political alternatives in terms of class division. Capitalism created the problem of class division, while socialism emerged as an attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to deal with it. Fascism, he argues, is the last in the sequence, and has emerged in weak capitalist societies as a reaction to socialism.

According to Bulaç, the spread of capitalism has resulted in a world-wide demoralization of society, in which individuals become dissolute and family life disintegrates. He believes that Islam is the answer, and will succeed where other ideologies have failed. Islam offers a dynamic response to contemporary problems, since it is suited to all times and all places. Islam is not a conservative or rightist ideology; it is not just a culture or a religion: it is a civilization.³⁰ Like Fazıl, Bulaç rejects the secular stereotype of Islam as a religion which cannot offer adequate solutions for modern problems. Islam is the only way out of the vicious circle of Western political regimes and ideologies.³¹

In addition to Western sociology, Bulaç has been influenced by modern Islamic thinkers. It is worth noting that the writer who most influenced his work was Ali Shariati. Scholars such as Ali Shariati and Maulana Maududi make greater use of modern concepts than their contemporaries, who tend to rely on the works of traditional medieval scholars as Al-Ghazali. Since the majority of his audience has not been exposed to traditional Islamic terminology, their use would be self-defeating.

²⁸ Ali Bulaç, "Devlet, Şariat, Örf, Sivil Toplum", Kitap Dergisi, (İstanbul: Birleşik.), Nisan-Mayıs 1991. pp.8-15.

²⁹ Ali Bulaç, Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler, (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1987).

³⁰ See also: Ali Bulaç, Bir Aydın Sapması, (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1989)

³¹ Ali Bulaç, İslâm Dünyasında Düşünce Sorunları, (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1985) pp. pp.13-22

6.6 Bulaç's Attitude towards Other Religions

According to Bulaç, apart from historical and formal variations, the three major monotheistic religions are essentially similar. Both Judaism and Christianity, like Islam, are "invitational" religions, he argues, meaning that they "invite" their respective communities and the whole of humankind to submit themselves to God. However, in spite of the similarity of their origins and cause, the three religions developed differently, with Judaism and Christianity losing their original tevhidi character due to appendages to their respective doctrinal bodies. Judaism ceased to be a divine religion, Bulaç suggests, its God³² became the God of the Jews only and no longer the God of all mankind.³³ As for Christianity, it was popular among the masses when it was oppressed by the Roman Empire, but deteriorated in the course of three centuries of struggle with it. Under the degenerative and destructive influence of St. Paul's reforms, the principles of Christianity lost their rebellious spirit.³⁴ Revisions, such as those by the rabbis to the Torah or by St. Paul to the Gospels, were never inflicted on the Koran. From a religion of rebellion Christianity became the official religion of an empire.

Islam, in contrast to Judaism and Christianity, has never abandoned its struggle against the corrupt and unjust status quo and has maintained its tevhidi essence and its integrity. The natural, logical conclusion, according to Bulaç, is that Islam is the only religion to reach the present day in its original, authentic form, with its scriptures preserved without modification since the time of the Revelation, and its principles derived from those scriptures. Tevhid is the message of the Koran. This is the affirmation that there is one God who created the universe, life, and humankind and

³² YAHOVA in Bulaç's spelling.

³³ İslâm Dünyasında., pp.13-16.

³⁴ İslâm Dünyasında., pp.16-22.

who ultimately determines everything.³⁵

The Koran shows the people the solution to their problems and sets out their obligations. It comprises both what is within and what is beyond human knowledge. Human activity amounts to nothing more than a confirmation of the scripture (which is the "knowledge of the truth") and the enrichment of its knowledge.³⁶

6.7 Islamic Thought and Muslim Intellectuals

The present state of Islamic thought and Muslim intellectuals is one of Bulaç's main concerns. He deals with this question in both İslâm Dünyasında Düşünce Sorunları ('The Question of Thought in the Islamic world') and Bir Aydın Sapması ('An Error of the Intellectual'). In the Ottoman/Islamic world, the nineteenth century was marked by attempts to examine the advanced position of the West and discuss appropriate responses. According to Bulaç, the novel socio-economic dynamics that gave rise to the development of the West were neglected in these discussions. Among the solutions proposed was the building of a wall against the West by returning to Islamic tradition and laws. Some advocated total openness towards the West and the total adoption of the Western model. The preferred course of action was to accept Western technologies while rejecting Western cultural values.³⁷ An attempt was made to protect the cultural values and morality of the Ottoman/Islamic culture.

In the early twentieth century the major political thinkers of the Ottoman Empire advocated

³⁵ Bulaç, Düşünce Sorunları, pp.30-31

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., p.55.

Ottomanism, Turkism and Islamism. Science, art, and Western technology were at a premium and in this respect, the Islamist was not an exception. However, as Bulaç asks,

But can the art, the concept of science, the technical development, and the scientific knowledge of the West be abstracted from the thought, the perception of the world, the set of beliefs and even the life style of the West?³⁸

Bulaç makes a distinction between Islamic thought before and after 27 May 1960 when a more liberal pluralistic regime was created.³⁹ According to Bulaç, Islamic thought before 1960 is characterized by a lack of political consciousness and of a strong intellectual grounding, as well as by reactionism and submission to the established order.⁴⁰ The basic challenge facing Islamic thought in the period after the 1960 coup is determined by Bulaç as "binding the thought and the belief with the Koran and the Sunna and purifying them of westernised ideas".⁴¹ The military coup, he argues, was caused by the fear within the elite of the opposition that flourished within the popular support for the Democratic Party. The religious masses themselves failed to constitute an organized movement during and after the 1960's for two reasons. The Justice Party, the heir of the Democratic Party, carried Islam into the political domain, as had its predecessor. The socialist Turkish Labour Party failed to understand of the concerns and spirit of the Turkish people and represented a communist threat. This reinforced the inclination of the Muslims toward the Justice Party.⁴²

Bulaç argues that the origin of the difficulties confronting Islamic thought and praxis is the

³⁸ Ibid., p. 55.

³⁹ 27 May is the date of the first military coup, historians also see in it the end of what they call the first Republican period.

⁴⁰ On the pre-1960 thought see: İslâm Dünyasında, pp. 53-57.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.65.

⁴² As to the 1970's and after, the two attempts, the National Order Party (NOP) and the MSP, to introduce Islam as an independent organization in the political domain are, according to Bulaç, significant stages of development.

opposition of two traditions, - that is, the Islamic/oriental/Asian tradition on the one hand, and the nationalist /occidental /European tradition, on the other. This opposition was caused by the new political and cultural choices which the republic made possible. The problem was a legacy from nineteenth century modernism. It appealed to borrowed Western concepts to understand and interpret Islam and to model Islam on the dominant line of thought in the West, he claims. Illusory ideologies such as "Islamic nationalism", "Islamic democracy", and "Islamic socialism", which mistakenly attempt to marry Western concepts and Islam, belong to this category. "No social system can endure for long relying on loans from other cultures," Bulaç argues.⁴³

6.8 Atheism, Modernism and Imperialism

Atheism, modernism and imperialism have been traumatic for the Islamic world. Bulaç feels that these "isms" are connected.⁴⁴ Atheism is a person's deviation from the path towards God and surrender to Satan. The Islamic approach reveals that in the course of history şirk, the intellectual basis for denying God, was expressed differently in different periods. Philosophies based upon şirk (such as those of Aristotle and Plato) rather than tevhid, and even those wearing Islamic colours (such as that of the mutazilites) are not essentially different from contemporary atheism. A significant difference between contemporary atheism and its earlier equivalents is that whereas the older forms gained favour only in restricted, elite circles, atheism has been appropriated by the masses.⁴⁵

Modernism is, by definition, the intellectual and technological state which is exemplified in

⁴³ Bulaç, Düşünce Sorunları., pp.70-81.

⁴⁴ İslâm Dünyasında, pp. 137-175.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp.143-156.

the most advanced nation or society. This definition, however, presupposes a Western model of thought. For less advanced nations, modernism is the channel of subjugation and destruction at the hands of the West. Any definition which ignores this aspect is in accordance with the Western, but not the Islamic, conception of modernism. Bulaç regrets that most intellectuals in Turkey adopt the Western definition and that they deem modernisation to be their primary objective. This identification of development with modernism serves the intentions and objectives of the West.⁴⁶ The ultimate aim of modernism, he claims, is the eradication of socio-cultural differences throughout the world and the creation of a universal culture of consumption, thus establishing a "mental occupation", which, in turn, prepares the ground for imperialism. On the other hand, Islam has also benefited from modernism. Among the reactions to the attempts to modernise Islam is a concern for preserving the authentic cultural sources of Islamic society. Bulaç states that the most pertinent effect of modernism is the appropriation of indigenous cultures by the West. Furthermore, the consolidation of Islamic societies around the idea of tevhid is apparently the only way to resist the racist and chauvinist Western cultural imperialism.⁴⁷

Bulaç feels that imperialism lies at the heart of the conflict between Islam and Christianity.⁴⁸ Since early times, whenever it has needed contact with the East, the West has presented itself with a Christian mask which completely conceals its true atheistic character. Throughout the course of history, conquest, colonialism and the like have been the names given in the West to its desire to dominate the East. Imperialism is just another of these names, one of a class of activities with a single aim. It should be defined, in the final analysis, as human

⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 157-167.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.187.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp 169-175.

domination.⁴⁹

Rejecting capitalist and socialist theories, Bulaç argues that while economic factors may be influential, the human factor is the determining one. The human basis of imperialism is fostered by the negative and destructive properties of human nature. These are manifested in man's pretensions of divinity (uluhiyet), and his claim to such godly qualities as creation, judgement, command and worship (ibadet). The route to imperialism, Bulaç argues, begins with humanism. Humanism is a way of thought that invites people to revolt against God and associates absolute power with human beings. Imperialist attitudes follow naturally from a humanistic intellectual stance. Indeed, humanism recognizes no power superior to the human being. Given the uneven distribution of human abilities it follows that the domination of the less competent by the superior is both indispensable and legitimate. In contrast, when Islam and its central theme, tevhid, are taken as the point of departure, individual differences have less effect, either positive or negative, on the larger society. There is no room for man to dominate man, because God is the source of life and power. All beings who flaunt their power are invalidated by the content of this universal principle.⁵⁰ Consequently, as opposed to atheism (the denial of God), humanism (the attribution of divinity (uluhiyet) to humans in rebellion against God), or imperialism, the origins of which are found in atheism and humanism, Bulaç suggests that Islam, the surrender to God, is the true answer.

The most important problem confronting the countries still under the influence of imperialism - a consequence of the inevitable dependence upon former colonial powers - is the existence of an indigenous power which attempts a reconciliation between the imperialist country and the dependent one. Bulaç undermines the solution he proposes for this problem in the light of

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.201.

the response of Islam to demands of reconciliation throughout the course of history.⁵¹ It is because Islam never accepted reconciliation with its antagonists that it can today serve as the ideology and the spirit of revolt for oppressed people throughout the world and mobilize the masses.

6.9 The Islamic Society of the Future

In his critical article, Meeker accuses Bulaç of being unable to develop a picture of a future Islamic society or the means to achieve it.⁵² This drives Meeker to the conclusion that Bulaç is "neo-orthodox", a conclusion that is not borne out by careful examination of Bulaç's work. The Egyptian Sayid Qutb, one of the leading Sunni fundamentalist thinkers, similarly rejects the idea that it is necessary to develop a clear programme for an active Islamic society, calling such an attempt an "optical illusion" based on the false belief that humans can predict the future. Nor can Qutb see any point in proposing a method of achieving such a projection. Bulaç assents to Qutb's belief that people cannot predict the future.⁵³

Bulaç recognises the inevitability of change and modern society, which he sees as two concepts important to Western discourse. Though the term "modern society" is a Western one, and it is the West which promotes its development, nevertheless Islamic society has no choice but to face the conflict it presents. Bulaç claims that the world is in constant change and while we cannot affect this change, we must monitor it. One obvious task that must be carried out is the reinterpretation of fiqh, (the system of Islamic law), in accordance with contemporary needs. This,

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 201-206.

⁵² Meeker, "New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey". in R. Tapper (ed.), Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 189-221.

⁵³ Interview, 21 September 1992.

it is suggested, should be done by exercising qiyas, or analogy, in a manner compatible with the Koran.⁵⁴

The same logic of adapting tradition to modern needs is exercised in choosing which Islamic scholars to study. Twentieth century Islamic scholars are usually preferred, since the work of earlier ones is no longer relevant for today's problems and conditions. However, without this adaptation their writings cannot give answers to the problems facing Turks and other Muslims today. If fiqh and pre twentieth century scholars are no longer adequate for contemporary Muslims, then the Asr-ı Saadet, the period of Muhammad, cannot be the perfect model of society for most Muslims. Since the world is changing, and Islamic society is part of modern times (if not a modern society), then this model of Muhammad is no longer appropriate. The incompatibility of the old model to the present should have led scholars to develop a model for a new society, but generally this has not happened. Bulaç is aware of this fault and attempts to create fundamental principles for his new political model for society.

According to Bulaç there are three ways of interpreting or implementing Islam.⁵⁵ The first is the Muslims' own interpretation of Islam in history. Bulaç claims that this mode of interpretation is outdated and is unsuitable for the present day. The second is contemporary Islam, that is, the very implementation of it in the modern Muslim world, which according to Bulaç is an aberration which should be dissolved. In short, these two models of Islam are incapable of dealing with the four main problems plaguing the Islamic world today: poverty, inadequate education, oppressive regimes and the existence of the state of Israel. Bulaç's conclusion is clear: only an "authentic Islam" can provide remedies to these four ills owing to its unique political and social order. Unlike many Muslim intellectuals, such as Sayyid Qutb, who see such a detailed programme or model as

⁵⁴ See: Meeker, op.cit., p. 202.

⁵⁵ Interview, 21 September 1992.

an optical illusion, Bulaç believes in the importance of a detailed plan. His authentic Islam is based upon his understanding of the Asr-ı Saadet, the "blessed period" of Muhammad's prophecy and statesmanship.

Bulaç's view is presented in "Devlet, Şariat, Örf, Sivil Toplum" (state, Shari'a, local usage, civil society), an article published in May 1991.⁵⁶ Bulaç presents a vision of a cosmopolitan society in which different communities (Jewish, Christian, Muslim, or atheist) coexist. Each community would live in accordance with the rules determined by its members. Every individual would have the right to belong to any group and would be obliged to accept its laws. In this way Bulaç hopes to solve the problems created by democracy; each minority would have rights equal to the Muslim majority.⁵⁷

Bulaç is anti-Western; more specifically, he opposes Western European and American ideas and thought. He does not dismiss socialism and, like most liberation theologians, is not against Marxism. Western culture is viewed as having an imperialistic nature. The most outstanding achievement of the West is democracy. Liberal democracy, however, is incompatible with the idea of tevhid, and therefore cannot be accepted by Muslims. A government chosen by people in a state that is imposed by people denies freedom; it is a slavery of the people. The democratic system liberates only those who are part of the system and there is no tolerance shown to others. The democratic system of Turkey denies liberty to Muslims who want to practise Islam, Bulaç claims. It was imposed on the Turks as a whole by Turkey's Westernized elite and does not really express the will of the people.

⁵⁶ Bulaç, "Devlet, Şariat", op.cit.

⁵⁷ Interview, 22 September 1992.

6.10 Tevhid and Ideological Pluralism

Tevhid (unification), a key theological concept in Islam, must also be seen in a social perspective, as part of the effort to develop social structures leading to the liberation of humanity from all types of bondage. The concept, considered to be central part of Islamic theology, is usually taken "to denote belief in one God as opposed to the unpardonable sin of worshipping more than one".⁵⁸ Liberation theology, as against traditional theology, interprets tevhid not merely as the unity of God but also as the unity of mankind, which cannot be achieved in its truest sense without creating a classless society.⁵⁹ The concept of tevhid so interpreted comes very close to the Koranic spirit of justice and benevolence (al-'adl wa al ahsan). As long as the world is divided into unevenly developed nations on the one hand, and exploiting and exploited classes on the other, true unity of mankind cannot be achieved. Hence tevhid can be achieved by creating exploitation-free structures on the one hand, and through unshakeable faith in the unity of God, on the other. To be meaningful, tevhid cannot be divested of either of these two dimensions.

In addition to social pluralism, that is, a classless society, there is also a recognition that ideological pluralism (çok renklilik = multi colouration) is necessary. At first, this seems contrary to the concept of tevhid so central to Islam. Before dealing with ideological pluralism, therefore, Bulaç's understanding of tevhid must be explained.

Ali Bulaç follows Ali Shariati in his understanding of the concept of tevhid.⁶⁰ In Shariati's "Islamology" tevhid gained a new importance. It is not merely one of several fundamental principles of Islam - rather it is the root of all the other principles. Tevhid is the foundation of the

⁵⁸ A.S. Tritton, *Islam*. (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1966) p.93.

⁵⁹ Yadegari., pp. 38-40.

⁶⁰ See Chapter 5. pp.130-132

individual and social life of the Muslim. All human activities and relationships, whether political, economic or artistic, ought to be firmly based on tevhid. The Prophet Muhammad established his social order on tevhid, thus creating nizam-ı tevhid (system based on unity). A muvaahid (believer in tevhid) does not fear death, illness, poverty or any other deprivation. Since tevhid prevents it. All the ills of society, argue Shariati, are due to the individual's lack of faith in one God. Failure to believe in one God results in a confused personality.⁶¹

Bulaç applies the same logic to the faith of society as a whole. This reasoning leads him to a discussion of dictatorship. In such a regime, the person and personality of the dictator are paramount. All other personalities are exterminated or absorbed into his persona, so that a society of a million individuals or more is left with only one real personality. It is this type of society which becomes impoverished. To prevent such a situation Bulaç suggests the necessity of ideological pluralism. This pluralism is limited by two constraints: first, there must be basic agreement on the principles of the Koran, the Sunna and iman, or belief. This agreement must be shared by all believers, regardless of their sect or dervish order. Second, there must be no attempt to embellish the Muslim movement with Western ideas and ideological movements, since previous attempts have failed.⁶²

Bulaç argues that pluralism of thought is part of Islamic tradition.⁶³ As people think and use their judgement, they reach different conclusions. This is even more true where different societies and cultures are involved, as in the Muslim world. Bulaç finds support for his idea in the nature of the fiqh, which he understands as comparison and analogy (kiyas). Differences of opinion and alternative views are inevitable, and are even institutionalized in Islamic law and religion. He

⁶¹ See Chapter 5. pp.130-132

⁶² Bulaç, İslâm Dünyasında, p. 88

⁶³ This might be understood as a contradiction to the principle of the tevhid, a contradiction which Bulaç does not recognize.

welcomes alternative views - within the abovementioned limits - even seeing them as the key to breaking the deadlock in which the Islamic movement has found itself in the past.

In this context his objection to the activities of tarikats (dervish orders) becomes clear. The exclusive nature of the tarikats has been criticized as an obstacle to the advancement of the Islamic movement. But the sects can also be criticized for becoming so involved with their own internal problems that the broader picture of Islam is forgotten. It is less their method of interpretation which he rejects, than their attempt to isolate themselves from the mainstream Islamic movement. Tevhid does not allow this.⁶⁴

Islam bases its message upon tevhid, which demands a nizam-ı tevhid, but man also needs a personal model to follow. This model is provided by Muhammad, who showed men the path to the truth. Like Qutb, Bulaç believes that humans are unable to predict the future. Instead of occupying himself with this problem, he concentrates his attack on modernism. His ideology is based on a search for authenticity, the return to the original Islamic identity. Any solution must be an Islamic one and faithful to its sources. Bulaç rejects the use of Western, rational standards for examining and testing the word of God - the Koran. He objects to the modernist use of Western methods in the attempt to "discover" the true Islam. He also rejects the apologetic trend which characterized modernist reformers such as Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida.

For the same reasons that Bulaç objects to the modernist approach, he also rejects the Western separation of religion and science. He does not reject science per se, but rather acknowledges its limits. Science is limited in its knowledge and humans do not have the answer to every problem. Bulaç's attitude to science is based on the assumption that the truth and the explanation for all matters is in the Koran. The human mind cannot compete with God.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Bulaç, İslâm Dünyasında, pp.30-31.

⁶⁵ Bulaç, Bir Aydın Sapması., pp.77-82.

Another point of contention is the Western worship of science and rational explanation. The disbelief in God brought the West to worship another God - the human mind. Here lies the threat of science to Islamic civilization. Bulaç does not develop this point, but one cannot resist making a comparison with Maududi's theory of the modern Jahiliya. Bulaç's analysis is based on the same assumption, that is to say that the Turkish people, like other Muslims, must be diverted from their deviant modern way of life as the first stage to salvation.

6.11 The Question of Identity

Bulaç argues that the liberation of the Islamic world requires a solution to the question of identity.

Be it in the individual, international, or any other sphere, reconciliation is an idea, even an ideology. By its nature it opposes the concept of independence held by nations like ours. We [the Islamic umma] need, however, to rely on our own power. We should learn how to stand by mobilizing all our cultural, intellectual, artistic, scientific, human, and physical resources. This is, of course, a serious problem of identity and personality.⁶⁶

Liberation theologians as well as many Muslim reformers rejected man-made systems of control such as imperialism, colonialism and nationalism, which divide human beings through arbitrary geographical lines. In his book Gündemdeki Konular (Subjects on the Agenda), Bulaç explains his attitude to the question of identity.⁶⁷ This book is written in clear and direct language, almost a summary of Bulaç's ideology for the layman. The 20th century is a century of Muslim renaissance, he argues. The new wind blowing through the Islamic world and awakening it is a positive factor. It is not regression, which is how the West sees it, but progress. Muslims are

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 234.

⁶⁷ Ali Bulaç, Gündemdeki Konular, (Istanbul: Akabe Yayınları, 1988). p.55.

not going backwards, but searching for their cultural, scientific and intellectual roots. In seeking their identity, Turkish Muslims must ask themselves what Turkey means to them, to what do they really relate, and what criteria should be used to determine identity. Here Bulaç has found the heart of the problem which Muslims face in the modern nation-state: am I primarily a Muslim or a Turk?

After examining geographical boundaries and racial considerations, Bulaç rejects both as valid determinants of identity. He regards himself first and foremost as part of the Muslim umma. He writes that Turks are not welcome in the West, but are welcomed in the Islamic world.

Why am I concerned about Europe and the West? Wherever I travel there I come up against visa barriers, but when I travel to Pakistan all doors are open.⁶⁸

While it is clear that Islam is the source of his identity, his attitude towards his country needs clarification. He addresses his speeches and writings to the Turkish people, in particular to its youth, and relates to specific Turkish problems and situations (such as joining the European Community, and the Rabita affair). He does not specify whether he distinguishes between nationality and citizenship, and allow to leave the reader to reach the conclusion that there is such a distinction.⁶⁹

6.12 The Leadership of the Intellectuals

Bulaç, following Shariati, is more specific than liberation theologians on the issue of leadership. For him, leadership should be transferred to the "enlightened thinker" from within the

⁶⁸ Bulaç, Gündemdeki Konular, Chapter on the identity problem ,pp.55-65.

⁶⁹ Bulaç, Gündemdeki, pp.133-136; 142-148.

people and not necessarily from the ranks of the ulema. The enlightened intellectual is better equipped to rule than the jurist. True, claims Bulaç, the cleric is learned, but only about subjects such as kalam, fiqh and usul. These subjects are not directly connected with the everyday concerns and needs of ordinary Muslims. The enlightened intellectual, in contrast, is more in tune with the everyday pulse of the masses and is thus more capable of dealing effectively with the real needs of his fellow Muslims.

In his book, İslâm Dünyasında Düşünce Sorunları (Questions of Thought in the Islamic World) Bulaç analyses the work and attitudes of Muslim intellectuals.⁷⁰ He has a special interest in them, seeing a great significance in their role as carriers of the Islamic message. According to Bulaç, westernization in Turkey has created a cultural dualism which is reflected in the country's intellectual activity. Two groups of intellectuals have emerged. The first preaches radicalism against the West in the name of Islam; the second, radicalism against Islam in the name of the West.⁷¹ Both approaches are equally wrong, according to Bulaç. The first group accepts history and tradition without question. This acquiescence results in an impoverishment of Islamic thought. The second group consists of Western oriented Turkish intellectuals who are alienated from their own history, culture and people; it produces no original works. In the Turkish academic world, "there are only successful translators".⁷²

According to Bulaç, the Islamic thinker must rid his mind of Western influences and concentrate on the Koran and Sunna. The duty of the intellectual is to develop a set of Islamic canons appropriate to contemporary life. This duty is so crucial to Bulaç that he even suggests that contemporary thinkers should focus on it to the exclusion of all other intellectual endeavors. Thus

⁷⁰ See: Düşünce Sorunları, *op.cit.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.88.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p.24.

Bulaç, like his contemporary liberation theologians in Latin America, accords the intellectuals the exclusive right to political leadership, at the expense of religious institution.

The Islamic basis for the concept of the intellectual, which can be found in the Koran itself, is the affirmation that a community (ummah) within Islamic society is obliged - as a consequence of the mission of the Prophet - to guide its people to the light (nur) of God, to the right and good.⁷³ In addition, each individual who upon becoming a believer finds the "truth" and the "right" as transmitted through the Koran, should endeavour to guide others to the faith. These two types of missionary activities reflect the two categories of intellectuals.⁷⁴ The first includes those members of Muslim society with superior talents and dynamism who, in guiding their society towards God, are successors to the Prophet. The second includes all members of Muslim society, regardless of their individual talents, who, in calling mankind to the "true faith", are the intellectuals of the whole of mankind. In an Islamic society, the intellectual is simultaneously scholar (fakih or rasih), ruler, and leader (imam) as he pioneers and guides the progression towards God. Thus, Bulaç argues, a distinct social stratum of "intellectuals" cannot exist in an Islamic society as in the West.⁷⁵ The split in Islamic society, between the elite (the havas), who hold authority with regard to science and law fikh, and the common people (avam), does not grow into socio-economic differentiation, as in the West. For the authority of the fakih is bound to the revelation of God and the example of the Prophet; it does not grant them special legal and political privileges.⁷⁶

In Europe, scientists came to secularism as a result of the preeminence of science over religion which accompanied the spread of enlightenment philosophy. The split between science and

⁷³ Ibid., p. 108.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 113-118.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Bulaç, İslâm Dünyasında, pp. 113-118.

religion developed only after the humanist view of the world took root. Ottoman Islamic society did not follow a similar route, but beginning with the 17th century, the trend toward adopting Western institutions generated a dichotomy between the culturally indigenous but incompetent ulema and the emerging modernist scientists, who were culturally alienated, but dynamic. According to Bulaç, both the ulema and the modernist scientist are "transmitters", equally removed from the creation of real thought and science.⁷⁷ The ulema is much more powerful than the Muslim intellectual. The intellectual, however, is obviously better equipped to understand the contemporary world and its problems. Bulaç concludes that the leadership of Islamic society requires cooperation and solidarity between them.

The role Bulaç ascribes to intellectuals is not alien to Muslim ideology. In fundamentalist circles, the work of the intellectual is seen as vital to increasing the power of Islam. Muhammad's prophecy partly explains the Muslim hulefa.⁷⁸ Intellectuals, Bulaç writes, are the "heirs of the prophet" and as such have a responsibility to initiate a cultural transformation which will lead the masses to internalize the Islamic world-view.

6.13 Methodological Remarks

One of the first problems scholars face when researching political thinkers is in attempting to classify their works. The problem is accentuated when dealing with an author who is still writing. The writer may change his approach or even criticize the researcher's classification of

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 78-81.

⁷⁸ In the same sense, the way of the French revolution was prepared by Rousseau, Voltaire and Montesquieu. It was Marx and Engels who made the Bolshevik revolution possible, as much as Nazism grew from seeds sown by Hegel, Fichte and Nietzsche.

him.⁷⁹

There are very few critiques of the work of Ali Bulaç, apart from those of Michael Meeker and Binnaz Toprak.⁸⁰ These two writers were the first to bring Bulaç's work to the attention of the West. It can be suggested, however, that both fail to classify Bulaç's work appropriately. Meeker categorizes Bulaç as "neo-orthodox".⁸¹ He bases his conclusion on Bulaç's awareness of the shortcomings of traditional religious education in Turkey, which distinguishes him from the conventional orthodox alim. Bulaç, however, as Meeker points out, "has not yet been able to resolve the problems of Muslims in the modern world in his own writing".⁸²

Meeker's attitude towards the contemporary problems of Muslim thought appears in his criticism of Bulaç's writing. Bulaç should be credited for highlighting the faults of conservatism in the traditional way of thinking. But since these faults drove him to choose a purely Islamic modern solution, Meeker considers him to be merely "neo-orthodox". Meeker's anthropological approach is influenced by the theory of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, first introduced by Ferdinand Tönnies.⁸³ This theory, which aimed to explain the shift from a pre-political to a political society, in fact described the emergence of a modern industrial state which claimed exclusive rights to the name of a political society in its classical form. The followers of Meeker, like adherents to any modernization theory, are bound by the assumptions that modern society is better than traditional society, and that there is a necessary correlation between tradition and religion and as well as

⁷⁹ See İsmet Özel's criticism of Toprak's article in Girişim, (İstanbul: Girişim Publishing House) September 1989, no.9.

⁸⁰ Michael Meeker, "New Muslim Intellectuals" op.cit.; Binnaz Toprak, "Islamic Intellectuals of the 1980's in Turkey", Current Turkish Thought, (Istanbul: Redhouse Yayınevi, 1989); "Üç Entelektüel", Toplum ve Bilim, no 29/30 Bahar-Yaz 1985.

⁸¹ Meeker, op.cit., pp.12-13.

⁸² Ibid., pp.12-13.

⁸³ Ferdinand Tönnies, From Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, (new edition, 1955).

between secularism, modernism and change.⁸⁴

In another article, Binnaz Toprak puts Bulaç in a new light.⁸⁵ She places him in a group which she calls "the new Muslim intellectuals". According to Toprak, Bulaç is part of a group of modern Turkish intellectuals including other writers such as İsmet Özel, Hüseyin Hatemi, and Rasim Özdenören, who broke away from earlier Turkish writers by developing new formulas for an Islamic way of life. Toprak's classification is the result of an examination in a rather narrow Turkish context, which ignores the wider world of Muslim thought or even the wider world of religious thought. It should be remembered that during the 1980's Turkish intellectuals were exposed for the first time to writings and ideas from the Muslim world.⁸⁶

Bulaç, it may be suggested, is not neo-orthodox and cannot be seen as holding the same opinions as İsmet Özel, Rasim Özdenören and many other Turkish writers. Criticising the social science approach to intellectual history is not the purpose of this. Nevertheless, something must be said about the approach chosen by Meeker and Toprak. Both are followers of the school of social science which uses models. Meeker uses an existing model, while Toprak tries to create one. In keeping with this approach, the Muslim intellectual is "somewhere over thirty and less than fifty years old" according to Meeker,⁸⁷ while Toprak writes "the Muslim intellectuals think that...".⁸⁸ Both treat Muslim intellectuals as a single, homogeneous unit; "they" think, "they" write, "they" explain and so on. The attempt to find a common thread running through the works of the new Muslim intellectuals forces Meeker and Toprak to rely on a very tenuous link. The only obvious

⁸⁴ See also, Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, (New York: Free Press, 1958)

⁸⁵ Toprak, "Islamic Intellectuals", *op.cit.*

⁸⁶ This has to do with the relatively liberal approach of the Turkish governments as was explained in Chapter 1.

⁸⁷ Meeker, *op.cit.*, pp. 11-12

⁸⁸ Toprak, *op.cit.*, pp. 30-32.

common characteristic is the writers' criticism of their predecessors, and their concerns with the people. It is suggested that a better understanding of their thought can be gained by examining it in the wide context of Third World religious thought.

6.14 Conclusions

Ali Bulaç is a product of a new Turkish generation. The rise of the Islamic oriented civilization movement in Turkey, which for the first time challenged the secular intelligentsia, opened the door to a new kind of literature. The political situation in Turkey and the availability of Islamic literature from other Muslim countries since the end of the 1960's (but particularly in the 1980's) exposed Turkish readers to a whole new world of literatures. It was this literature that influenced Bulaç's thought and enabled him to develop the socio-cultural approach of the civilization movement into a cohesive ideology. The main argument of this ideology is that since modernism and westernisation have proved to be false solutions, it is time for the Turkish people to turn to Islam, which is their true origin and identity. Any attempt to integrate these other two approaches is bound to fail since Islam and the West are two different civilizations based on two different value systems. In this new resurgence of Islam there is an important place for the intellectual as an agent of social change. The Muslim intellectual's problem, which virtually focuses on Turkey, stems from the fundamental question of social identity. Bulaç considers Islam to be the correct and authentic identity of Turkish society. Accordingly, the solution he proposes is the realisation of an Islamic cultural formation in resistance to other cultural influences.

It seems that Bulaç's solution tends to exclude the non-Islamic elements of Turkish society, which is comprised of different cultural formations. Contending that Islamic thought inspired by different cultural and political circumstances can be applied to Turkey, Bulaç argues:

there is no essential difference, however, between the respective historical traditions of Turkey and the societies where they are written. The Turkish society, as an Islamic, Oriental and Asian society, has undergone the same process as these other societies and shares a common vision of civilization.⁸⁹

Bulaç follows other modern Islamic writers in showing more concern for Islam than for God. The belief in God per se becomes a means to the end of creating a true authentic Islamic society in which Muslims could live freely and in prosperity. In other words, the belief in God is more a by-product of this Islamic society than a goal. Islam is clearly a means to achieve social change. This new Islam, the outlines of which are being drafted by Muslim intellectuals, is not only an individual way of life, but also a social order. According to Bulaç, the solution to the problems of Turkey is the orientation towards an Islamic society and state structure, inspired by the principle of tevhid, and adoption of the unification of the whole Islamic world as its final aim.

The belief in the concept of tevhid is, according to Bulaç, the principal guide for reaching the ultimate goal of founding an Islamic society. Tevhid does not allow for national particularism - hence, the notion of Turkish nationalism is rejected at the theoretical level. Just as the idea of tevhid is universal, so the social order presented in the spirit of tevhid is universal and does not tolerate particularism. Islam is seen as both a religion in the technical sense and as a social revolution. The liberation version of Islam lays great emphasis on social justice in all its aspects. There can be no justice without the liberation and leadership of the weaker and marginalised sections of society.

Bulaç's thought contains recognizable Marxist concepts which can also be found in the critique of liberation theologians of Latin America. The similarity between his work and his critique and that of liberation theologians can be seen in tendency to infuse a new revolutionary fervour into traditional religious concepts and precepts through the use of Marxist analysis.

⁸⁹ İslâm Dünyasında, p. 69-71.

Chapter 7

NECMETTIN ERBAKAN AND THE IDEAS OF THE ISLAMIC PARTY**7.1 Personal History**

Necmettin Erbakan was born in Sinop, a port on the Black Sea coast of Turkey, in 1923.¹ His father Mehmet Sabri Erbakan was a judge who held positions in different provinces of Anatolia. Accordingly, Erbakan studied in different schools in Kayseri, central Anatolia, and Trabzon on the Black Sea and later was sent to the Istanbul High School for boys as a boarding student. In 1948 he graduated as an engineer from the Istanbul Technical University Faculty of Engineering and continued to work at that University until 1951.² He then left for Germany where he earned his Ph.D.³

Upon his return to Istanbul in 1953, he was appointed an Associate Professor at the Department of Mechanical Engineering at Istanbul University and in 1965 he became a professor. Concurrently with his academic work, Erbakan supervised the construction of an electric motor factory. He was appointed chairman of the board of the Industrial Department of the Union of Turkish Chambers of Trade and Industry in 1966, and served as the union's general secretary. After two years he was elected to the directorate of the union and after a year became its chairman.⁴

In 1969 Erbakan was elected as an independent candidate for Konya, after failing to get Demirel's support for his inclusion in the Justice Party. In 1970 he founded the Milli

¹ For details on Erbakan's personal history see: Necdet Onur, Erbakan Dosyası, (İstanbul, 1974); Necmettin Erbakan, Milli Görüş, (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975). [Hereafter Erbakan, Milli Görüş]

² Erbakan, Milli Görüş, p.7.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p.8.

Nizam Partisi⁵, ("National Order Party") NOP and served as its chairman. The economic crisis of the late 1960's had changed the existing balance of class forces. Big business interests, based mostly in Istanbul and organized into large holding companies, began to clash with those of small and medium provincial capital. The Justice Party gradually became identified with big business and consequently lost the support of other constituencies. This gave rise to a number of smaller parties. One of these was the NOP, which emerged as the first party in many decades which openly espoused an Islamist political philosophy. The party's electoral support was based on artisans, small traders and other low income groups from rural areas.

The party was closed down by the authorities after the March 1971 coup for its illegal anti-secular stand. After two years Erbakan was called to stand as the head of a new Islamic party, the Milli Selamet Partisi⁶, ("National Salvation Party" or NSP),⁷ which was in effect the continuation of the NOP. Here again, the party's supporters were those social groups such as petty tradesman and artisans which had been hardest hit by economic policy and were least able to defend themselves through existing political institutions. The NSP's stress on moral virtues attracted those people who felt their traditional institutions and values to be under attack. While the Justice Party was the object of the economic attack, the RPP and the left represented the threat to the family, religion and cultural values. The

⁵ On the party see: Landau, "The National Salvation Party", AAS, II (1976), pp. 1-54. (pp. 9-11); Milli Nizam Partisi, Program ve Tüzük, (Istanbul, 1970).

⁶ For details on the party see: Jacob M. Landau, "The National Salvation Party" op.cit; Binnaz Toprak, "Politicization of Islam in a secular state: the National Salvation Party in Turkey", in Said Arjomand (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, (London: Macmillan, 1984), pp. 119-133; "Milli Selamet Partisi", Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, No 67, pp. 2104-2110; Islam and Political Development in Turkey, chapter V; Türker Alkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey" in: Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli (eds.), Islam and Politics in Modern Middle East, (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 79-102; Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, L'Islam dans la vie Politique de la Turquie (Ankara: Ankara University Basımevi, 1982), part III. Ali Yaşar Sanbay, Türkiye'de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası, MSP Örnek Olayı, (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985).

⁷ Erbakan, Milli Görüş, p.8.

NSP's opposition to Turkey's entry into the EEC on the grounds that this would further widen the gap between big business and smaller businesses, appealed to people from the weaker layers of society. In the 1970's, the party joined a series of government coalitions. In 1974 Erbakan was nominated as Deputy Prime Minister to Bülent Ecevit, breaking a historic barrier and lending the NSP a certain legitimacy which had never been granted to Islamic representatives in the Kemalist-based Turkish republic. In 1975, Erbakan became a minister in Süleyman Demirel's government. Throughout the 1970's the NSP remained the third largest party in parliament. After the 1980 coup, the NSP was closed down by the military. Erbakan was arrested and tried by a military court in Ankara in July 1983 but was later released.⁸ In 1985 he made a political comeback to again become the leader of an Islamic party, this time the Refah Partisi ("Welfare Party").⁹ In 1992, Erbakan entered parliament with 16.7 percent of the votes, together with Türkeş.¹⁰

7.2 Introduction

Analysing Erbakan's work and expressions may leave the reader puzzled. The inconsistency the rhetoric and the use of simplistic analysis, both of history and of the present society, contradicts his wide public support. The only explanation for this support can be found in Mary Douglas's anthropological explanation, which was further developed by Emanuel Sivan to describe fundamentalist groups.¹¹ Douglas's theory of 'Cultural Bias'

⁸ Geyikdağı, Political Parties, p.139.

⁹ Technically Erbakan did not do this until 1987, after the referendum.

¹⁰ More details on his personal life in: Erbakan, Milli Görüş, p.8.

¹¹ Emanuel Sivan, "The Dissenting Minority", Alpayim, (A Multidisciplinary Publication for Contemporary Thought and Literature, Tel Aviv), No. 4 (1991). Hebrew.

is based on the assumption that in any social context, cultural ideas such as time, place and the nature of the world, must be constructed in a way that enables each individual to use them in everyday life in a way that will make the world seen meaningful. Among the groups Douglas describes, of particular interest to this study is the "dissenting minority".¹²

The dissenting minority, generally speaking, is the reaction of one community to the problems of its borders. It seems that for one reason or another this group cannot control its members and their moving to another group. Since the community of the dissenting minority is unable to punish those who desert the community, the only tool to secure its borders is the moral tool. Accordingly, its main task is to establish an opposition to the 'outside community'.¹³ It seems that this explanation adequately explains the basic problems and behaviour of fundamentalist movements.

The ways in which the dissenting minorities create the walls around themselves, or in other words, safeguard their borders, are varied. Sometimes they use names such as muslimun, muminun, mustad'ifin, and very often rely on words reflecting their moral and social superiority to describe themselves: "the saved", as in the case of the National Salvation Party and the Welfare Party. The degree of morality that the dissenting minority try to project is an important issue. The 'outside' is contaminated, dirty and dangerous, and its raison d'être is the destruction of the dissenting minority.¹⁴

The dissenting minority shows contempt towards the 'outside', but alongside this contempt strong feelings of inferiority can be detected. The modern world and modernism is not only tempting but also very efficient as can be seen in areas such as medicine. Thus

¹² Ibid., pp. 50-52

¹³ Ibid., pp. 55-60

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 58-60

the only way to struggle against its appeal is by presenting it as a rebellion against God which will lead not to the expected salvation but to the slavery of one man by another. On the dissenting minority's "black list" is first of all communism, but the next evil is nationalism.¹⁵

Nationalism is seen as a new kind of polytheism (şirk), since it makes a connection between a modern God - the umma - with the real God - Allah. Şirk is heresy, therefore nationalists are infidels. The state ignores the Şari'a and the believers desert their customs and Islamic principles. Since Islam is expressed more in orthopraxy than in orthodoxy, the desecration of external Islamic symbols is seen as a serious crime. This is also why the dissenting minority promotes symbolic acts such as the wearing of headscarves to manifest their difference from the 'others'.¹⁶

Members of the radical Sunni dissenting minority are not heirs of the traditional ulema. In fact, very often the dissenting minority members feel contempt towards the hierarchial ulema class for giving legitimacy to the secular rulers even though they destroy religious orders and values. The result is that Sunni dissenting minority leaders are common people, sometimes with inadequate Islamic education. Very often this leader is an autodidact in religious affairs and has no intellectual depth. In most cases it is a man whose education has been in the field of engineering or medicine. This is why the leadership of the dissenting minority is based on personality and rhetoric abilities - the belief in the heart - and not on the knowledge that is in the head. This description definitely fits Necmettin Erbakan.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 58-60

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 62-63

7.3 Erbakan's Political Philosophy

While Erbakan is unlikely to be classified as an intellectual, he is often seen as an ideologist, and his ideology has often been described as nationalist.¹⁷ This analysis seeks to question this view and to argue that Erbakan's ideology does not accept the concept of a nation-state. His ideology is Islamic, but more important, it is seen and understood as such by his followers.¹⁸ The attempt to analyze Erbakan's political thought is made difficult by two main problems; the first is the caution he takes in expressing his opinion due to legal restrictions (that is, the constitutional Political Parties Law, Penal Code Art. 163). The second is that Erbakan's targeted audience is often his party's supporters, and the party's documents and platforms are often adapted for specific political purposes within certain legal boundaries such as the laws of the republic. As a result of these limitations the party's programmes and publications do not necessarily accurately reflect its world-view.¹⁹ In fact, reading the party's official platform may actually pose an obstacle to understanding Erbakan's real views on such concepts as democracy, human rights, secularization or more importantly for this study, nationalism. Officially, these concepts are praised in the party's programme, while in reality the case is very different.

Perhaps a more accurate and dynamic outline of this world view can be found, as suggested by Türker Alkan, in the semi-official publication of the NSP, the Milli Gazete.²⁰ Alkan's analysis of the Milli Gazete issues between 1973 and 1980 clearly indicates that

¹⁷ See Landau, "The National Salvation Party", op.cit., p. 13.

¹⁸ On his views see: Binnaz Toprak, "political development", op.cit., pp. 97-104.

¹⁹ Türker Alkan, op.cit., p.86.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-97.

religion became less prominent in Erbakan's speeches during this period, with non-religious issues gaining increasing importance.²¹ This reduced emphasis on religion in Erbakan's rhetoric does not necessarily indicate that less significance was given to religion in the party's ideology; it does indicate that the targeted audience for his speeches was more likely to be attracted by other issues, such as unemployment, high inflation, and other economic problems. In addition, it indicated that the religious party was seen as the legitimate leader of the fight for social justice, as the leftist movement had once been. Alkan's analysis also demonstrates that the party's religious militancy became more pronounced over time²².

The key to comprehending Erbakan's textual political philosophy is in understanding his use of a dual approach. Erbakan employs a double standard, using one measure to evaluate the Western world and another for the Islamic world. He supports such ideas as secularism, nationalism and democracy when they serve his purpose, but attacks them when they are at the service of the West. Democracy, for example, is praised in the party's programme. In other places, however, it is described as a Western plot to rule ignorant people according to Western and Christian ways.²³

The political philosophy of Necmettin Erbakan is referred to as milli görüş ("the national view").²⁴ This term does not imply a recognition of the territorial nation state; rather it is clearly an Islamic view. Here again, Erbakan uses the dual approach. The use of the term milli ("national") is confusing. I believe that it was chosen by Erbakan and his party in order to avoid confrontation and political restriction. This was a practical move,

²¹ Ibid., p.86.

²² Ibid., p.88.

²³ Ibid., p.93.

²⁴ This is also the name of his book. See the first note of this chapter.

since religious parties are illegal in Turkey. Erbakan's philosophy is called the national view, but perhaps the term 'nation' refers instead to the "people", or perhaps a vision of a nation defined by ethnic proximity. It should be pointed out that the word milli is understood in certain contexts as millet, the term the Ottomans used to identify ethnic or religious groups. In other words, the definition of the nation is not clear. It seems that Erbakan, when speaking about the Turkish nation, means something other than the citizens of Turkey. He clearly does not include Turkish Jews, Christians or even Alevis in his definition. In any case, the national view stands in opposition, to the leftist point of view of the former Republican People's Party (RPP) and the social democrats in the 1980's, and to the right wing parties' liberal outlook. Both of these are alien philosophies imported from the West and not rooted in the people's history and culture.

Erbakan advocates an Islamic fundamentalist political philosophy which calls for a return to national-historical roots alongside *modernization*.²⁵ This philosophy is based on a symbiosis between industrialization and culture. Its aim is the creation of a strong Turkey - Yeniden Büyük Türkiye ("Great Turkey once again"), which is another way of saying the recreation of an Ottoman Islamic empire. He does not advocate the return of the Ottoman caliphate, but rather the nomination of a new one. In this sense, in Turkey as much as in Germany, but unlike Romania and other countries, demands for the return of the old royal family are never expressed. The method advocated for re-establishing an empire is modernization without westernization. The creation of a powerful Muslim nation is not merely an irredentist nationalist idea, but a major goal with religious significance. As Toprak points out, in Muslim thought the vision of a great civilization is closely connected with the religious mission of following the divine command to establish a just and powerful

²⁵ See: Milli Gazete, 9 september 1973.

Muslim world, dar al-Islam, for the Muslim umma.²⁶ This slogan also suggests the importance of the Turkic peoples in the Islamic world.

7.4 The Question of Cultural Decline and Turkey's Relations with the West

Erbakan's assessment of the problems facing Muslim society today is closely connected with his view of East-West relations. The main question for Erbakan, like most Turkish intellectuals, is why the once powerful Ottoman empire is today among the less developed countries in the world.²⁷ Erbakan sees the key to understanding this problem in the relationship between Turkey and the West.²⁸

Erbakan's ideas are reminiscent of the Egyptian fundamentalist Sayyid Qutb.²⁹ It is of note that both had similar education and were exposed to the West during their student days. This might suggest a connection between awareness of the technological inferiority of one's country fundamentalist reaction.³⁰ According to Emmanuel Sivan, Qutb's thought in the 1950's left a clear mark on Islamic thought in many countries, including Turkey.³¹

²⁶ Binnaz Toprak, "The Religious Right" in Irvin Cemil Schick and Tonak, Ertugrul Ahmet (eds.), Turkey in Transition, (N.Y: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 227.

²⁷ Also see Chapter 6 on Ali Bulaç.

²⁸ Erbakan, Milli Görüş, pp. 235-262.

²⁹ Whether Erbakan actually read or used Qutb's writings is hard to establish since Erbakan failed to give credits in his book. On Sayyid Qutb's work see: Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, (Yale University Press, 1985).

³⁰ Sociological research of fundamentalist groups showed that they were from the professional class, in contrast to the traditional background of the ulema.

³¹ Emmanuel Sivan, "Sunni Radicalism in the Middle East and the Iranian Revolution", IJMES 21 (1989) pp. 1-30 (p.1)

Erbakan, like Qutb, emphasised the internal danger facing the Islamic world in the twentieth century. This danger comes from Muslim public figures and movements which, despite being sincere in their concern for their people's welfare, have wittingly allowed themselves to be enchanted by Western ideas of nationalism, socialism, liberalism, economic development and democracy. Those stricken by love for the West, the "westoxicated", are Muslims in appearance only. They use the latest audio-visual aids to instill their ideas into the subconscious minds of Muslims and to stimulate westoxication, in other words to further modernity and the good life. A necessary result of all this is that the Muslim world is in a state of apostasy, a condition especially dangerous for being unconscious. In Qutb's terms, dar al-Islam has returned to a state of jahiliyya even worse than the one that preceded the appearance of the Prophet Muhammad in Arabia.³²

In contrast to secularist intellectuals, who saw in the conservative role of Islam the stagnation of Islamic thought and the reason for the decline of the Ottoman Empire,³³ Erbakan interprets the decline as a consequence of the Ottomans' acceptance of the influences of foreign culture. The rise in the standing of foreign influence in Ottoman intellectual thought came at the expense of Islamic philosophy and traditions. The superiority of Islamic philosophy, Erbakan argues, had been responsible for the Ottoman Empire's period of greatness. Therefore, in order to regain world prominence, the Turkish nation would have to regain its consciousness as a Muslim society.³⁴

The Turks, he argues, lost their power and influence because they alienated themselves from their own cultural heritage. In blaming the leadership, not the religion,

³² Sivan, "Sunni Radicalism", p.2.

³³ See N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, (Montreal, 1964), pp.23-50; Bernard Lewis & P.M.Holt, Historians of the Middle East, (1962).

³⁴ Erbakan, Milli Görüş, pp. 61-63.

Erbakan is using an argument common among fundamentalists.³⁵ The country also failed to adopt industrialization, the only Western example worth imitating. Turkey's relationship with the West was therefore, imbalanced: "We took from the West what we needed least, namely, inferior Western culture, and we failed to borrow what we needed most, Western technology", he states.³⁶ Like eighteenth century Muslim writers and reformists, Erbakan fails to acknowledge the relationship between the West's technological superiority and its cultural heritage. Moreover, he sees in the Western achievement a temporary achievement, accomplished despite the Westerners' spiritual poverty and not because of any cultural superiority. Like his predecessors in the nineteenth century Erbakan seeks a synthesis of Western technology with Islamic moral and social codes.³⁷

Erbakan's ideology as represented by the National Salvation Party (NSP) or its contemporary form, the Welfare Party (WP), has been described by Binnaz Toprak as

a continuation of at least a century of debate over Islam and the West. The party stressed that the decline of the Ottoman Empire had been the outcome of rejecting Islamic civilization in an effort to westernize. According to the NSP, the grandeur of the empire during its periods of strength had lain in its moral and intellectual excellence, both of which derived from the Islamic faith.³⁸

In spite of the closeness of Erbakan's ideas to that of some of those of the *nineteenth century reformers*, he believes that the modernizers of the nineteenth century had failed to see this source of power. They were unwittingly looking to western civilization for a solution to the problems facing the Ottoman Empire, he argues. The rapid westernization

³⁵ The logical result is the importance of removing such leaders from power as a precondition for achieving Islamic order.

³⁶ Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, pp.82-83.; In October 1991, *Milliyet* published a series of Erbakan's statements in this spirit.

³⁷ Erbakan, *Milli Görüş*, p. 93. Also see Chap 3 on Muhammad Abduh.

³⁸ Toprak, "The Religious Right", in Schick and Tonak, *op.cit.*, p. 227.

process of the twentieth century had once again created this problem. Original creativity in the arts, sciences and social sciences and social studies should be encouraged, not the imitation of Western approaches as the modernizers advocate.³⁹

An investigation of the roots of our own culture, Erbakan argues, would lead to such creativity. Islamic culture is after all the root of all scientific achievement. He argues that

The fundamental knowledge of human beings is provided by the prophets...The foundation of all the present day sciences are revealed in the Qur'an.⁴⁰

In an article titled "İslâm ve İlim" ("Islam and Science")⁴¹ he claims that Western countries developed their technology at the expense of the Muslim world.⁴² The West borrowed, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the cumulative knowledge which Muslims had accumulated without giving credit to Muslim sources. As a result, the West erroneously took credit for originating many scientific principles which in fact were developed by the Muslims:

The only source of truth is in Islam...studies show that 60-70 percent of the existing knowledge is produced by Muslims...I claim that what are considered as Western sciences, physics, chemistry, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, geography and all the existing sciences were founded by Muslims.⁴³

More tragically, Western cultural imperialism, he argues, spread this claim among the Muslims, who came to believe the Western claim that technical innovations originated in the West.

³⁹ Erbakan, Millî Görüş, pp. 90-93.

⁴⁰ Quoted by Alkan, op.cit., p. 89.

⁴¹ Necmettin Erbakan, "İslâm ve İlim" in Necmettin Erbakan, Üç Konferans (İstanbul: Fatih Yayınevi, 1974) pp. 6-42.

⁴² Erbakan, Millî Görüş, pp.82-84

⁴³ Erbakan, Millî Görüş, pp.88-89

According to Erbakan, the contribution of the Islamic nation to the development of science and knowledge is genuine. This contribution has never been fully acknowledged by Western countries. In addition, he argues, Turkish history is rich both in military victories and scholarly accomplishments. Today, when Western civilization seems to be at a technological standstill and can no longer solve its problems through science, the Muslim nation can solve them with its special qualities. However, such technological accomplishments and scientific superiority can be realized by the Muslims only if they can recreate their past. Muslims cannot take the lead in the scientific arena if they continue to deny their own history and adopt the inadequate world-view of the West.⁴⁴

The accusations that Erbakan throws at the Western countries, that is that they stole Islamic knowledge and are using it against the Islamic world, reflects his basic view of East-West relations and the nature of Western imperialism. Like of Ali Bulaç, Erbakan sees no difference between the sources of capitalism and of socialism.⁴⁵ His interpretation, however, is much less sophisticated. Although socialism and capitalism may seem different, he argues, both are in fact imperialist by nature and aimed at enslaving other nations by imposing their own culture and economic interests. Erbakan is very sensitive to Western superiority: "Those who always look down on us and show off", he writes, and on another occasion, "a European does not have the right to show off and look down on us"⁴⁶

Despite material advancement, both the socialists and the capitalists are also in a spiritual crisis, Erbakan claims. Because the Muslims had, as their glorious past shows, stood firmly against the West for many centuries, the Western countries were able to

⁴⁴ Milli Gazete, 9 september 1973. Quoted by Toprak, Islam and political Development, p. 101.

⁴⁵ Erbakan, Milli Görüş, p. 135

⁴⁶ Alkan, op.cit., p.89

weaken the Ottoman Empire only by introducing into it their own corrupt culture, during the Tanzimat era. In contradiction to many historians he argues that this was not done through military or scientific superiority, but rather through the "back door" of culture and science.⁴⁷

According to Erbakan, Turkish intellectuals who adopted the cosmopolitanism of that period were responsible for the material and spiritual decline of the Empire.⁴⁸ It is interesting that Erbakan links moral and cultural achievement with material achievement in the case of the Empire. He does not, however, make the same connection in the case of Europe. This inconsistency suggests that he uses different standards to judge the West and to judge the Muslim world.

7.5 The Revival of Islam and the Industrialization Process

The precondition for Turkey to become a great power is its return to Islam. Once this precondition is met, rapid industrialisation will follow. Although Erbakan does not present a coherent economic blueprint, industrial advance seems to be the basis for his economic plans, especially in the 1970's. It was later, towards the late 1970s and in the 1980s, that he shifted his emphasis from industrialization to the problems of inflation and the cost of living. He makes an interesting link between Islam and industrialization, offering Islam as a psychological mechanism to ease the burden of rapid industrialization.⁴⁹

Turkey, he believes, would accomplish industrial growth without, it is hoped, enduring the

⁴⁷ Milli Nizam Partisi, Milli Nizam Partisi Kuruluş Beyannamesi, (Ankara: Nüve Matbaası, n.d) p. 1. See also: Erbakan, Milli Görüş, pp. 82-84.

⁴⁸ Toprak, Political Development, p.98.

⁴⁹ Toprak, "The Religious Right", op.cit., p. 227.

same social upheavals brought about by the capitalist model, with its inherent materialism.⁵⁰

Rapid industrialization is an important issue for Erbakan. Unlike the Marxists, who see industrialization as a value in itself and reduce history to the development of modes of production, he sees in it a tool for achieving his goal of establishing an industrialised, but 'Islamic' Turkey. The Turkish nation has failed to industrialize and has therefore lost its place in history. Once the Turkish people embrace their cultural past and develop the spiritual and moral qualities (ahlak ve fazilet) necessary for hard work, they will develop into a strong, industrial society.⁵¹ Industrialization, argues Toprak, is almost a matter of religious zeal for Erbakan and other party leaders, who repeatedly point out their commitment to creating an industrialized society.⁵²

Erbakan advocated a heavy industry campaign, which his party claimed to have initiated in 1975 and promoted during the period they were coalition partners in Süleyman Demirel's Nationalist Front (Milliyetçi Cephe) government of 1975-78.⁵³ Turkey, or the Islamic world, would regain its lost grandeur through industrialization. Part of Erbakan's zeal for industrialization, as Toprak and Necdet Onur⁵⁴ point out, can be explained by his personal history. He lived in Germany during the early 1950's as a postgraduate student and was impressed with the way the Germans were rapidly industrializing despite their

⁵⁰ See: Erbakan, Milli Görüş, pp. 195-226.

⁵¹ Erbakan, Milli Görüş, pp.193-227; "Sanayi Davamız", in Üç Konferans, pp. 68-111.

⁵² Toprak, Political Development, p. 102.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Necdet Onur, Erbakan Dosyası, p. 27

defeat in the Second World War.⁵⁵ Erbakan saw the speed with which the Germans regained their strength as a result of the German people's discipline and commitment. The Ottoman Empire, in Erbakan's mind,, was compared with the German Reich. Both had lost the battle but while the Germans had managed to recover through industrialization achieved through discipline and values, the Ottoman Empire has never recovered from its own defeat. To Erbakan, the Germans demonstrate the importance of a nation's value system to its economic development.⁵⁶ In this, Erbakan sees Islam as a method of social control, as did the Aydınlar Ocağı and the ruling Motherland Party. All failed to acknowledge the serious social problems that were a by-product of industrialization.

7.6 Turkish Internal Problems

For Turkish society to regain peace (selamet), order and social justice (içtimai adalet), "the revival of moral qualities and the spiritual excellence (ahlak ve fazilet) dormant in the Turkish character is necessary."⁵⁷ Erbakan deals with Turkey's domestic problems in two categories, the material and the spiritual. Regarding the first, he criticizes the dependence of the Turkish economy on foreign markets and capital and the unjust distribution of wealth. He also criticizes the weak financial situation, as a result of which Turkey has become dependent on foreign aid and consequently has lost its autonomy in foreign policy. This criticism is very effective in Turkey, where the trauma of the

⁵⁵ See: Erbakan, Milli Görüş, pp. 138; 214-215

⁵⁶ See: Onur, op.cit., p. 27-28.

⁵⁷ Milli Nizam Partisi, Milli Nizam Partisi Kuruluş Beyannamesi, (Ankara: Nüve Matbaası,) n.d , p.1

capitulations is very much alive, and sentiment against Western imperialism is very strong. The temporary rejection of Turkey's application to join the EEC definitely strengthened Erbakan's arguments.

Erbakan seeks to modernize the country through both spiritual and technical development programs. In the technical field, these programs would emphasise creativity rather than the imitation of Western technology. The development of an indigenous technology coupled with rapid industrialization would place Turkey in the ranks of the materially well-off countries, he believes. However, material well-being is seen as an end-product of a moral and just democratic society and of a nation which has a historical consciousness, unity, and faith in common national goals.⁵⁸

Erbakan's idea of democratic society is a system of government which develops the moral excellence of the individual and brings to power only those who possess such excellence, a political system which eliminates profligate spending, bribery and corruption by screening both politicians and public administrators for moral fortitude, in addition to mandating objective testing for professional qualifications. It can be argued that Erbakan cannot accept democracy, since according to his understanding of the fundamentals of Islam and Islamic doctrine, God ordered man to rule according to the holy book and not according to his own judgement. Human beings, he believes, cannot make laws; they can only apply divine ones.⁵⁹

Erbakan rejects Western cultural influences and emphasizes the re-creation of what he considers to be a national moral consciousness. He believes that Turkey will catch up

⁵⁸ Milli Nizam Partisi, Milli Nizam Partisi Programı, (İstanbul: Hatanir Basımevi, n.d), pp.5-20. See also at Erbakan's press conference: Bütün, January 27, 1970; and Toprak, op.cit., p. 99.

⁵⁹ Alkan, op.cit., P.93. See also: Demircan, Kelime-i Tevhid ve İslâm Nizamı, MG, 6 April, 1980

with Western technology only if its superior culture and morality can be revived. This view, argues Toprak,

was basically an extension of the 19th-century Islamic movement which had opposed the wholesale acceptance of both the cultural and the technology of the West advocated by the Ottoman "westerners" but rather, had argued that Western influences be limited to the technical fields alone.⁶⁰

7.7 Family and Social Life

Another significant element of Erbakan's ideology is the importance of the family and social behaviour.⁶¹ He vehemently criticizes the Western orientation of the Turkish elite in this area. He includes in his criticism the wearing of long hair and miniskirts; the viewing of pornography and of television shows, films and plays which are influenced by Western culture rather than the 'national' one; the wearing of shorts by women students during gym classes; the youth's lack of respect for parents and older people; the elite's "illness of imitating Western culture"; lack of religious belief among youth; the disappearance of traditional family life; and the growth of nightclubs. These changes in social norms and value systems are an indication of the corruption which has infected Turkish society as a result of Turkey's opening to the West, he claims.⁶²

Erbakan attributes major importance to the issue of ictimai adalet, ("social Justice")⁶³ He and other party leaders have repeatedly criticized the ruling governments for

⁶⁰ Toprak, Political Development, p.99.

⁶¹ This is similar to right-wing populists propaganda in the US.

⁶² Toprak, Political Development, p. 101.

⁶³ He uses the Islamic term ictimai adalet in opposite to sosyal adalet, used by the Turkish left.

their indifference to the plight of the poor and underprivileged.⁶⁴ In an attempt to compete with the socialists, the Welfare Party has been quite vocal in its criticism of rising prices and unemployment, the lack of adequate social security and medical insurance programs, and the misuse of government credit which favours the well-to-do with social connections. The main issue in the Turkish economy in the 1980's was inflation; thus, the economy and the high cost of living receive greater attention and importance than industrialization, which was a burning issue in the 1970's. In addition, the WP has argued in favour of more balanced regional development programs which would give priority to the least developed areas of the country, provide government aid to agriculture and to rural communities, and protect small traders and artisans.⁶⁵

7.8 Education

Another element of Erbakan's world-view is the importance he attaches to education. Erbakan heavily criticizes Turkey's education system, arguing that it is the only one that has failed to educate its youth.⁶⁶ The country's education policy has focussed on repudiating its own history. It has adopted false goal by accepting the West's inadequate world-view, which has plunged the Western countries themselves into a spiritual crisis. Additionally, it has not coped with the challenge of foreign cultural influences, which have penetrated Turkish society in the form of communism, socialism, and cosmopolitanism.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ For example see : Milliyet, 30 sep 1973.

⁶⁵ Toprak, Political Development, p. 103. The party attacked capitalism on the ground that it is ruining the small businesses. See: Milli Gazete, 1/2/6/9 September 1973.

⁶⁶ On his view about education see: Erbakan, Milli Görüş, pp. 90-95.

⁶⁷ Toprak, Political Development, p. 98.

Erbakan believes that historical and religious values should be taught to children.⁶⁸

If Turkey is to regain its historical greatness and become an industrial country, it will have to adopt the right education policy. For him, a major reason for Turkey's underdevelopment is the inadequate educational policy of Turkish governments, which has been geared to the imitation of Western culture and technology. If Turkey is to modernize, Turkish governments will have to guarantee universal higher education which emphasizes national-historical traditions and values systems that are creative rather than imitative, and which will enable competence in technical fields.⁶⁹ Here again, he blames the government. A good educational system can be established only if the government stops giving priority to "building dance halls and stadiums" rather than universities and factories, he argues in an article published in Milli Gazete.⁷⁰ As Binnaz Toprak puts it:

In a sense, therefore, the NSP represents the third world view of modernization within the Turkish political spectrum. It sees the world with the same type of glasses that nationalist leaders in colonial countries have viewed it: the lenses focus on a similar feeling of resentment against both the cultural and the economic imperialism of the West.⁷¹

7.9 Relations between the West and the Islamic East

Erbakan argues that the resurgence of Islam in the twentieth century has followed a four-phase course in the relationship between Muslim countries and the West. The first

⁶⁸ MG, 12 August, 1980.

⁶⁹ Toprak, op.cit., p. 103. Erbakan also advocated higher education for women, although there are limitations on which occupations are better suited to Muslim women. On his attitude toward women see: N.Erbakan, "Doğuda, Batıda ve İslâm'da kadın" in Üç Konferans, pp. 43-67. Also in MG, 9/ September/ 1973; Milli Görüş, pp. 33-37.

⁷⁰ MG, 28/July/1973.

⁷¹ Toprak, Political Development, p.104.

phase was one of wars between Western countries and the Islamic world during the first quarter of the century, followed by Western occupation. The third was independence, and finally there was a period of awakening as the Muslim countries entered into a close inter-relationship based on brotherhood and cooperation.

In Erbakan's view, this last phase will eventually lead to the creation of a United Muslim Nations (as an alternative to the UN); a Muslim Economic Community (instead of the EEC), with an Islamic Dinar as common unit of currency, and a Muslim version of NATO.⁷² Erbakan is careful not to commit himself directly to an Islamic state based on the Shari'a, since such a declaration would be an offence against the Kemalist state. Nevertheless, in periods of greater freedom he has given more rein to the expression of his beliefs. The Pakistani experiment and the Iranian model are discussed by Erbakan and other party leaders in Milli Gazete.⁷³ He seems to see Islamic revivalism in other countries as strongly related to the Islamic movement in Turkey.⁷⁴

How is the future Islamic state to be achieved? Erbakan sees recent developments in Iran as an important step towards realizing his proposed Islamic cooperation. He argues that Iran's move away from a pro-American, pro-Western foreign policy designates the end of a "master-servant" relationship, which should be followed by other Muslim countries.⁷⁵ Because the Islamic countries lack a leader, they should join together soon to elect their caliph. All social and political institutions should be reorganized according to the Koran and the Shari'a. Since the NSP-WP rejected westernization as a prerequisite for modernization,

⁷² On his views on the above organizations see: Milli Görüş, pp. 227-270; Toprak, Political Development, p. 104.

⁷³ MG, 4 January 1980.

⁷⁴ Alkan, op.cit., p.90

⁷⁵ Cumhuriyet, 1-2 August 1979.

it saw the latter process in quite unique terms. It accepted the necessity to industrialize, but rejected the cultural forms which have accompanied economic development.⁷⁶

According to Alkan's analysis, foreign policy⁷⁷ became one of the more important issues in Erbakan's speeches during the 1980's. The questions of Cyprus,⁷⁸ the Common Market, relations with other Islamic countries, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Zionism were the most discussed issues.⁷⁹ At the end of the 1980's, attention was also given to the Muslim population of the Soviet Union. For Erbakan, there is no difference between communism and capitalism. As an ideology, he believes, communism is one arm of Zionism and capitalism the other. He argues that the purpose of the Yalta conference was to divide the world in the name of Zionism. This sentence explains his basic view of the West.

7.10 Conclusions

Erbakan's philosophy employs a simplistic and naive rhetorical formula that is typical of dissent minority leaders. The past grandeur of the Ottoman Empire, he argues, would be re-established if power were given to his religious party (WP), which is the continuation of the grand Islamic tradition. The party proposes using the Islamic formula to re-establish the Golden Era. But what is the golden era- the Asr-ı Saadet of Muhammad, or the days of Süleyman the Magnificent? The answer to this question remains uncertain.

⁷⁶ Toprak, Political Development, p. 104.

⁷⁷ On Erbakan's views of foreign policy see: Milli Görüş, pp. 227-262.

⁷⁸ See: Erbakan, Milli Görüş, p.233.

⁷⁹ His antisemitic views are revealed in his book, Milli Görüş, pp. 248-254. Erbakan repeated the famous antisemitic arguments concerning a Jewish conspiracy.

Secularism and westernism, according to this formula, were responsible for the decline of the Ottoman Empire and should be rejected. The only solution is Islam and an Islamic order⁸⁰ whose characteristics are not specified. Erbakan uses a dual approach when using problematic terms. He officially supports secularism while believing in Islamic totalism, he officially supports democracy but while denouncing it. He professes concern for human rights, but is tolerant only to the demands of the Sunni religious community. He officially advocates pluralism, but believes that only when Islam infiltrates into all institutions "we can say that there is Islam".⁸¹ In other words, he is totalitarian, not tolerant.

As for nationalism, it is apparent that Erbakan uses the term milli to describe a *greater political framework*. The notion of a territorial nation-state is rejected, but not the ethnic proximity. The political reality in Turkey forced him and his various parties to be cautious when expressing anti-secular or anti-"Atatürkist" views; therefore, the display of any sign of pan-Islamic or pan-Turanist irredentism was seen to be dangerous. Further investigation of Erbakan's dual approach and his symbolism is needed to establish this point. It is my belief, however, that his fundamental principles, that is his belief in the Shari'a, the Koran and his support for Islamic-oriented state models, indicate that the nation-state, a foreign Western political system based on particularism, is rejected.⁸² However, the idea that an Islamic state based on the Turkic people must be re-created is retained.

⁸⁰ MG, 5 January 1980.

⁸¹ Alkan, *op.cit.*, p.90

⁸² For an opposite view, see Türker Alkan's reference. He claims that the NSP or the RP of today could become a practically secular party, since the day-to-day political needs of a relatively urbanized, educated and industrialized country like Turkey may place certain limitations upon a purely religious approach. See: Alkan, *op.cit.*, p.88.

Chapter 8

THE "TURKISH-ISLAMIC SYNTHESIS:"
THE NATIONAL-RELIGIOUS NARRATIVE**8.1 Prologue**

The use of religion as an instrument of control in the hands of ruling elites in Eastern and Western societies is a subject which has been researched in the past, in a variety of contexts, by historians and sociologists. Among researchers of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey this subject attracted the attention of those who sought an appropriate formula which would gauge the significance of the religious factor in the mindset of Turkish governments. While on one hand, many continue to debate the question of the importance of religious belief in the achievements and failures of the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, a consensus exists among researchers regarding the fact that since the foundation of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal, the authorities have constantly fought religious tendencies and strove to distance religion from politics.

This focus of this chapter is on the official ideology of the Turkish governments in the 1980s, and an antithetical process to that described in research to date, is presented. Furthermore, the return of the religious ideological component to the centre of the political stage is analyzed, as are the efforts of rightist circles to create a national religious ideology. Also, the development of a national-religious historical narrative known as the 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' is discussed, and an examination of the application of this synthetic ideology, as a tool for close social and political monitoring by the authorities, is made.

Although this chapter focuses on the narrative and not on its creators, it should be pointed out that the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' was originally formulated in the 1960s by a

group of intellectuals from the right wing of the Turkish political spectrum.¹ The club they founded, the "Hearths of the Enlightened" (Aydınlar Ocağı),² was established - according to the official version - as a reaction to the students' movement of 1968 in France.³ The goal of its founders was to produce an ideology which would act as an alternative to Kemalism, which was blamed for the confusion which plagued the younger generation. Furthermore, the Aydınlar were to act as an ideological barrier vis-a-vis the left, which was perceived by many as being responsible for the anarchy and the political terrorist wave which hit the country toward the end of the 1960s.

The Aydınlar's ideological starting point was that, contrary to religious or leftist circles, the right-wing secular majority lacked a collective consciousness and awareness, and because of this reason it was passive. This meant that a minority with a consolidated radical consciousness, such as the left, was capable of carrying the country towards an undesirable direction. By writing a new historical narrative, the Aydınlar produced a new collective identity for this passive majority. Their preoccupation with history and the emphasis which they placed on the study of their own version of history was intended to give legitimacy to the nationalist government and political guidance and awareness to the younger generation.

Although the Aydınlar's historical version and social outlook was developed in the 1970s, the fact is that they reflected a world of concepts, symbols and values which had been popular in Turkish chauvinist literature, in the past. The Aydınlar's contribution was not in the

¹ Binnaz Toprak, "Religion as State Ideology in a Secular Setting: The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis", in Malcolm Wagstaff, (ed.), Aspects of Religion in Secular Turkey, (University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Occasional Paper No.40, 1990), pp.10-15. (p.10) Hereafter: Toprak, (This paper is a short version of a paper given in BRISMES conference in Leeds, 1989.) On the Aydınlar Ocağı see: Tercüman, 3, 22, 28 May 1987; 27 June 1987; İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Türk-İslâm Sentezi, (İstanbul: Aydınlar Ocağı, 1985).

² Hereafter: "Aydınlar".

³ Toprak, p. 10. see also: Yeni Gündem, "Türk-İslâm Masonları", February 22-28, (1987), p.11; and Türk-İslâm Sentezi Görüşünde, (İstanbul: Aydınlar Ocağı, 1988), No.1 pp. 9-11; No.3 pp. 181-199.

production of these values, but rather in their consolidation into a comprehensive and applicable ideology. Thus, their way of dealing with religion fell within the context of its function in society and had nothing to do with its theological and spiritual value. Religion, according to the Aydınlar, is a social ideology which acts in a manner conducive to keeping cultural and political order; this is achieved through teaching and explaining that the existing order is the right and just one, having been ordained by God, and that any change of this order is a sin. The traitor is a sinner and the faithful is a believer - and this is the crucial link between the concepts of government and state and those of religion and morality.

Initially, the Aydınlar consisted of a small group of journalists and academics. However, before long, many politicians and business executives joined the circle and the organization became powerful, especially in the fields of education, politics and economics.⁴ Some have compared the style of action of the club to that of the Freemasons or felt it reminded them of the Spanish Catholic Establishment, whose objective was also to set up an intellectual and moral base for an authoritarian political system.⁵ The ideology of the Aydınlar becomes clearer if its attempt to create a nationalistic-religious ideology is perceived as an effort to guide individuals and dominate the political consciousness of the masses. To the dismay of the Aydınlar, this attempt had been had been made by the left and reached the peak of its success toward the end of the 1960s.

Many members of the Aydınlar, who entered the political centre stage during the riots and the unrest of the mid-1970s, were supporters of the Justice Party, the largest right-of-centre party and the spiritual successor of the Democratic Party which was closed in 1960. Party

⁴ Erkan Akin and Ömer Karaspan, "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis", MER, 5 (July-August 1988), p.18.

⁵ See: Gencay Şaylan, İslâmiyet ve Siyaset, (Ankara, V Yayınları, 1987), p.66.; also see: Türk-İslâm Masonları, op.cit.

members, as was pointed out by Toprak, wishing to avoid electoral competition by the coalition ally, the National Action Party, sought the help of the rightist intellectuals in the ideological struggle against the left.⁶ The organization, which succeeded in establishing a dialogue among the various currents of the Turkish Right, early in the 1970s, obtained official political recognition only after 1980.⁷

After the coup of September 1980, the generals - who declared that the resurgence of Islam was one of the most worrisome developments in Turkish society, and who publicly stressed the threat of Islam as one of the reasons for the coup - paradoxically adopted the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, originally of the Aydınlar, as part of their manifesto. Aydınlar members began to be appointed to important posts within the political and governmental bureaucracy, and their political platform became part of the official state ideology.⁸ Also, following the civilian return to power, under the rule of the Motherland Party (1984-1992), the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis continued to be an important element of the official ideology, and the Aydınlar approach was reflected in the legislation and policy of various governments led by Turgut Özal during the 1980s.

The influence of this policy was manifested mostly in the traditional arenas of conflict between the religious and secular segments of the population: education and the media. To a great extent, since the 1980s, it has been difficult to differentiate between the Aydınlar and the government because the ruling elite has mostly been made up of club members. The list of Aydınlar members in the 1980s included both Turgut Özal and his opponent Demirel, as well as most cabinet members of the Motherland government, such as Minister of Education Salih

⁶ Toprak, p.10.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ As Toprak noted, two Aydınlar members were even appointed to the New Constitution Committee.

Tuğ, Minister of Health Halil Sivgin and others.

8.2 Religion as a tool for social control

For Aydınlar members, Islam is not just another element of Turkish culture, or even an essential and central component of that culture, but rather, it is primarily an efficient tool for social control. Like many leaders before them, Aydınlar realized the intrinsic potential in the use of religion and its institutions toward the socialization of the population.⁹ It should be emphasized that their aim was not to found an Islamic society, but to shape the personality of the individual so as to render it "immune" to all sorts of anarchistic influences - those of the Left and of fundamentalism alike.¹⁰ Their basic assumption was that Turkish Islam, which they held to be the right, pure version of Islam, is a quiet movement which can be guided by the authorities. This led to the premise that, by encouraging the moderate religious wing, the influence of Iranian fundamentalism would be contained.

There is no need to recount the historical models which considered religion an opiate in order to understand that the Aydınlar's attempt to propose religion as a compensation for oppressed workers in a period of social and political unrest is neither unique nor original. Professional sociological literature is also quite full of examples of the cynical use made of religion by states or socio-political elites.¹¹ Accordingly, this paper does not claim to suggest

⁹ See: Şerif Mardin, "Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey", in: James Piscatory, Islam in the Political Process, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

¹⁰ It is interesting to note the frequent use of terms related to the world of medicine - germs, inoculation, and the like - with reference to foreign or other ideas.

¹¹ See the fascinating article by T.W. Laqueur, "Sunday Schools and Social Control", in: Laqueur, Religion and Respectability: Sunday Schools and Working-Class Culture, 1780-1850 (Yale University Press, 1976).

anything new in the theoretical field, rather, it adds - to the large number of studies which have explored the subject - the case of Turkey and the attempt by the ruling Turkish elite to use religion for the purpose of shaping "popular culture," as opposed to elitist high culture, through the creation of "ideological cement." The historical conclusions of Thompson and Halévy, who studied the attempts to divert the working class from revolutionary political ideologies by encouraging their potential leaders to join Methodist and Evangelical sects, were clearly known and understood by the Aydınlar members. Those studies, and others as well, pointed to the fact that governments had succeeded in controlling and preventing social and political instability by using the church's educational system.¹²

Armed with such conclusions, the Aydınlar members analyzed religion as a type of so-called ideological cement, that is a method for unifying separate groups into a framework and a cohesive social order. Religion was perceived as an instrument which made it possible to maintain social order over long periods, and capable of bridging possible materialistic conflicts between the various social strata. In addition, it could serve as a major factor in the foundation and conservation of the collective ethnic identity, as well as in the transmission and re-creation of important values in the realms of gender differences and the family.¹³

This approach, was presented as a coherent, detailed and applicable ideology, which fell like a ripe fruit into the hands of the generals who carried out the coup in September 1980 and who sought the support of the intellectuals.¹⁴ In practical terms, as Binnaz Toprak has stated, many of the important institutions of the Turkish spiritual and cultural life underwent

¹² See: E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963), Chapter 11.; Elie Halévy, A History of the English People in the 19th Century, (Penguin edn, 1938) 3 vols.; Weber, M., The Sociology of Religion, 3 vols, (London, Penguin, 1922).

¹³ Toprak, p. 13

¹⁴ It should be noted that, ever since the first days of the republic, the various rulers adopted ideological clubs and circles, which took upon themselves the task of giving legitimization to the regime.

a process of re-organization along the ideological lines of Aydınlar members, who sought to impose a new historical narrative.¹⁵ The basic elements of this narrative, and especially those stressing the tolerant nature of the Turks and extol their obedience to their government, existed in the Turkish intellectual awareness long before, and were presented by the Aydınlar as an ideological alternative.

Aydınlar members, like members of other organizations with a totalitarian ideology, sought to "purge" the universities of more than two thousand academics, and the universities lost their independence.¹⁶ During the 1980s, publication of 251 studies was banned and many books whose contents were not in line with the official narrative were confiscated.¹⁷ One case, which became famous for its extremism, was the trial of the editor of the Turkish editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica, who was accused by the state of having distributed propaganda aimed at destroying the national Turkish sentiment. The "crime" of the editor, Ms. Potuoğlu, consisted of an annotation which she introduced to one of the reference items, in which she stated that, during the Crusades, the Silica area was controlled by the rulers of the Armenian Kingdom.¹⁸

In coordination with government employees, the Aydınlar assigned to the mass media, particularly to television, an important role in creating and stabilizing collective values and feelings. The control over TRT - the Television and Radio Network - was *de facto* passed on to ideologists of the Aydınlar as early as the 1970s, with the nomination of Nevzat Yalçintas, one of the club's founders and its second president, as Managing Director of TRT. The

¹⁵ Toprak, p.10.

¹⁶ In addition, the Higher Education Committee (YÖK), was attached to the Office of the President of the Republic, and institutions such as the Turkish Language Association and the Turkish History Association, were closed (though later reopened). See: Toprak pp. 10-11.

¹⁷ Speros Vryonis, Jr., The Turkish State and History: Clio Meets the Grey Wolf (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991), p.120. (Hereafter: Vryonis)

¹⁸ Vryonis, p.120.

function of TRT may be compared to that which had been entrusted to the BBC: the transmission of civilian rituals. An example of the use of the mass media for the purpose of social control can be seen in the attempts made after 1980 to forbid the use of certain words in the Turkish broadcasting networks.¹⁹ Proof of the unrelenting attempts to control the media may be seen in the incessant harassment of journalists, especially reporters of the Sabah, Güneş, and Günaydın newspapers. In 1989 alone, the State sued close to 400 journalists.

On the basis of the stiff censorship laws, in the 1980s, the distribution of 937 foreign and local films throughout the country, most of them due to inappropriate ideological content which was deemed dangerous to the cause of "national solidarity", were prohibited.²⁰

8.3 The Elements of the Synthesis Theory

The origin of the simplistic Synthesis theory lies in the integration of three elements - the Turkish, the Islamic and the Western - and in the division between national culture and international civilization. Western civilization, it is stated, has achieved a level of technological accomplishments which Turkey must match. On the other hand, this should not mean that Western civilization has a system of intrinsic moral values that should be adopted. On the contrary: by contrast to the degraded morality of the West, the Turkish nation has an ancient culture which is strongly based on pure Islamic morality, say the Aydınlar members.²¹ The link made by Aydınlar between Westernism, Islam and Turkishness or between culture and

¹⁹ Toprak, p.12.

²⁰ Vryonis, pp. 119-120.

²¹ Ibid.

civilization is obviously not original, even in a Turkish context; rather, it is a reproduction of ideas propagated as early as the Tanzimat period and elaborated into a comprehensive theory by Ziya Gökalp at the beginning of the century. However the difference is in the increased importance given to religion by this version of the ideology, which combines eclecticism on one hand with Islamic conservatism on the other.²²

The Aydınlar historical narrative emphasizes the argument that contemporary Turkish culture is the result of a merging and synthesis between pre-Islamic Turkish culture and Islam, a link which engendered a flexible, tolerant and stable society. However, this theory, which claims to be a unifying element, suffers from the unrelenting tension between the nationalist and religious elements which it is supposed to unify. It calls for a strong state and claims that a centralized state will destroy those elements which debilitate national culture and consensus (i.e the left). While it still extols the struggle for independence, led by Kemal Atatürk, as a struggle of the Muslims against Western imperialist states, on the other hand, the Aydınlar blame Kemalism for having turned its back on many centuries of Turkish history and tradition, thereby causing damage to the national culture and its strength and exposing the country to the great social and political crisis which afflicted it in the 1970s.²³

Since Islam is believed, by the Aydınlar, to be the key to social and political stability, Kemalism, in its attempts to eliminate Islam, effectively exposed the youth to immoral and radical theories which led to their militant behavior. The position of the Aydınlar is perfectly clear, as the report drafted by its members on the subject of national culture states: any artificial separation of the various components of Turkish culture will inevitably bring about a social and

²² See Mustafa Güngör's article in Yeni Düşünce, 1 May, 1987, and Mumtaz Soysal's article in Milliyet, 6 May 1987.

²³ Salih Tuğ, "Revivification of Islamic Teaching and Education in Turkey". Al-Ittihad, Vol. 18, no.1, January-March (1981) pp. 10-22. (p.11).

cultural disaster.²⁴

8.4 Demand for the Repair of the Educational System

For those who believed in Turkish-Islamic synthesis, the main reason for the political problems of the 1960s and the 1970s was the republican governments' failure to implement a proper educational policy.²⁵ The republican educational system neglected national cultural values, which had always been the guiding force behind the major Turkish-Islamic civilization achievements, be they in military matters, in politics, in economics or in the arts. According to Salih Tuğ, former Minister of Education and member of Aydınlar, this neglect was the reason for which Turkey fell into the "age of Cahiliya".²⁶

According to this analysis, republican education destroyed respect for government, discipline and morality, which had formerly been an important element of the culture and which were instilled through the family, tradition, custom and religious faith. The result was the youth of the 1960s and the 1970s: detached from the national culture and ignorant of Turkish history. This rootless and hopeless youth became attracted to foreign ideologies and took on a revolutionary attitude. It was the educational system that lay the foundations for this generation of anarchists.²⁷ The antidote, therefore, for social protest and political unrest lies in the strengthening of the national culture through a reform of the educational system and the

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Toprak, p.10.

²⁶ Tuğ, p.21.

²⁷ T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Milli Kültür: Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu, Yayın No: DPT: 1920-OIK:300. Ankara, (October 1983)., pp. 542-43.

media by means of state-controlled planning.²⁸

The state is perceived to be an active agent in the cultural and intellectual life of the population. Through the Ministry of Education, elements of national culture are introduced into formal education, as are moral and religious values chosen by the state to be transmitted to the younger generation. This policy has been implemented in the educational policy following the coup of 1980.²⁹ Examples of this implementation may be seen in the history and civics textbooks used by junior and senior high school students, which explain the duties of the citizen vis a vis the state by stressing the Koran and Hadith quotes pertaining to relevant subjects.³⁰ For example, telling a lie, the students are told, is a major crime, however it is permitted to do so in three cases, justifiable in Islam: in time of war, in order to improve soured relationships between friends, and to bring about marital harmony. One does not betray the state and always obeys its laws because the social order is a projection of the family order. Therefore, non-compliance with state laws is equivalent to rebelling against paternal authority and vice versa. Nearly all the other religious values stressed in those books relate to subjects directly or indirectly related to the social order, such as the prohibition against alcoholic drinks, as well as the attitude to prostitution, gambling, military service and mandatory obedience to the ruler.

Another instrument, albeit an indirect one, for transmitting social and national messages, is found in the mosque itself. The mosque is considered a highly influential medium in the transmission of ideas and messages, as suggested by Tuğ:

²⁸ Tuğ, p.21.

²⁹ See: Cumhuriyet, 19 May, 1987; Milliyet, 13 June, 1987.

³⁰ Nevzat Pakdil, S. Müftüoğlu and Üzeyir Gündüz, Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi, No.1 (İstanbul: Kaya Matbaacılık, 1994).

We shall not describe how they function in Turkey, but shall content ourselves with noting that they number more than 70,000 and their importance is therefore obvious.³¹

The messages which Tuğ seeks to transmit are very clearly defined in the literature distributed by the Aydınlar, often funded by the Directorate of Religious Affairs.³² In this literature, a very special emphasis is placed on the rewriting of Turkish history, a process aimed at the development of a public-collective memory, through which the state will ensure its continuity. Within the framework of this rewriting, the Aydınlar diligently select those events deemed worthy of being maintained in the future collective memory, as well as favourite historical personages, such as the sultans Fâtih Mehmet and Kanunî Süleyman and Abdülhamit II, all of whom may appropriately serve as models in Turkish history.³³

8.5 The Origins and Characteristics of the Turks: The Historical Narrative of the Aydınlar

According to the Aydınlar members, it is necessary to rewrite the history of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, this time with emphasis on three main messages: the *importance of the Turks* in Anatolia as a stabilizing factor, Islam's contribution to cultural tolerance in Anatolia, and the fact that the ruler was of higher importance than the clerics.

According to the official Aydınlar historical version, the Turks migrated to Anatolia

³¹ Tuğ, p. 21.

³² See Chapter 1, pp. 21-23.

³³ It should be noted that, in recent years, the character of Abdülhamit II has again begun to feature in textbooks and is presented as a strong and much-admired Sultan, whose contribution to society was praiseworthy. To the members of the Aydınlar, Abdülhamit represented an example of the positive use of religion as a means of obtaining political and social control.

from Central Asia long before the 11th century, the period in which most researchers of the period agree that the migration actually occurred, although the Aydınlar admit that during that period the Turkish social organization was still tribal.³⁴ Most tribes, so they claim, converted to Islam between the eighth and the tenth century; by doing so, they created the Turkish-Islamic synthesis.

The mass conversion of the Turks to Islam in the tenth century brought about the creation of the Karakhanid kingdom in western Turkestan, the first to be considered by the Aydınlar as a Turkish and Muslim state. After that came the Ghaznavid state (962 AD) in Afghanistan and Punjab, which achieved - during Muhammad's lifetime - particularly high cultural achievements.³⁵ But it was in the period of the Seljuks that Sunni-Turkish Islam reached important cultural achievements for the first time. Through the Seljuks, the Turks initiated direct contact with the Byzantine Empire; during that period, they ruled the Iranian world as well as the Middle Eastern Arabs, at a time in which the power of the Abbasid caliph was reduced to a minimum. Eventually, in 1071, the Seljuk army defeated the Byzantines at Malazgirt (Manzikert) and flung open the gates of Anatolia. The Seljuk Turks became the protectors of the Caliphs and of the Sunna in the Muslim world and carried the flag of Islam against Christianity.³⁶

When analyzing the Turks' relationship with the Christian world, the Aydınlar see the tolerance imprinted in the Muslim Turks' character as the key to understanding their success. Because of their tolerant and heterodox faith, they were not the sworn enemies of the

³⁴ The official history may be found in: İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Türk-İslâm sentezi, (İstanbul: Aydınlar Ocağı, 1985). Since Kafesoğlu's death, Muharram Ergin and Salih Tuğ are considered the Aydınlar's leading ideologists.

³⁵ The Gaznavids may be considered of Turkish origin; however, the attempt to call their regime a Turkish state is a bit far-fetched.

³⁶ Kafesoğlu, pp. 161-212.

Byzantines and it was not difficult for them to earn the trust of the conquered local population. As proof of this, the history books describe the Anatolian army's war against the Mongols of Genghis Khan, a war in which - the Aydınlar point out - they joined forces with Greeks from Trabizon and from the Kingdom of Nicaea as well as with Franks.

The Aydınlar narrative aspires to present the Turks as a settled people - that is, a stabilizing factor - contrary to the traditional way of presenting them as an unstable force of nomads. It also emphasizes the coexistence and intermarriage between the Turks and the local population, in order to illustrate the aspiration to a harmony, almost Hellenistic in style, which is imprinted in the Turks.³⁷

The Turks, so they say, settled in Central Asia and put down roots there before the Mongols uprooted them from *their land and forced them to wander westward*. Although they founded no metropolis, in thirteenth-century Anatolia there were one hundred cities. Furthermore, Islamic civilization, being basically a culture of merchants, called for settlement and stabilization of the political system. For this reason the Seljuks built a network of caravansaries, which allowed them to offer safe passage and which naturally led to a flourishing system of trade. The government's desire to stress the Turks' historical contribution to Anatolia's stability, as well as to its economic prosperity, is the reason for the fact that, toward the end of the 1980s, a project for the construction of caravansaries throughout the country was declared a national project which received a great deal of media exposure.³⁸

Islam's tolerance toward minorities, Jews and Christians alike, is said to have brought

³⁷ A good example of this attempt may be found in Özal's book.

³⁸ The architect who headed the project, Cengiz Bektaş, even received the President's Prize for his contribution to the national culture.

about an impressive and uncommon level of cultural harmony in Anatolia under Turkish rule.³⁹ The Aydınlar ideologists describe both the Seljuk Turkish empire and its successor - the Ottoman empire - as examples of Islamic tolerance. The dismantling of the latter empire during World War I is explained by infiltration of foreign elements into the area, which disrupted the natural balance and the quiet toward which the Turks had laboured, and eliminated the tolerance and the flexibility which were the secret of the Ottoman empire's success as well as of its very existence.⁴⁰

According to Süleyman Yalçın, not only should the rise of the Ottoman empire be rewritten, but also the process leading to its fall. Here also, history must be written with an emphasis on the unique Turkish cultural elements.⁴¹ Aydınlar connect the Ottomans' success to the integration of Turkish cultural tradition with Islam.⁴² In pre-Islamic Turkish culture, the family and the army were the two most important institutions. Within this framework, says Yalçın, the Turks developed - over time - a cultural approach to the world which stressed specific moral principles, and this approach defined the individual's behavior. Such morality determined the value of qualities, truth and justice in social relations. Furthermore, this led to the rise of a unique political philosophy, whose foundations rest on love of the land, fear of God and obedience to the rulers. He claims that Turkish-Islamic synthesis recognizes the importance of preserving racial purity and political independence, and that these elements are essential if maximum distance is to be maintained from foreign cultural influences.

Yalçın disapproves of the cultural integration of minorities in the Turkish state. Jews

³⁹ In a sense, the Seljuk Empire is the direct continuation of the tolerant cultural heritage of the Uighur and the Tu'-Kce.

⁴⁰ Tuğ, pp. 10-22.

⁴¹ Toprak, p. 11. See: Nokta, 22 February, 1987; Milliyet, 3 June, 1987.

⁴² Kafesoğlu, p. 161.

and Christians are welcome to stay in Turkey as guests, but should not consider themselves an integral part of the Turkish nation. The historical Turkish-Islamic synthesis, says Yalçın, collapsed following the "infection" of the national culture with Western ideas imported by modern Turkish intellectuals.⁴³ The imitation of the West caused a violation of the balance between the family, the religion and the army, which had for centuries constituted a major component of the collective Turkish consciousness and had contributed to the creation of social values with regard to discipline and fulfilment of the individual's duties toward society. It should be pointed out that the Aydınlar approach in this area is characteristic of many societies which perceive the past as a source of order and a model for normative social behavior.

8.6 Islamic Tolerance

As already explained, the members of the Aydınlar believe that Islam may be used as a basis for legitimization of the existing regime and order. For this reason, great efforts have been invested in presenting Islam as a tolerant religion, both in order to justify its function and in order to convince the public that "quietism" and conservatism are qualities and characteristics of true and original Islam, and that revolutionary tendencies are foreign to its culture. This context sheds light on the efforts of many conservative Turkish leaders to explain the Jewish Holocaust as specific to the Christian context, and to claim that such a tragedy could not have taken place in the Muslim world.⁴⁴

⁴³ See also: Tuğ, pp. 10-11.

⁴⁴ There is, of course, an additional reason for this approach: the attempt to detract from the importance of the Armenian holocaust. In his book Özal wrote:

In Islam there is no struggle against race-consciousness or in favour of toleration, for there is no need for

In spite of the fact that Islam has a more tolerant aspect than Christianity, according to the synthesis, its supporters strive to underline the common denominator between the Turks and the Europeans. This issue has an immediate political connotation, and is particularly sensitive for those who feel rejected by Europe on the grounds of their religion. As a monotheistic religion, Islam carries a message for all of humans, including - so it is claimed - the Europeans.⁴⁵

The Islamic religion, as was the case for the other great monotheistic religions, originally developed among people of Semitic origin. Thus, both the Turks and the Europeans have adopted Semitic religions - an argument which is repeatedly expressed, especially to political leaders of members of the European Economic Community.⁴⁶ Therefore, the difference in religion should not be an obstacle to Turkey's joining Europe, as was so aptly expressed by Turgut Özal, former Turkish president and Aydınlar member, when he wrote that:

The question here is whether or not the new emphasis on religion in the west as a social cement of integration, and the return to religion in Turkey should cast further doubt on Turkey's belonging to Europe. Given the historic hostility between the two religions, the answer seems obviously to be positive at first sight. But if the religious reinvigoration in question is faithful to the One True God, I do not understand how and why it should exclude Turkey from Europe.⁴⁷

This issue is related to the third component of the synthesis: Westernism. Turkey is a country of Muslims; however, from the economic and political point of view, its rulers are

either. Certain circumstances have created this virtue in Islamic culture beyond human will and wish.

⁴⁵ Tuğ, p.10.

⁴⁶ The common factor between Europeans and Turks, as well as Turkey's chances of joining the EEC, were the subject of a lecture by Nevzat Yalçınas held at the Rabita building in London in May 1989.

⁴⁷ Turgut Özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey, English edition, (Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brothers, 1991). p.290.

more interested in turning toward the West. As was the case with the reformers of the Tanzimat period, the Aydınlar ideologists claim that Western knowledge and achievements will be accepted in the context of civilization alone - that is, in the areas of technology and science, and under no circumstance in the context of cultural elements such as moral values, education and spiritual life.

In order to achieve a stable social order, the tolerant character of Islam is emphasized. The Turks belong to the Sunni branch and to the Hanafi school of Islamic law, a school which ascribes great importance to broad consensus when making legal decisions; this purportedly accounts for the flexibility and tolerance in Turkish legal tradition.⁴⁸ As a result of this cosmopolitan foundation, the Ottoman state, in contrast to Arab states, opened up to other cultural influences. The Aydınlar do not explain the contradiction between this argument and the claim that the Ottoman Empire collapsed as a result of the infiltration of foreign cultural elements.

One indication of Ottoman openness, according to the Aydınlar, is the fact that there is no Sunni clergy in the Western sense of the world, therefore no intermediary between God and the believer exists. This very important principle of Protestant reform has been an important part of the Turkish faith from its beginning, so it is claimed. But more important is the emphasis placed by the Aydınlar on the superiority of civil governments as compared to religious ones in Turkish history - a particularly important aspect for those who wish to use Islam as an instrument of social control.⁴⁹ During the Ottoman period, they point out, the status of the Sultan, who represented civil government, was always superior to that of the Sheyhülislam, who represented the religious authority. Furthermore, despite the fact that the

⁴⁸ So goes the Aydınlar "line", which ignores at least a quarter of the population.

⁴⁹ DPT, *Milli Kültür*, pp. 514-517.

Shar'ia includes laws which are sacred and immutable and which involve all aspects of jurisprudence, the Sultans had the power to propose and impose civilian laws of their own - the Kanun.

8.7 Ideological Application in Social Fields

In a protocol signed by the right-wing parties in 1975 and inspired by the Aydınlar, the signatories declared that:

Lessons in religion and ethics shall be introduced in an orderly manner in the elementary and junior high schools, in a way which will fit the goals and the principles of national morality. Such lessons shall preferably be given by graduates of the faculty of Theology, the High Institute of Islam and Schools for Imams and Preachers".⁵⁰

Indeed, in the 1980s, religion and morality lessons became a major part of the lessons taught in state schools throughout the country. Furthermore, from 1985 onward, the teaching of the Arabic language was introduced in state schools.

The degree to which the government desired and was willing to adopt and implement the Aydınlar religious-national narrative in the 1980s was made evident by the exposure of the Rabita affair.⁵¹ However, despite the fact that the synthesis was presented as an ideology that encompassed all fields of social life, the economic field was left, to a great extent, out of the reach of religion. The state, which strove for a free and liberal market economy, avoided linking religion with the national economy. On the other hand, in other social fields - such as art and science - religious morality was applied with far greater success.

⁵⁰ Protocol of the Coalition, 31 March, 1985, Ankara. p. 4.

⁵¹ See Chapter 1, pp. 15-16.

In spite of Aydınlar's claim that they believe in cultural pluralism, a claim that is often heard from Islamists as well, they attempted to impose religious moral codes on society, although they met with limited success.⁵² One of the most famous cases of an attempt to subjugate science under the rule of religious morality in Turkey was the attempt of Education Minister Dinciler in 1987 to forbid the teaching of Darwin's theory of evolution in schools, or alternatively to teach the religious explanation of the creation side by side with Darwin's theory, while presenting both theories as equal in scientific value.⁵³

In high schools textbooks, future citizens learn in two pages about Islam from the point of view of Western scientific theories.⁵⁴ Sociologists such as Spencer, Taylor, Max Mueller and Durkheim are presented in a simplistic and generic manner, and the list of all these theories concludes with a reiteration of religious doctrine. On the question of the creation, the textbook authors conclude that it cannot be resolved with any certainty. Admittedly, students are asked to learn about the origin of religions according to Western sociology, however, at the end of the chapter on religion, they are required to memorize those passages of the Koran which teach that Islam is the last religion and the most correct of all.⁵⁵

Religion, according to Aydınlar members, is a component of the ideology which helps to legitimize the state, the constitution, the government, the law and the security forces by bringing them into contact and linking them with the "sacred". The values preached by this formula of religion are simple: man must be loyal to the state and its rulers and ready to fight

⁵² See for example, Ali Bulaç's ideas on ideological pluralism.

⁵³ On this subject, see Feroz Ahmad, "Islamic Reassertion in Turkey", TWQ, April 1988, Vol.10, no.2, pp. 750-769 (p. 766); see also the chapter on religion from the standpoint of scientific theories in the textbook by Nevzat Pakdil et. al., op.cit., pp. 14-20.

⁵⁴ Pakdil, p.21.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

against its enemies. Students are expected to find religious legitimization for such values in the Women's Sura, verse 59. Messages of this type were spread by means of brochures published with state funding in the provinces of South East Anatolia, afflicted with political violence. Women, on the other hand, are expected to manifest their share in social stability in their function as wives and mothers. In this spirit, the Department of Religious Affairs financed tens of books aimed at women, in which guidance and counselling are given in the area of the family in general, and in the field of child-rearing and education to love of land and family in particular.⁵⁶

8.8 Conclusions

The members of the Aydınlar Ocağı chose to call themselves by a pretentious name deriving from the word aydınlanma, which means "enlightenment". The choice of this name is not a coincidence, but represents the self-image of the circle members. In the Turkish context, leftist thinkers were almost always called "intellectuals" (entelektüel), whereas rightist ones were called "ideologist" (ideolog) - a term with a negative connotation in many cultures.

The term aydın, on the other hand, is neutral in political orientation and positive in meaning. This is a term by which many Islamists tend to call themselves lately, in order to differentiate between themselves and the traditional religious sages while also separating themselves from leftist circles. The term 'aydın' suited the Aydınlar members in their attempt

⁵⁶ 2000e Doğru, 4 January, 1987.

to market themselves and their intentions as those who perceive religion, history and state as a product of enlightened and developed thinking. However, despite the adoption of this pretentious name, this movement does not represent the Age of Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th century: quite the contrary - in its approach, the Aydınlar represents the absolute opposite of Western education and humanism.

Aydınlar's preaching religious tolerance should not be ascribed to open-mindedness, but rather, to the exploitation of educational ideas for the purpose of transmitting basically anti-humanistic messages and the fear of success of other religious ideas. It should therefore come as no surprise, that the list of recommended "classics," which the Aydınlar say should be read in every home also includes Hitler's Mein Kampf. The Aydınlar's goal in producing the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was to achieve political stability and total control of society, by denying the Turkish population the right to that pluralism of thought which had produced the enlightenment in the West.

History is used by the Aydınlar as a tool for forging a common social identity, through the creation of a commonality of past memory and the establishment of a common goal in the present - the strengthening and the unification of the Turkish people in the Turkish state. In the hands of the politicians, historical knowledge became an instrument for the maintenance and promotion of their personal ideas and social vision. Therefore, attempts by researchers to prove that the historical narrative promoted by the Aydınlar lacks historical basis and is propagandist in nature are superfluous.

The unreliability of the historical texts propounded by the Aydınlar and their lack of adherence to a system of historical criticism should not alienate the researchers in their writing. In this connection, it is difficult not to recall Umberto Eco's words as put into the mouth of Casobon, the press worker:

I shall look through your manuscripts with humility. I am convinced that even in the worst text I would find a sparkle, if not of truth, then at least of a strange lie, and so often these two ends meet. I shall feel bored only when I find things that are obvious..."

(Foucault's Pendulum, p. 296)

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis is concerned with the question of the mutual compatibility of Islam and nationalism in Turkey in the 1980s. In the past, most researchers asked how Islam was perceived in the Turkish Republic rather than to what extent the nation-state is accepted by Islamic groups. The question presented in this thesis is whether the nation-state concept, as a political framework and source for identification, is accepted by the religious ideologists.

From the way the subject is presented it is understood that a separation between two communities which live side by side in one state - the secular, elitist community and the religious community (which includes ideological, social and political sectors) - was realised. This separation is not sharp and decisive. There are mutual influences, and a constant flow of peoples and ideas. Nevertheless, it seems that the closer the two come, the stronger is the reaction on both sides. This reaction is sometimes reflected in symbols such as choice of dress, and sometimes on the ideological level. (See Chapter 2)

Events during the 1980s bore witness to this process. In September 1980 the military took power. The military commanders and the civilian governments tried to create a strong ideological base to counter the ideology of the left, by allowing and even promoting Islamic activities. Their intention was to encourage a conservative, peaceful and apolitical version of Islam. The Motherland Party, which won the elections in 1983, continued this policy and encouraged further religious activities. Turgut Özal, the Prime Minister, aimed to create the so-called 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis', without neglecting the West. The intention was to create a new ideology which would act as a social cement so that Islam would act as a tool of social control. The result, however, was very different (see Chapter 1).

The policies during the decade caused a renaissance for the Islamic movement, which was characterised by a period of relatively free religious publication and intellectual activity never before experienced in Turkey. The Islamic boom was manifested in all fields of life including the economy, in politics and more importantly, in education. The nature of the Islamic movement must be examined, since it is an umbrella term which includes various organizations, parties, charities, publishing houses, and individuals who share the wish to establish an Islamic society. Nonetheless, a definition of an Islamic society, and the means to achieve it, are controversial.

As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, there are two main political-ideological streams in the movement. The first approves the take-over of political institutions, and intends with their help to change the face of society. The other stream, while supporting the same goal - that is, the establishment of an Islamic society - believes that the existing social and economic structures should be prepared for a political change to come later. The 1980s saw the domination of this second stream in the activities of the movement. In the 1980's, for this stream, the democratic system has become the means of the destruction of the existing democratic regime and the establishment of an Islamic order in its place.

The poor state of the current research on the Islamic movement, reflects this alienation between the two communities. The case of Said Nursi and the Nurcu, which has been thoroughly studied by Şerif Mardin, is an exception.¹ The existing research suffers from a basic lack of knowledge as a result of the reluctance on the part of the secular community to learn and understand the nature of the other side. (See Chapter 1 and 2)

The concept of us and them, here and there, is vital for a clear understanding of the movement. Any society, one might argue, defines itself by defining the Other. This division of the

¹ Şerif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey. The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)

world into us and them has accompanied the world of Islam since its beginnings and was the basis for the division of the world into two: dar al-Islam and dar al-harb. But this is not typical only of the Islamic way of thinking - it is true for all societies. That is why the question of the West and relations with it is the focus of the writings of Muslim intellectuals. This aspect is apparent in the writing of the Islamic ideologists and intellectuals. In all three cases examined - Ali Bulaç, Necmettin Erbakan and the Aydınlar Ocağı - the main topic is the Other and the relationship with the Other.

Although self-definition has already been achieved, the defeat and the decline of the established political system forced the Muslim world to re-define its community and identity. In this sense, the attempts of traditional society to re-define itself can be described, in the words of Mardin, as 'tradition on the move'.² When one speaks of tradition one does not mean "orthodoxy", a term which is not applicable to Islam, but rather the dominant culture.³ Today, it is hard to determine whether orthodox Islam exists at all in Turkey. There are conservative attitudes in different circles on the social and personal level and there is the conservative 'quietist' political stream, but the two do not always go together.

Since the establishment of the republic, religion has been an instrument, sometimes the only known and recognized one, for expressing ideas, views and protest. Islam is not just the content but also the instrument, and sometimes the importance of religion as a tool is more than that of religion as an essence, as is demonstrated in the case of Ali Bulaç and the Aydınlar Ocağı. Mardin already noted the connection between religion and social protest when dealing with the Nurcular:

In the case of Said Nursi, the Ottoman rural population were not so far removed from the effects of modernization to fail to be aroused to a need for a new expansion of human horizons. This they could only express with the one language capable of carrying that

² Mardin., op.cit., p. 231.

³ It is better to use the term orthopraxy.

weight, the language of religion. What I am arguing here is that students of social change who associate the growth of social communication with an expanded vision of the world seem to forget that spiritual needs are also expanded as part of this change. This expansion comes at a time when a new populist thrust is also emerging. Indeed, there is a democratized aspect in the very rise of Nurculuk since it provided an opportunity for persons with a lower class background to devise their own interpretation of the religious message.⁴

The process of modernization created not just the need for protest but also the ability to protest.

While in the past society was divided between the intellectuals who were occupied with theosophy and mysticism and the ordinary believer, the modernization processed to a blurring of these boundaries. The policy of the Ottoman and the republican regimes which sought to break the power of the ulema, in steps which are described in Chapter 4, caused the emergence of intellectuals of a different kind, with a different background. The change in the ulema's status led to a vacuum which was filled by a new religious leadership with a new goal and audience. This blurring was not only social, but also theological. These new leaders created a new theology focused on comptability with the social change. The church was no longer seen as separated and detached from the people and their problems; rather, it was seen as a mirror church, which reflects these problems. In other words, these new theologians brought theology to the popular level. The realization that theology was the answer and could be applied to social problems caused this change. Liberation theology is the best example for the result of this process. The wish for liberation must be preceded by a theology of liberation. (See Chapter 6)

All three cases discussed here - that of Ali Bulaç, the Aydınlar Ocağı, and Girişim - pointed to a new phenomenon. This was the phenomenon of teaching and discussing Islam in 'home circles' as sufi tarikats do. Home circles became a means to exchange and transfer ideas on religion. These private circles flourished as a result of the changing political situation which allowed

⁴ Mardin, op.cit., p. 227

freedom and pluralism of thought. Although they began in the provinces, in a poor non-elitist society, they continued in the big cities to which many Turks from lower-class backgrounds had emigrated since the 1950s. These new urban dwellers were in need of answers to their problems, and sought hope in the explanations provided by religion.

This need for hope and optimism were, part of the psychological background to these as pointed out by Emanuel Sivan.⁵ On the one hand there was the desperation caused by poor social conditions, and on the other, the optimistic motivation so necessary for starting any religion. The establishment of a new religion or the reinterpretation of an existing one is necessarily connected with the recognition that the current situation is not good; to improve it, there is a need first of all to explain the reason for the existing world order. When the explanations given are no longer satisfactory, a new school or sometimes a new religion is created. Therefore, these 'home circles' could be described as a form of ideological optimism, as a result of social and economic depression.

Together with the rejection of the current explanations, there is a rejection of their carriers, in this case, the ulema. These, in their attempts to preserve their position, stuck even more closely to their tradition, and saw any attempt at reform as a sign of revolt. Signs of original thought, scientific experimentation or any other form of creativity were seen as a threat to the existing order and to their own position, and therefore had to be stopped. An extreme example was the case of the Spanish Inquisition, and it could be argued that the same happened in Islamic history. The result was stagnation of thought and the suppression of any attempt to implement a rational approach in Islamic thinking. To promote the creative and original thought needed for scientific achievement, a rational way of thinking and a logical methodology is required. In the Islamic tradition, two main attitudes existed. One was the rational, the other, the traditional, which has

⁵ Emanuel Sivan, Radical Islam, op.cit., pp. 21-42 (Hebrew version)

dominated Islamic thought for centuries. The rational approach was pushed to the fringes of Islamic thought, except for a short period when the modernists attempted to combine rational methodology with Islam. On these grounds, the objections in modern Islamic circles to the religious establishment can be understood (see Chapter 5).

Modern Islamic thinkers made efforts to transfer the leadership from the learned (ulema) to the modern religious intellectuals who were better equipped, so it was argued, with social sensitivity and the intellectual tradition which was needed to solve social problems. Two things are related; the rejection of the ulema did not encourage rational thinking (except in the earlier case of Muhammad Abduh and his school). In addition, by arguing that the modern intellectual is better equipped to solve their problems, they admitted that the knowledge of Western thought was important to the creation of modern thought.

The connection of the modern intellectual with the belief in and the will to solve the problems of society takes us to the next issue - the connection between the social situation and political-religious ideology. The foregoing discussion shows that there are causal connections between historical events and the evolution of an ideology. The writers under review responded to the socio-political climate in their work and so doing contributed to and reinforced the changes which were occurring. Since the intellectuals and the ideologists of the three trends of thought were active within society and politics, their writings were always in response to events and represented a continuous attempt to reshape them.

The existence of a connection between religion and social or political protest has already been established. In the early 1920's, when political problems such as the humiliation of an occupation by foreign nations were burning issues, the champions of protest were the nationalists, led by Atatürk. It was the Sultan and the religious establishment who had humiliated the Ottomans. The popular political protest therefore derived its support from religious circles who established a

link between Islamic protests and nationalism. There was a sort of ideological contract between the nationalists and the Islamists in this early stage of the republic. However, disappointment came soon. The nationalists abandoned the temporary alliance and decided to secularize society. In addition, social and economic conditions in Turkey continued to be difficult and at the peak of the economic crisis, in the 1970s, social protest which was voiced through Islamic channels increased in intensity.

In the Turkey of the 1980's, where social gaps widened in urban areas and the problems of unemployment, inflation and poverty were increasing, the subject of protest was social justice. Since, as Mardin suggests, many of the underprivileged chose to express their protest through the channel of religion, the connections between socialist theories, especially Marxism, and Islam became strong. This process was also found in Christian Third World countries. Here the combination of the struggle for social justice and religion with the rejection of the religious establishment created what is known as liberation theology. It can be argued that a similar process happened in Islam and that ideas presented today in circles like Girişim and by writers like Ali Bulaç represent the Islamic version of liberation theology.

The process described caused the nationalist right to become discredited in modern Islamic circles. The nationalists now represented and identified themselves with the establishment. The rise and decline of the Motherland Party in the 1980's is a good example of this process. There is no doubt that the party enjoyed much support from the religious sector. This was a deliberately engineered move by Özal to allow representatives of this sector to share power and, by doing so, to both enjoy its support and to control it. However, the inability of the government to improve the socio-economic situation of its supporters, in addition to the party's internal change of leadership, which brought the liberals to power and pushed aside the Islamists, appears to have caused the rejection of the party by religious voters. It seems that the ideology which attempted to combine

nationalism and Islam was rejected.⁶

One of the conclusions to be drawn is that there is no necessary connection between the kind of political ideology, or more precisely, the advocated political order and Islam. The second is that the relationships between Islam and political ideology can be viewed in two ways: as ideology in the service of Islam, and as Islam as a tool in the hands of ideologists. The relationship between nationalism and Islam at a theoretical level was reviewed in Chapter 3. The fact that there is no precise definition of nationalism reflects disagreements about its nature. Nationalism, as it was generally understood in the Middle East, was the demand that a nation should have the right to express itself and determine the nature of its political regime. Nationalism was not seen as a substitute for religion, though its origin is in secularism and liberalism. It was seen as a form of political order. The compatibility of such a political order with religion is uneasy, since religion is universal and nationalism is particular. Nevertheless, theoretically it is not impossible. The question is whether Islam determined a specific political order. The answers are varied, both in the existing academic research and among Muslims. On a theoretical level, it can be argued that the more religion is occupied with the transcendental world, the less it is concerned with the political system. Therefore, nationalism is more likely to be accepted by the conservative ulema and to be rejected by the modern Muslim intellectuals who replaced the traditional leadership of the ulema. Although the synthesis of political theory, based on particularism, and a religion such as Islam, which is based on universalism, had already been attempted at the beginning of the century, its synthesis has always been heavily criticized. Today there is a tendency to reject it in favour of other options.

The question is, naturally, whether Islam determines political theory. This is a controversial issue. The answer depends on our definition of Islam and, more importantly, on the way Muslims define and understand it. It appeared that in Turkey, besides the attempts in conservative Islamic

⁶ Although it is possible that the voters were merely disappointed with the government's economic performance.

circles to advocate an Islamic-Turkish synthesis, most Islamists rejected the idea of a nation-state within the geographical boundaries of Anatolia. Even among the Aydınlar Ocağı members, there was no determined position in this issue. Some of them pushed towards the pan-Turkist solution, which was based on ethnicity rather than on geographical territory.

The theological concept which this rejection is based upon is tevhid, which was always the most important principle in Islam. However, in the modern period, particularly since Ali Shariati, tevhid has taken on a new meaning and importance. For the purpose of the present enquiry, the importance of tevhid lies in its implementation as a social and political order, that is to say, a complete rejection of all particularities and divisions of different communities of all forms. This has acquired the status of a religious value and commandment, hence the idea of nation-states is strongly contested. Following this logic, ethnic particularity, which is advocated by some members of the Islamic movement, is rejected as well. However, the creation of an Islamic Turkish state or confederation, based on the Turkic people of the former USSR could in theory be accepted as an interim solution (see Chapter 7).

Does this mean that the nation-state is in danger? It is impossible to answer this question, and no answer is attempted here. The intention was to determine the dominant ideologies which directed the political movement in Turkey which defined itself as religious. The purpose was the examination of their evaluation of the existing political order. To determine its implications, there was a need to investigate the 'Other'- the secular community. In addition it would also be necessary to establish whether political declarations and beliefs necessarily lead to the corresponding political behaviour by those concerned.

Another issue to be investigated with regard to political claims and their implications is the position of the tarikats. Their influence on Turkish society was significant for a long time but the understanding of their involvement and relevance to the political process since the 1950's became

vital. An investigation of the political ideology advocated by those different tarikats may either change the received picture or confirm it. This enquiry highlights other issues which should be examined. One of these is the possibility that the attempts of the government to create, adopt and advocate the quietist version of Islam, caused the identification of quietism with the establishment, and therefore discredited it.

Another topic is the role of the intellectual in society. Were those ideologues or intellectuals whose work is analyzed in this investigation products of the social condition? These were not traditional intellectuals standing on the edge of society, occupied with mysticism which was forbidden to the ordinary people. They were modern intellectuals, whose main occupation was the social-political existence in this world. They acted in response to a certain situation and attempted to improve it through their writings and actions. All three of those examined are intellectuals whose main occupation was society and politics. Two opposed the established order, what is termed as 'intellectual descendant' by Nettle⁷. The third - the Aydınlar Ocağı - were the 'carriers' of tradition, according to the definition of Shils and Eisenstadt⁸. For all three examples success was noted, in the popularity of their books as in the case of Ali Bulaç, and the votes won in the elections for parliament, as in the case of Erbakan, and in the laws passed in parliament, as in the case of the Aydınlar Ocağı.

Another subject which this debate addresses is the issue of Sunni-Shi'i relations. The amount of literature translated from Persian into Turkish in the last decade, especially of Shariati, is impressive. Even though many believers would not accept the attempt to present a universal version of Islam, the influence of Shi'i ideas can hardly be doubted. On the other hand, those who present

⁷ J.P. Nettle, "Ideas, Intellectuals and Structures of Dissent", in P. Rieff (ed.), (Garden City, N.Y, 1969) pp. 3-24.

⁸ Edward Shils, "Intellectuals", in L.Sills (ed.), International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.7 (New York, 1968) pp.399-415; S.N Eisenstadt, "Intellectuals and Tradition", in S.N. Eisenstadt and S.R Graubard (eds.), Intellectuals and Tradition (N.Y, 1973), pp.1-19.

such a universal picture do not try to deal seriously with the contradictions and difficulties involved in such a synthesis. A related topic, which has yet to be investigated, is that of the relations between parts of the leftist movement and parts of the Islamist circle. Both relations with the leftists and with the Shi'ites, it can be argued, could be explained by reference to the social background. In all three cases, socialism, Shi'ism and Islamism, the focus is now centred around social justice and the fight for its realisation.

It is also worth noticing that there are many similarities in the evolution of Christian and Islamic theology. It can therefore be suggested that a useful methodology could be drawn from research on Christian theology, particularly in Latin America. Revivalism is a world-wide movement and the underprivileged people in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East face similar problems of poor social, political and economic conditions.

Turkey is not isolated, and should not be viewed as disconnected from the Muslim world. The Turkey of the 1980's was a melting pot of different Western and Islamist influences. The relatively liberal line advocated by Özal in the 1980's strengthened this process of pluralism. Turkish Islam is dynamic, and the ideas which it promoted were sometimes new, original and attractive to much of the population. However, its ultimate destination is unclear, and it is doubtful whether Islamic reform necessarily means the adoption of rational ways of thought. It is also unclear how such dynamism will affect relations between Islam and the West. It may be concluded that there is no way back, but this does not mean that progress necessarily means westernization or rationalization.

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Abbreviations

<i>AA</i>	Asian Affairs
<i>ASQ</i>	Arab Studies Quarterly
<i>AAS</i>	Asian and African Studies
<i>AHR</i>	American Historical Review
<i>AQ</i>	Anthropological Quarterly
<i>BRISMES</i>	British Society for Middle Eastern Studies
<i>CAS</i>	Central Asian Survey
<i>CTT</i>	Current Turkish Thought
<i>DR</i>	Daily Report
<i>DT</i>	Dateline Turkey
<i>DWI</i>	Die Welt des Islams
<i>EI</i>	Encyclopedia of Islam
<i>EI2</i>	Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition
<i>sEI</i>	Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam
<i>FT</i>	Financial Times
<i>IA</i>	International Affairs
<i>IJMES</i>	International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
<i>IJTS</i>	International Journal of Turkish Studies
<i>IS</i>	International Studies
<i>ISSJ</i>	International Social Science Journal
<i>JCH</i>	Journal of Contemporary History
<i>JDS</i>	Journal of Development Studies
<i>MECS</i>	Middle East Contemporary Survey
<i>MEED</i>	Middle East Economic Digest
<i>MEF</i>	Middle East Focus
<i>MEI</i>	Middle East International
<i>MEJ</i>	The Middle East Journal
<i>MER</i>	Middle East Report

<i>MES</i>	Middle Eastern Studies
<i>MET</i>	Middle East Times
<i>MG</i>	Milli Gazete
<i>MW</i>	Muslim World
<i>NLR</i>	New Left Review
<i>NME</i>	New Middle East
<i>RMES</i>	Review of Middle Eastern Studies
<i>SRWA</i>	Swiss Review of World Affairs
<i>TWQ</i>	Third World Quarterly

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